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Abstract  
 
 In the 1960s and 1970s many Americans of widely dissimilar motivations used the study 
of possible futures as an open forum to express their desires, fears, and visions. Their efforts led 
to new organizations, publications, conferences, and university programs, which constituted an 
intellectual movement with far-reaching influences. The emergence of post-WWII futurism is a 
multi-stranded history involving people with diverse motivations and backgrounds who aspired 
to revolutionize policymaking at all levels. Their efforts crossed national borders and often 
transcended Cold War divisions. Many futurists hailed from governmental, business, or scientific 
backgrounds and advocated for issues ranging from national economic planning boards, or 
“future-consciousness” at corporate levels of decision-making, to sustainable ecological 
practices.  
One of their many historical strands went back to the early Cold War years and the 
philosopher-mathematicians employed by the RAND Corporation. Given the sensitive 
forecasting challenges brought by Cold War unknowns, these architects of futurist 
methodologies believed they needed to devise better – more scientific – opinion technologies. 
Their search for improving the tools, such as the Delphi method, of future-minded decision-
making continued into the 1960s and 1970s. While qualitative assessments still reigned supreme 
in the social sciences, quantitative analysis became increasingly important during the 1960s. 
Futurists used social, political, and economic indicators to study alternative futures and comment 
on their presents. These futures researchers prized the quantification of past and present values 
both for physical and social concepts. From these numbers, they aspired to clarify the future: 
how to predict and understand it, and ultimately how to change it for the better. 
v 
 
 
 
Futurists cared about many things, not only about perfecting their methodologies or 
epistemic foundations, but also about addressing current, pragmatic, and popular issues. The 
desire to disseminate their ideas more widely and have their methodology gain greater influence 
compelled futurists to organize and formalize their field. The field‟s momentum slowed down by 
the 1980s as many critics disapproved of futurist methods and the deterministic, wishful, or 
simplistic outlooks that some futurists imagined. Although the movement in the United States 
was unique, other international case-studies developed in distinct yet comparable ways. 
Although futures researchers around the globe for centuries had enjoyed speculating about the 
future, this twentieth-century movement promised better predictions that were more systematic, 
detailed, controlled, quantitative, and expert. 
 
1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“Leaving utopians and science-fiction writers far behind,” stated a 1966 Time magazine 
article, “a growing number of professionals have made prophecy a serious and highly organized 
enterprise.”1 This news piece titled, THE FUTURISTS: Looking Toward A.D. 2000, surveyed a 
variety of forecasting studies and organizations dedicated to studying the future and argued for 
an increasing trend of interest in the future. This essay sampled several futures studies and drew 
attention to newly emerging professionals called “futurists.”  
This was one of many contemporary commentaries about the inception of futures studies 
as a new political forum. Over the decade spanning roughly from 1965 to 1975, futurists 
published, organized, and debated in unprecedented numbers. One of their defining rallying calls 
was to deal with the rapid technological advancement that Alvin Toffler, among many others, 
popularized with his 1970 book Future Shock. Fear of Cold War tensions, but also disgust of the 
existence of a Cold War right after the Second World War, also motivated futurists to rally. The 
Cold War paradigm defined the outlooks of many futurists, which centered on predictions for the 
nuclear arms and space exploration races.  Other observers shifted their focus of analysis beyond 
military and international political tensions, to concentrate on assessing the futures of more 
broadly-defined ecological, industrial, or technological issues. 
The arguments and writings of these 1960s and 1970s futurists built on work conducted 
in America‟s post-World War Two military-affiliated think-tanks, which played a nurturing role 
for the research and development of many futures studies methodologies. In particular, the 
RAND Corporation exemplified the government‟s commitment to expertise, based on the 
principle of bringing together scientists and putting them in a government-funded facility with 
                                                                 
1
 “THE FUTURISTS: Looking Toward A.D. 2000” Time, Friday, Feb. 25, 1966) 
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the assignment to think about “what‟s important.” 2  It was RAND‟s researchers who created and 
developed specific methodologies for quantifying unknown variables that set the foundation for 
futures studies. Their approach quickly won converts in the military arena, where secret forecasts 
had influenced policy recommendations for some time.3 
The Cold War era created an especially intense focus on the future. By the late 1960s, the 
newly emerging field of social and technological inquiry seemed to promise a novel response to 
post-industrial growing pains.  This professional interest in scientific forecasts of complex multi-
dimensional questions had expanded beyond RAND and federal agencies to reach public notice. 
What changed during the late 1960s was the focus of forecasts and the sheer quantity of them. 
This emerging “enterprise” of studying the future, as the Time article described it, inaugurated a 
distinctly future-minded social commentary. Following principles such as the acting in light of 
desirable future images or scenarios, and a belief in the multiplicity of futures, reflected the 
field‟s self-definition. The plural name of “futures studies,” as opposed to “future studies” that 
would seek to forecast the one future, encouraged alternative thinking and alternative 
perspectives about the future. Futures studies attracted a diverse following, drawing contributors 
from a wide range of disciplines, who had dramatically different motivations and political 
beliefs. Futurists utilized this open forum and produced futures research in larger quantities than 
ever before. 
According to the Time piece, these futurists presented “a view of man not only in total 
control of his environment but of his own brain and his own evolution.” This commentary, as 
much as some of the futures studies it referred to, reflected the technological determinism, and 
                                                                 
2
 Olaf Helmer, Oral History Interview with Olaf Helmer, conducted by Kaya Tolon, Deposited in the Olaf Helmer 
Folder at the University of Southern California Archives, 2009) (Appendix 1) 
3
 United States National Intelligence Council (NIC) forecasts and policy recommendations. Accessed on March 30, 
2011 from:  http://www.foia.cia.gov/nic_geo.asp  
3 
 
 
 
optimism (not to mention gender-bias) of the 1960s futurists. Even as many of these futurists 
warned that the post-WWII world was facing increasing social, political, and environmental 
challenges, they nonetheless remained optimistic, declaring that the number of technological 
solutions to the many problems had also increased.4 Time‟s author(s) portrayed the futurists as 
having a “can do” attitude towards global problems, and as advocating for a “technological 
reassertion of free will.”5 
But the futurists‟ motivations were much more diverse than simply understanding how 
rapid change impacted society, or how to rationalize the future in order to seek solutions to the 
problems of their time. The ranks of 1960s-1970s futurists ranged from Senators to government 
analysts; from environmentalists to technocrats; from Republicans to Democrats – and 
consequently, they pushed different agendas. This open forum provided an avenue for eco-
futurists to worry about the future of the earth, for technophiles to be dazzled by the possibilities 
of space-exploration, and for any future-minded person to warn against and worry about a 
myriad of other issues such as rising world population, limitation of natural resources, impact of 
industrialization – or impact of post-industrialization as sociologist Daniel Bell argued in his 
1973 book The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. 
The Time article highlighted the emerging interest in the future, as much as it 
foreshadowed the way that the momentum on this “highly organized enterprise” would continue 
to build and intensify. During the 1970s, the “futures studies movement” established many 
national and international organizations, held sizeable and attention-getting conferences, and 
started publishing magazines, journals, and books. As one futurist reflected in 1977, his peers 
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had founded more institutions and journals in the past decade than ever before. By tracing 
society memberships, formation of new organizations etc., and various indicators of interest in 
the future since the beginning of the twentieth century, this futurist spotted trends of interest in 
the future. According to his data on the use of words such as „future‟ or „tomorrow,‟ or the 
abstract listing under future- or forecasting-related headings in indices, this futurist identified 
ebbs and flows in society‟s interest in the future and projected “a rather steep rise in interest in 
the future” during 1977-1987.6 
More than just providing an open forum for thinkers to brainstorm about their forecasts of 
solutions to major issues, many futurists aspired to found a field of inquiry based on science and 
numbers. While the argument that “future-consciousness,” or “interest in the future” surged 
during the years of the futures studies movement can easily be supported qualitatively, this 
futurist tried to ascertain this by quantifying and fitting statistical or other scientific approaches 
onto indicators of such a social concept. After all, what was “future-consciousness” and how 
could you measure such a notion, let alone predict it for the next ten years? During this time, the 
methodologists among the futurist community tried to build an epistemological foundation for 
the “inexact science” of studying possible futures.7 
One researcher who had been most influential in establishing some of the original 
prediction methodologies back during the early Cold War years was the mathematician and 
operations researcher Olaf Helmer. This philosopher-mathematician worked at the RAND 
Corporation from shortly after its inception in 1946 until 1968. The organizational climate of the 
early years of the RAND Corporation encouraged collaborative and interdisciplinary research, 
and Helmer worked on a variety of futures and game-theory related projects, along with other 
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 Roger D. Evered, “Interest in the Future: A Search for Useable Measures” Futures 9.4 (1977) 299 
7
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civilian Cold War scientists. As RAND‟s nature shifted in the late 1960s, Helmer left to help 
start an organization called The Institute for the Future (IFTF).  He also briefly worked in 
academia as the Harold Quinton Professor of Futures Research, a post created in connection with 
the establishment of the Center for Futures Research at the University of Southern California 
between 1973 and 1976. Helmer continued to contribute to futures research, and in 1984 
compiled his various essays in the book Looking Forward, which set out his vision of ideal 
“generic methods of exploring the future and the application of such methods to long-range 
planning.”8  Helmer stated that futurist methodologies were not just useful for futurists, but to 
“anyone professionally engaged in planning the future of a given area or organization or activity, 
be it international trade, human values, criminal justice, computer applications, warfare, space 
exploration, a particular country, a particular city, a particular corporation, or whatever.”9 
During my oral history interview with Olaf Helmer, I was surprised to hear his notion of 
who the futurists were. Though he had the utmost respect and affection for his colleague Herman 
Kahn, Helmer did not consider him a futurist. While Kahn popularized scenario-writing as well 
as long-range forecasting, Helmer noted that Kahn‟s focus was not to contribute to the 
fundamentals – methodology or philosophy – of the field of futures studies. Others in the field, 
however, took a wider view than Helmer and defined their ranks more inclusively. Michael 
Marien, editor of Future Survey, pointed out that many futures researchers did not consider 
themselves futurists.  Marien lamented that futurists needed no credentials whatsoever to study 
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 Olaf Helmer, Looking Forward: A Guide to Futures Research, (CA: Sage Publications 1983) 15 
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the future, and proceeded to argue that futurists were “specialists in generalities, integrators of 
knowledge, thinkers who emphasize breadth, and educators at large.”10 
Helmer ardently believed that futures studies was a normative field within operations 
research. This meant that futurists aimed to assist decision-makers by aggregating knowledge in 
the most expert and desirable way possible. While he distinguished between hard and soft 
sciences, Helmer proposed the premise that data gathered from social and physical sciences were 
equally inexact. This concept allowed for the epistemological foundation onto which futures 
research and futures methodologies would be built.11 Accepting Helmer‟s premise necessitated 
the systematic aggregation of expert knowledge, which led him and other futurists to develop 
social technologies and opinion technologies. Helmer, along with a couple of other colleagues 
from the RAND Corporation, wrote a book about the former called Social Technology in 1966, 
in which he maintained that social sciences were as capable of producing technologies as 
physical sciences.12 Another RAND mathematician and futures methodologist Norman Dalkey 
referred to “opinion technologies” in the 1960s, but only in passing in a footnote without stating 
who coined the term and why.13 This less articulated expression of “opinion technologies,” 
however, better described the methodological hurdles futurists faced in utilizing data gathered 
from experts.  
Opinion technologies were methods that could be used to manipulate, compile, and 
express individual judgments. Helmer, Dalkey and their fellow Cold War scientists embraced 
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 Michael Marien, “The Good-Books Imperative: Keeping up in Futures Studies” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, (Special Issue: The Future Trends into the Twenty-First Century, edited by 
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 Olaf Helmer, Oral History Interview with Olaf Helmer, conducted by Kaya Tolon, Deposited in the Olaf Helmer 
Folder at the University of Southern California Archives, 2009) (Appendix 1); D. Aligica, R. Herritt Epistemology, 
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 Norman C. Dalkey, The Delphi Method: An Experimental Study of Group Opinion , RAND Publication RM-5888-
PR (June 1969), vii. 
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opinion technologies as objective procedures for collecting, quantifying, and resolving 
differences in experts' opinions on highly-complex subjects, such as the outcome of a nuclear 
exchange or the social impact of dwindling natural resources. This concept of “opinion 
technologies” nicely draws on the field of history of technology‟s intellectual embrace of 
technologies as not just machines or devices, but as ideas, designs and means of transferring 
information.14 
One of these opinion technologies was the Delphi Method, developed by Helmer and his 
RAND Corporation colleagues in the early 1950s as a response to Cold War pressures. This 
method produced a consensus of judgments made by a group of experts in a systematic and 
controlled manner. By answering iterations of the same quantitative questionnaire, these experts 
revised their previous responses after only seeing an anonymous edited compilation of all 
experts‟ judgments. The Delphi method was an important thread of futures studies, because as 
the signature forecasting technique, it defined the futurists and revealed their desire to study the 
future in a sterilized, scientific, and controlled way.  
Theodore Jay Gordon, a colleague of Helmer at the RAND Corporation, developed and 
worked on many other futures methodologies.  Gordon, regarded by a fellow futurist as “Mr. 
Methodology,”15 distinguished between normative forecasts that produced desirable outlooks, 
and exploratory forecasts that produced plausible forecasts.16 Futures methodologies such as 
scenarios, genius forecasting, or Delphi surveys, could be used for both normative and 
exploratory forecasts, while statistical methods such as modeling, trend-impact analysis, and 
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 Norman C. Dalkey, The Delphi Method: An Experimental Study of Group Opinion, RAND Publication RM-5888-
PR (June 1969), vii.  
15
 Fabienne Goux-Baudiment, Oral History Interview with Fabienne Goux-Baudiment by Kaya Tolon (Paris, 
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time series analysis could be used for exploratory forecasts. Gordon described the purpose of 
futures research methodologies as “to provide early warning about problems that might lie ahead, 
to help identify and evaluate policies, and to illustrate the futures that are attainable.”17 Although 
the Delphi method spread far outside the military forecasting paradigm, it was not the most 
popular futures methodology. For example, scenarios by Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener 
reached a far wider audience than calculations produced in any Delphi study at the time. But 
none of the other methods embodied futurists‟ ambitions to envision the future through an 
objective lense as well as the Delphi method. 
The Cold War lent weight to the whole notion of expertise in America; experts enjoyed 
an authoritative and venerated image, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. The Delphi 
method, along with other methods such as “genius forecasting,” which basically required only a 
genius, highlighted the premium that futurists placed on expert knowledge. But while Helmer 
and other methodologists saw expert opinion as a desirable source for obtaining forecasts, their 
opinion technologies – excluding the genius forecasting method – were ultimately designed to 
control and diminish the role of the all-knowing expert. Their methods, according to WFS 
founder and president Edward Cornish, grew more sophisticated by the 1970s, and thereby 
supplemented futurism requisites such as expertise and common sense.18 
  
Much of the historical literature currently available on the “futures studies movement” 
has been produced by members of the futurist community themselves. Edward Cornish‟s 1977 
book The Study of the Future: An Introduction to the Art and Science of Understanding and 
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Shaping Tomorrow‟s World was the definitive primer to futures studies and remained so for 
many years. In this single-volume introductory text, Cornish traced the history of futurism and its 
modern formalization and explained its goals, methods, and principles. Because of his 
background in journalism, Cornish thoroughly studied his own field. So, this source serves as an 
excellent starting place for studying the history of Cold War futurism, and the futures studies 
movement. Yet, written shortly after the movement, by one of the pioneering futurists of the 
time, this book is too close to the new field. As a practitioner‟s history The Study of the Future, 
also occasionally suffers from self-aggrandizement of futurist efforts. 
A more thorough introduction was provided by the founding editor of Future Survey, in 
the form of a suggested reading list.19 Marien divided his “introductory list” of over a hundred 
books into five categories: environmental, global, domestic, technological, and methodological. 
Despite his recommendations of certain books over others as an introduction to futures thinking 
in particular topics, Marien stressed the evolving nature of futurist literature, and how newer 
books in futures studies were usually better. With his list, Marien made a strong case for the 
impossibility of getting acquainted with the field of futures studies with just a single book, and 
warned that the fast pace of literature development risked quickly leaving observers out-of-
date.20 
Futurists wrote many other practitioner‟s histories and introductory volumes through the 
1990s and into the twenty first century, leading in 2003/2004 to Wendell Bell‟s two-volume 
Foundations of Futures Studies: Human Science for a New Era. The first volume had the 
subtitle, History, Purposes, and Knowledge, and covered the emergence of futures studies by 
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 Michael Marien, “The Good-Books Imperative: Keeping up in Futures Studies” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, (Special Issue: The Future Trends into the Twenty-First Century, edited by 
Joseph F. Coates and Jennifer Jarratt)  (July 1992) 140-151 
20
  For a few other seminal futures studies publications s ee Michel Godet – Memory of the Future list of 
fundamental futures texts. Accessed on March 30, 2011 from: http://en.laprospective.fr/memory-of-the-future.html 
10 
 
 
 
questioning many of the same issues that Cornish did in his The Study of the Future, with a more 
comprehensive and international flare. Bell‟s second volume, titled Values, Objectivity, and the 
Good Society complemented the background on the field by introducing aspiring futurists to the 
ethics of forecasting, concerns of objectivity, and considerations in judging preferable futures. 
Many of the futurists involved in the key organizations of the futures studies movement 
wrote articles, memoirs, or even special editions in journals dedicated to their own histories. 
Edward Cornish wrote a memoir about the early years of his society, which was published over 
the course of several issues of the magazine The Futurist in 2007.21 Futurists involved in the 
World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF), including Jim Dator and Wendell Bell, published 
articles and memoirs in a special 2005 issue of the journal Futures22. 
While futurist publications throughout the Cold War decades contained abundant 
reflections and projections based on historical analyses, not all contained thorough analyses of 
their historical contexts. Studying past futurists has grown to become a small but lively historical 
subject, with even an online magazine called Paleo-future, put together by Matt Novak, a 
blogger of past visions of the future. In her dissertation, Jamie Pietruska traced the late 
nineteenth century U.S. histories of weather forecasting by the Weather Bureau, crop forecasting 
by the U.S.D.A., Edward Bellamy‟s literary prophesying, and fortune telling.23 She argued that 
propheteering during the late nineteenth century in America was not a deterministic or esoteric 
endeavor, but one that was shaped by the culture and one in which the actors, after seeking 
predictability, came to accept the unpredictability of their futures.  
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More pertinent to the futures studies movement discussed in this dissertation, Lawrence 
R. Samuel wrote a cultural history of Americans and how observers of different periods regarded 
the future. In his 2009 book titled Future, Samuel looked at the twentieth century through a 
panoramic lens, jumping from one future-related event, idea, or product without relating these 
efforts to how futurists organized. As he put it, Samuel looked at each period of U.S. history 
post-1920, and dissected the way that different thinkers predicted the future, as it related to the 
six areas of public/civic, popular/consumer culture, economic/business, travel/transport, 
architecture/cities, and science/technology. 24 The strength of his analysis was in showcasing the 
different cultural expressions of futurist concepts and their diverse motivations.  
Samuel saw the futures studies movement – he described it as the emergence of “new 
futurism” – as an adolescent field that grew up in the mid 1970s. But his historical analysis 
neglected the vital role of the mid-century methodologists, who laid the intellectual and social 
foundation for the popularization of the field.  In this dissertation, I will be studying futurism 
through a much more focused lens, analyzing why and how the field originated and became 
formalized in the middle of the Cold War. In contrast to Samuel‟s timeline, I argue that the 
think-tanks and forecasts that emerged in the 1960s constituted the growing-up of the field. It 
was the earlier efforts by RAND Corporation philosopher-mathematicians to develop the Delphi 
method and similar futures research methods that constituted the adolescent years of futures 
studies, those earlier decades that produced the philosophical tracts which defined a new set of 
epistemological foundations for studying the future. 25    
In his concluding remarks, Samuel expressed his preference against most of the analytical 
approaches of futurism, arguing the most successful futurists had been those who used their 
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imaginations and creativity rather than scientific approaches.26 While his evidence was valid, his 
argument that futurists ought to position themselves as an art rather than as a science, and write 
fiction rather than non-fiction, failed to see the impact of scientific approaches. For it missed an 
important historical influence of the analytical futurist efforts, which was the grey influence; the 
use and spread of futurist methods and data, and the impact this had on governing and managing. 
The futures studies movement accomplished this task of raising future-mindedness at many 
levels of policy-making, while also formalizing their field and generating popular awareness of 
concerns about world problems and possible futures. 
 
There are several difficulties in finding the right sources for writing the Cold War history 
of such a broad field as futures studies in the United States. The first challenge lies in the fact 
that, though this was primarily an American history, in more than one way the emergence of this 
field crossed international borders. Its content spanned most subjects and most countries, but 
more importantly, contributors to futures scholarship also hailed from around the world. From 
the movement‟s inception, international thinkers such as Gaston Berger and Bertrand de 
Jouvenel strongly influenced the emerging futurists in the U.S. Many early futur ists in the U.S. 
were first generation immigrants who had left the old world to escape Nazism, including Olaf 
Helmer, Ossip Flechtheim (who coined the term futurology) and John von Neumann. This 
inherent diversity of the American futurists makes categorizations such as the American school 
of thought in futures research a fuzzy idea, because there were many futurist schools of thought 
in America. 
                                                                 
26
 Lawrence R. Samuel, Future, (University of Texas Press, 2009) 204 
13 
 
 
 
Another difficulty arises from futurists having failed to establish an academic discipline, 
and a corresponding library subject section.27 Instead of unifying the commonalities and futures-
thinking principles they believed in, futurists embraced their interdisciplinary diversity and 
independence, which led to futures-related sources being disorganized.  
Understandably, futurist organizations or think-tanks do not have archives as larger 
university or government libraries do. The organizations or academic departments covered in this 
dissertation, either did not have any archives of their own, or had small libraries with incomplete 
selections of publications and proceedings. Although not explicitly a futures organization, even a 
think tank of RAND Corporation‟s size does not have a public library of primary and secondary 
futures literature accessible to the average historian.28 WFS, which operated for many years in 
the home of Edward Cornish, similarly did not have an organized archive. 
However, I was able to sift through the limited materials in the University of Southern 
California archives, which had relevant information on Olaf Helmer and the Center for Futures 
Research from the 1970s. Also, I was able to research in the library of the Futures Studies 
Department in the Corvinus University in Budapest, Hungary. This two-room office/library had a 
selection of various American newsletters and journals and nearly three thousand books on 
futures studies, a majority of which were in Hungarian. 
Ultimately, newspaper articles, monographs, newsletters, and journals, in particular 
Futures, as the flagship (and as the only peer-reviewed) publication of the field, provided the 
best set of primary sources for understanding the history of the futures-studies movement. I also 
                                                                 
27
 According to Jim Dator, the lack of a designated library subject area greatly contributed to the failure to establish 
futures studies as a distinct academic discipline. Jim Dator, “The WFSF and I”  Futures 37 (2005) 371–385 
28
 Assuming the RAND archives would be a boon for studying the history of futures studies I tried to access material 
at the RAND archives in 2009, but was told they did not have any archival documents, other than material accessible 
on-line publicly, that related to Project DELPHI, the emergence of the Delphi method, or any of the other projects, 
or papers by the scientists who invented this opinion technology. E-mail correspondence with Vivian Arterbery of 
the RAND archives, May 2009. 
14 
 
 
 
benefited greatly from three oral history interviews that I conducted in 2009: with Olaf Helmer, a 
pivotal character in the history of futures studies in the U.S., with Fabienne Goux-Baudiment, a 
past president of the WFSF, and Erzsébet Nováky, a veteran futurist from Hungary. The 
transcripts of the first two can be found in appendices 1 and 2 respectively.  
 
In this dissertation, the first two of five chapters concentrate respectively on the first and 
second decades of the Cold War, tracing development of the Delphi method and its influence on 
ideas of scientific forecasting in military and government circles. Chapter three highlights the 
many strands and motivations of the futurists, as the futures studies movement expanded during 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Chapter four examines the organizations, conferences, 
publications and the formalization of the field of futures studies, and also briefly the post-
movement years. The fifth and final chapter compares international developments in futures 
studies with those in the United States. 
In the first chapter, I examine the birth of futures studies during the early Cold War era. 
The new realities of the post-WWII era prompted scientists and politicians to look anew at the 
future, placing a priority on addressing the challenges of post-WWII reconstruction efforts, the 
apparent threat of Communist aggression, and the nuclear weapons age. The U.S. Air Force in 
particular became a patron for development of new futures methodologies, amidst Cold War 
unknowns, and a lack of ways for dealing with these unknowns. It was an era when the fate of 
the world seemed to turn on complex variables such as the size and power of the Soviet nuclear 
arsenal. Delphi fulfilled the urgent need to quantify and speculate about such unknowns in a way 
that the RAND philosopher-mathematicians argued was the most objective and scientific way 
possible. This method from the early 1950s yielded not only an estimate of a potential Soviet 
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threat, but a seminal intellectual contribution to futures methodologies. During the first decade of 
the Cold War, futurists concerned about non-military matters were few and disorganized. 
The second chapter looks at the impact of nuclear and space exploration developments on 
the outlooks of futurists, and the ways in which these thinkers began to apply futures 
methodologies such as the Delphi method to problems other than quantifying the risk of nuclear 
apocalypse. In particular, this chapter examines an influential long-range forecasting study 
conducted at the RAND Corporation in 1963 that addressed broad issues such as population 
growth, space exploration, and more. This 1963 Delphi study, facilitated by Helmer and Gordon, 
had technologically deterministic, occidental, and over-simplifying undertones, and inspired 
1960s futurists to imagine the future in a systematic and scientific way. 
The third chapter examines the third decade of the Cold War, when futurism, with its 
emphasis on scientific and technological expertise, thrived.  A time of tremendous societal and 
governmental change, the years between 1965 and 1975 rightly qualify as an intellectual 
movement for futurists. I highlight the diversity contained within the broad “futures studies 
movement” by identifying different actors, their many motivations, and the nature of their 
movement. Eco-futurists, future-minded politicians, Cold War strategists, and the philosopher-
mathematicians from the RAND Corporation, made up some of the distinct historical threads of 
the movement, and they voiced a diversity of opinions, measurements, estimations, and 
prognostications in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Together these futurists of sundry motivations 
contributed to the open forum generated by the futures studies movement.  
Futurists cared about a variety of issues, but they were unified in the belief that decision-
makers needed to consider possible futures systematically and scientifically. As futurists 
transitioned from military scenarios to civilian outlooks, their involvement expanded to 
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industrial, domestic, and international arenas. Another important part of the movement was the 
increasing drive toward quantification and rationalization of the rapid changes in society. The 
influence of futures thinking helped spur new government efforts to collect social indicator data, 
provide reports on technology assessment, and with the help of the National Science Foundation, 
fund social sciences. The methodologists, futurists who primarily thought about how to study the 
future and how to establish a strong epistemic foundation for the field, were also part of this 
drive to rationalize.  
Chapter four continues the examination of the futures studies movement by focusing on 
the pioneering organizations, meetings, and publications of the field. In particular, the World 
Future Society (WFS), the World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF), and the Institute for the 
Future (IFTF) led the formalization of futurists and helped the diverse members to interact and 
debate their issues. The fourth chapter also transitions into the post-movement years and 
analyzes why the field lost some of its earlier momentum during the 1970s. The first of four 
reasons was that increasingly visible critics denounced the futurists for showing intellectually-
misguided optimism, determinism, and use of pseudo-scientific methodologies. Second, as the 
discussion of certain methodologies matured, the use of opinion technologies lost its earlier 
novelty. Third, futurists were in a seemingly continual identity crisis; their internal divisions and 
lack of rigorous professional identification ultimately weakened them. And fourth, despite their 
ambitions, they could not establish futures studies as a distinct academic discipline. The end of 
the futures studies movement, however, did not signify the end of the field, as suggested by the 
evidence provided in chapter four. 
In the fifth and final chapter I contrast the post WWII development of futures studies in 
the United States with a sampling of international efforts. Post-WWII forecasters questioned 
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their efforts during the Cold War, whether they worked in despair in war-torn countries in 
Europe, or with optimism in the U.S. futurists. Despite their different ideologies, Soviet and 
American futurists formalized their efforts with some surprisingly similar trends. In most of the 
cases, despite their different political contexts and reasons for studying the future, futurists 
gathered and produced futures research in increasing quantities during the post-WWII years. 
 
Forecasters of hugely different political backgrounds talked about technological change 
and their futures during these post-World War II decades. It is helpful to distinguish between 
different groups. First, the eco-futurists concentrated on environmental issues and were 
especially concerned with the impact of the growing human population on our planet. The 
technological futurists tended to focus on the quantification of complex social issues and produce 
deterministic predictions. Finally, the cultural futurists imaginatively focused on future life-
styles, cultures, and societies. Of course, these three categories are far from rigid; in many cases 
they mesh together and are not terribly helpful in describing the overall climate of the field as a 
whole. The very inclusive nature of futures studies allowed for people from different academic, 
political, and social backgrounds to voice their opinions on possible futures.  
Futures studies harbored intellectuals from wildly different persuasions and therefore 
became a forum for expressing the futurists‟ beliefs on many topics in many forms. Futurists 
used art and science, poems and statistics, science fiction and Delphi panels to focus on defining 
possible futures while analyzing the impacts of ongoing changes. They cared about many things, 
not only about perfecting their methodologies or epistemic foundations, but also about 
addressing current, pragmatic, and popular issues. The desire to disseminate their ideas more 
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widely and have their methodology gain greater influence pushed futurists to organize and 
formalize their field. 
This multi-stranded history was strongly influenced by the angst from the Cold War era. 
Some futurists used the field to shadow and others to transcend the ideological divisions brought 
by the Cold War. With the increasing complexity of technologies, the post-WWII era depended 
on forecasting more heavily. They believed in combining expert opinion and producing 
consensuses, rather than relying on individual judgments. To that end, American futurists 
worked to develop innovative methods, which connected the belief that expert knowledge was 
both valuable and suspect – as something to be systematized and verified.  
The Cold War saw the rise of global organizations such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the United Nations, not to mention the military alliances of NATO and Warsaw Pact, 
amidst increasing world population. As a result of the many post-WWII pressures both 
domestically and internationally, the promise of adding certainty to an uncertain world lent 
weight to the promise of futures studies, drawing respected thinkers and would-be change agents 
to the field. Although people around the globe for centuries had enjoyed speculating about the 
future, this twentieth-century movement promised a more systematic, more detailed and more 
controlled means of prediction. 
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Chapter 1. Post-World War Two Beginnings and Cold War Pressures 
 
In 1953, President of the United States Harry S. Truman allowed himself to look forward 
to a "new era … a wonderful golden age” when U.S. capital and science would be "released from 
the tasks of defense and turned wholly to peaceful purposes all around the world.” Full of hope, 
he exclaimed there would be “no end to what can be done ... [to] do away with poverty and 
human misery everywhere on the earth.” In this farewell address, Truman looked to the future 
with confidence. He had no doubt that the "menace of Communism," which he considered the 
"overriding issue of his time," would eventually be overcome.1 
Futures studies was a new field of social and technological inquiry strongly rooted in 
Cold War strategic thinking. Around the same time when outgoing President Truman examined 
the future, scientists in the employ of the social sciences arm of the U.S. Air Force, the RAND 
Corporation, looked ahead as well. Under the clairvoyant title of “Project DELPHI,” a group of 
mathematicians devised a forecasting technique – the Delphi method – meant to yield a way of 
quantifying, analyzing, and understanding the potential threats of this “menace” that was 
communism. As a new tool for aiding in strategic decision-making, this opinion technology 
provided alternative guidance to decision-makers. Named, or rather misnamed, after the oracles 
of the ancient Greek city of Delphi, these architects of futures studies sought guidance not 
through mythology but through science. They worked toward establishing a scientific foundation 
for forecasting. 
At a time of uncertainty amidst a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union, Cold War 
forecasters devised and used many methods to move ahead with military planning. Delphi in 
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particular provided a welcome peace of mind to authorities as it was able to quantify potential 
threats compiling expert opinion with a scientific aura. This method basically polled experts in 
an anonymous and controlled manner to see if a consensus could be reached. Inventors of Delphi 
viewed this technique of iterating polls as a scientific device that engineered the best possible 
forecast. Rather than any anonymous, controlled iterative questionnaire, the Delphi method 
defined a specific set of processes that yielded the best and most unbiased consensus that the 
RAND philosopher-mathematicians could think of. 
Futurism in general, and Delphi as a key futurist method, emerged during the post-WWII 
pressures and thrived during the Cold War, which begs the question, what was the relation of this 
drive for scientific forecasting and the Cold War? Historians studying the Cold War often 
question if their content of this period should be considered post-World War II, rather than 
specific to the Cold War. This also is a valid concern in a study of futures studies and futurists of 
the 1950s and onward. However, a concept as broad as “studying the future” existed long before 
the twentieth century.  
The Cold War period saw an intensification of interest in the future, especially during the 
decade between the 1960s and 1970s. In order to understand the many forces and actors against 
which the futures studies movement responded, and the reasons for occurring when it did, it is 
necessary to analyze several distinctive historical threads. Some of these roots provide continuity 
in the history of studying the future, such as forecasting efforts in businesses, predicting crop 
yields, or trying to understand meteorological phenomena, but other threads were products of a 
new post-WWII reality.2  
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One of the most important forecasting roots came from Cold War efforts to think 
quantitatively and strategically, which is this chapter‟s focus. One of my arguments is that 
futurist methodologies invented during the early Cold War years reflected the societal pressures 
of the time as much as they influenced the events. But, the story of post-WWII futurists was not 
principally a Cold War story, although the Cold War climate strongly influenced many of the 
actors.  
 
 
a. Overall Context & Start of the Cold War 
 
The Second World War followed a tumultuous four decades in the twentieth century. 
This period included the defeat of the Central Powers during the First World War, the Spanish 
Flu, and the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin‟s efforts to modernize the USSR. Each of these events 
shook the world and cost millions of lives. But the Second World War brought about a whole 
new scale of suffering, destruction, and military mobilization. The Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor awoke the sleeping giant, and Americans rallied with conviction. Although the situation 
was grim in Europe, WWII songs like “The White Cliffs of Dover” gave hope and inspiration to 
the American‟s preparing for battle. “Tomorrow,” the song popularized by Glenn Miller went, 
“when the world is free … there‟ll be love and laughter, and peace ever after.” The battles, more 
than ever, spread into the seas and the air, while huge resources were spent on scientific research 
and the development of new technologies.  
The seeds of the futures studies movement were planted, in essence, by the many 
unknowns after the Second World War. Where would the world go, after the heroic victory of 
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the U.S.? How would the “threat” of communism be dealt with, how would Europe deal with its 
destruction and loss, how would Germany deal with its shame, Japan with its surrender - all of 
these questions enabled the existence and growth of a new field of inquiry. 
The Cold War, with its proxy wars, arms and space races, and economic and military 
treaties, prompted the need to see the future not only of U.S. projects by themselves, but also of 
the Soviet ones, and other actors of Cold War events. Decision makers in the Soviet Union and 
the United States alike closely followed and tried to anticipate the policies of their opponents. 
The escalations of these two superpowers‟ nuclear arms race resulted in the policies of 
deterrence known as MAD, an appropriate abbreviation for Mutual Assured Destruction. MAD 
began shortly after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and was based on the idea of maximum 
retaliation, which would deter the enemy from attacking in the first place.3 
Competition between the Soviet Union and western countries, however, existed prior to 
the Cold War and the unexpected Soviet nuclear ambitions. Soviet policies had carried the 
banner of “catch up and overtake” in between the World Wars, signifying their technological 
backwardness compared to more advanced countries such as the United States of America. To 
achieve this goal they replaced the ideas of American industrial visionaries such as Frederick W. 
Taylor and Henry Ford with Stakhanovism, super-Fordism and super-Taylorism. Soviet genetic 
sciences were similarly “overtaken” by Lysenko‟s ever-changing vernalization methods.4 
However, when Fat Man and Little Boy detonated in Japan, General Secretary Stalin surmised 
the decline of the Soviet Union, unless they too became a nuclear power.5 The Soviet leader 
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immediately placed an extreme urgency on the “catch up” part of Soviet nuclear efforts, which 
fuelled the nuclear arms race.6  
European nations continued to suffer in the aftermath of the Second World War. Both 
Allied and Axis air-bombings left most of the European countries ravaged, in addition to the loss 
of tens of millions of people. The survivors, including millions of injured, also faced many 
hardships.7 Constraints on people and resources aside, the defeat of Japan and Germany at the 
end of WWII left a vacuum in the postwar international system of diplomacy.8 The weary 
survivors sought peace, but reality brought more tensions. Allied and Axis nations alike had a 
somber and contemplative view of the future. In France, Jean-Paul Sartre led the existentialist 
philosophy that struggled to find meaning in humanity‟s existence. Europeans reflected back to 
the years of the Second World War in angst, questioning not only the devastation on their own 
continent but throughout the world, and especially the use of atomic bombs in Japan. In short, 
losers and victors had varying outlooks of their futures and that of the world‟s. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States of America was a nation seemingly 
coming together, unified under a “national faith.”9 This image of a united and conforming post-
WWII America, however, submerged many tensions (social inequality etc.) that surfaced later in 
the 1960s during the counterculture. Nothing embodied this sense of conformity better than the 
paving of highways and sprouting of suburbia. Unlike the European nations, Americans were full 
of hope. As the discussion on the consensus-building Delphi method and the image of 1950s 
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conformity towards the end of this chapter examines, the generalization of the early Cold-War as 
a time of conformity was not wholly accurate. 
After the conclusion of WWII, the goal of U.S. military authorities in funding places of 
knowledge production such as the RAND Corporation was to retain the scientific expertise of the 
War Department. While the military had produced complex strategic methodologies, the field of 
futures studies embraced the transfer of ideas and technologies from military paradigms to the 
social realm for social inquiries. Cold War scientists devised many methods that later futurists 
widely used, such as modeling, gaming, and polling via Delphi questionnaires and cross-impact 
matrices, among other forecasting techniques. 
When in the 1940s the Cold War exactly began is debatable; some historians argued that 
the use of an atomic bomb should begin the period that would be so strongly defined by nuclear 
weapons.10 However, Bernard Baruch coined the term “Cold War” in 1946 and George Kennan, 
the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, popularized this notion after an anonymous (signed as Mr. X) 
“long telegram.”11 Especially after a series of articles written in the New York Herald Tribune in 
1947 as a response to Mr. X‟ containment policy by journalist Walter Lippmann the term quickly 
became commonplace.12 While fully agreeing with Kennan that the communist threat needed to 
be contained, Lippmann suggested that the U.S. might become frustrated with this policy sooner 
than the Soviet Union decayed. This journalist criticized Kennan‟s policy as relying on the U.S. 
to be able to organize “a coalition of disunited, feeble and immature states, and to hold it 
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together for a prolonged diplomatic siege, which might last for ten or fifteen years.”13 Regardless 
of the ideological, social, or geographical arguments, however, the atom bomb was the defining 
technology of this conflict. 
Nobody in the United States expected that the war-torn USSR would have successfully 
detonated its first atomic bomb before the end of the decade. When the Soviets gained nuclear 
weapons capability in 1949, with substantial help through espionage, this catapulted the world 
into the Cold War. The nuclear arms race began in the following decade, when both superpowers 
acquired the hydrogen bomb and increased their nuclear weapons tests and stockpiles. By the 
end of the 1950s, the United States had amassed several thousand nuclear warheads, and the 
Soviets, with an arsenal of a few hundred nuclear bombs, zealously strove to achieve parity. 
The Cold War doctrine MAD advocated for massive retaliation in the event of a sneak 
nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. The logic of MAD ensured the destruction of the enemy even 
if the United States was destroyed in the process – thus the name mutual assured destruction. The 
Soviet response was to follow in the footsteps of the U.S., as they had many times before 
throughout the Atomic Era, in building arsenals of thousands of nuclear weapons. Traditional 
Cold War historians have blamed Stalin‟s paranoia for the escalation of nuclear weapons.14 From 
the U.S. secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who served in John Kennedy and Lyndon B. 
Johnson‟s administrations, to Gerald Ford‟s chief of staff Dick Cheney, many policymakers 
supported MAD. 
Forecasting became paramount, because a key element of the arms race was the 
perception of strength more than strength itself. Until reliable intelligence sources such as the U2 
spy plane could ascertain the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet military, uncertainties required 
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making conservative assumptions. The development of the hydrogen bomb – a super weapon 
with radically greater destructive capabilities – complicated the nuclear weapons policies of the 
two superpowers and the nuclear arms race. The Cold War came to its highest point when the 
nuclear strategizing of the two superpowers led to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, which served 
as a wake-up call of the potential harm not only to the United States and the Soviet Union, but 
the whole world.15 After the crises, however a slowing down of tensions, also known as a period 
of détente, started for several reasons. Radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests raised 
concerns that led to a partial test ban in 1963. In the late 1960s and into 1970s, the superpowers 
negotiated two Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties. The entrance of China into the arms race in 
the mid-1960s, and the economic strain caused by the production and maintenance of thousands 
of warheads complicated the nuclear policies, which continued to place a premium on scientific 
forecasting of Cold War opponents‟ capabilities. 
A number of policy-makers and scientists strongly opposed the MAD doctrine. Hans 
Bethe, Nobel laureate in physics, for example advocated for “deterrence through agreement,” 
while President Kennedy‟s science adviser Jerome Wiesner argued that “50 bombs, properly 
placed, would probably put a society out of business.”16 While Wiesner‟s claim may have 
validity, many others disagreed. 
 One of the vocal advocates for “deterrence through strength” throughout the Cold War 
period was Edward Teller, the father of the U.S. hydrogen bomb. Teller was a Hungarian-
American scientist with aggressive views on nuclear technologies. He was not only involved in 
nuclear weapons research but publicly advocated for the use of nuclear bombs in projects like 
excavating for the building of canals or harbors. He later also became one of the strong voices in 
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support of Reagan‟s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as Star Wars, a nickname 
reflecting many experts‟ perceptions of the unfeasibility of the project. McNamara and Teller 
emerged as two of the louder voices in support of MAD in the U.S., but many others like 
historian of the Soviet Union Richard Pipes, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, 
and Richard Perle also promoted the approach. 
The history of the nuclear weapons arsenals of the two superpowers was a race both of 
the types of technologies, as well as quantities of technologies. In Was the Nuclear Arms Race 
Deterministic? Cold War historian of technology Alex Roland showed that both arsenals 
developed roughly in a proportional and symmetrical fashion.17 In other words, both 
superpowers maintained thousands of nuclear bombs with similar delivery systems. Roland 
continued to argue that “Reagan‟s insistence on pursuing a space-based missile defense that 
threatened the “balance of terror” in the two arsenals and contributed to the unraveling of the 
Soviet Union.” 
Early futurists worried about nuclear and military developments domestically as well as 
in the Soviet Union. Shortly before leaving office in 1961, outgoing President of the United 
States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, notoriously warned against the acquisition of influence by the 
military-industrial complex. As historian Stuart Leslie pointed out, through affiliated research 
centers and laboratories, this complex also included top U.S. universities, thus being more 
properly the military- industrial-academic complex.18 The continuation of defense budgets into 
the peace-time reflected the intensity of the Second World War and its aftermath, but also the 
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reluctance of the military to give up the power – financial, as well as political – it had during the 
war. 
Amidst this gloomy backdrop of potential apocalypse, scientists in the RAND 
Corporation worked to develop some key concepts for the evolving field of futures studies.  
Renowned for their contributions to rational decision-making theories, early RAND scientists 
worked in a uniquely collaborative and independent environment. The management as well as 
researchers created a climate that permitted creativity in areas such as game theory, a field 
without significant direct benefit or application to their funding sources.19 Some of the architects 
of futures studies worked at RAND‟s early stages and tried to fight the Cold War with 
rationalism. 
 
 
b. Emergence of Project RAND and its Theoretical Division 
 
U.S. mobilization for the Second World War created a momentum for developing 
technological expertise that carried over into the post-war military- industrial-complex. The 
increasing complexity of military systems and their reliance on science and technology 
motivated military leaders to retain the scientific expertise in the form of military advisory 
institutions.20 Vannevar Bush, the director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development 
during WWII advocated for continued government support of scientific research during 
peacetime. His 1945 report, Science, The Endless Frontier, eventually led to the formation of the 
National Science Foundation in 1950.  
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The United States Air Force was a product of this time as well. General Henry H. “Hap” 
Arnold advocated for the creation of the Air Force, and actively led its development. A second 
active leader of the early stages of this military branch was Theodore von Karman, a Hungarian-
born physicist and engineer. In a November 7, 1944 memorandum Hap Arnold asked von 
Karman to compile long-range development reports that foresaw the future needs of the Air 
Force.21 Both of these aerospace enthusiasts – General Arnold was a decorated test pilot of many 
new crafts, and Von Karman a pioneering aerospace engineer and physicist – advocated for the 
U.S. Air Force because of the unique technological complexities and systems requirements of 
aerial warfare. In Arnold‟s memo he asked Von Karman‟s group to “divorce [themselves] from 
the present war in order to investigate all possibilities and desirabilities for postwar and future 
war‟s development” for the Air Force.22 The General asked for a guarantee of national security, 
but also for a “basis for adequate Congressional appropriations,” which became a foothold for 
military-industrial-complex funding.23 This highly influential memo asked for a report on future 
techniques, weapons, ways of training pilots, and securing sufficient funding after WWII ended. 
These efforts led to the Scientific Advisory Boards (SAB) in the Air Force that started a long 
history of studying how it should retain U.S. supremacy in air power for the future .24 
The RAND Corporation, named for the letters in “Research ANd Development,”25 
emerged from such a climate in order to retain scientists who had been affiliated with the 
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military.26 On 2 March 1946, the Air Force awarded a contract to Douglas Aircraft Company in 
the name of “Project RAND” that initially charged researchers to study possible designs for 
space vehicles.27 The modern nature of the post WWII U.S. Air Force – as a much younger entity 
than other military branches – allowed for an experimental climate of non-military advisory 
organizations such as the Santa Monica based RAND Corporation.28 Two years later, this think 
tank became an independent (from Douglas Aircraft Company) corporation, and by 1950 it had 
gathered a competent and diverse civilian research staff. These thinkers, who were not cooped up 
in a tank but an advisory research center, created both the climate and capacity to pursue projects 
of a technological nature that were seen as crucial to U.S. Cold War superiority. 
The scientists of the RAND Corporation‟s theoretical divisions included mathematicians 
who were influenced by European philosophers of science from the 1930s. One of the RAND 
personnel in particular, Olaf Helmer, went on to contribute greatly to futurist methodologies and 
the field‟s epistemological foundations. Trained and influenced by logical empiricists such as 
Hans Reichenbach of the Berlin Circle, which was a sister group of the Vienna circle with 
similar views on the philosophy of science, Helmer placed great value on rational thinking in 
decision-making. Logical positivists of the Vienna Circle also influenced Helmer‟s work, and a 
leading member of this circle, Rudolf Carnap, guided the young Helmer when he came to the 
United States by hiring him as a research assistant at the University of Chicago in 1936.  
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Helmer was born and raised in Berlin, Germany in 1910, and fondly remembered his time 
in the Weimar Republic – a cultural haven for stage actors like his father.29 In 1934 he left Berlin 
the day after receiving the documentation for his doctorate and arrived in London the next day. 
His first Ph.D. was in mathematics from Berlin University. Because he was a non-traditional 
graduate student with a Ph.D., the women‟s college of the University of London made an 
exception and housed Dr. Helmer at Bedford College. Under supervision of Susan Stebbing, he 
earned a second doctoral degree in Logic with Bertrand Russell as one of his examiners.30  
In 1936 Helmer left for the United States to work as an academic in various places for 
several years. In 1944, he worked part-time as personal assistant to Felix Oppenheim – a patron 
of philosophers of science – at Princeton University where he also collaborated with Carl 
Hempel, an influential philosopher of science and cofounder of the Berlin Circle. During the last 
year of the Second World War, Helmer participated in the Applied Mathematics Panel (AMP), 
under the National Defense Research Committee, in Columbia, New York. Helmer worked with 
AMP on mathematical problems contracted by the U.S. military under the supervision of John 
Williams – who would become the head of the mathematics division at RAND Corporation. In 
1946 Williams hired Helmer as one of the first RAND mathematicians because of his 
background in operations research and expertise in studying complex mathematical problems.31 
Starting with his long tenure at RAND and continuing with involvement in various 
futures organizations afterwards, Olaf Helmer was a recurring actor throughout this period 
covered in this history of futures studies.  He worked at the RAND Corporation for twenty two 
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years until he left to help start the Institute for the Future in 1968. Despite his long and renowned 
career as a futurist, Helmer‟s early years at the RAND Corporation were the most productive. 32 
One defining characteristic of this early climate at RAND was interdisciplinary 
collaboration of researchers.  John Williams encouraged researchers to have an open-door policy 
and take advantage of the available expertise. Even though researchers such as Helmer had a 
narrow focus in supporting the engineering divisions and military goals of the corporation, they 
also had a great deal of freedom in selecting what to work on. For instance, they were able to 
work on Von Neumann and Morgenstern‟s game theory, which at the time was more of an 
intellectual exercise than a practical tool.33 As an aside, while Helmer contributed to the 
scholarship of game theory, he also designed a couple of parlor games for fun: One was the 1961 
board game Summit, which pitted board-gamers in a Cold War geo-political power struggle, and 
another, Square Mile, which required players to make economic decisions to develop a square 
mile of land.  
Often listed as the co-inventor of the Delphi method, Norman Dalkey was born in 
Crowley, Colorado in 1922, and studied mathematics at San Jose State College.34 During his 
doctorate, he briefly studied under Carnap in Chicago, thus linking him to the Berlin circle.35 In 
1942, he earned his doctorate in philosophy from UCLA, and worked as an instructor, physicist, 
and assistant director for a radio production firm, before joining Project RAND during its 
planning stages in 1945. Helmer and Dalkey were the primary innovators, but other 
mathematicians such as Nicholas Rescher, Bernie Brown and Frederick Thompson were also 
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members of the group that developed the Delphi method. According to Rescher, all these 
researchers involved in Project DELPHI had been trained in logic as well as philosophy of 
science.36 Therefore, the civilian philosopher-mathematicians were not simply technicians or 
engineers providing support to technological issues, but they put in a great deal of thought into 
how to improve procedures, best explore unknowns, and find rational solutions. 
 
 
c. Emergence of Project DELPHI 
 
These civilian philosopher-mathematicians toiled within a collaborative culture and 
gradually designed the Delphi Method together during the early 1950s. Interestingly, the U.S. 
Air Force funded these researchers, but had no input on the direction of their research. The 
mathematics division was simply told to “think about what‟s important.” While the U.S. Air 
Force during its early years placed a premium on futures-thinking, military authorities did not 
provide any specific scenarios or guidelines to consider. Nevertheless, with studies such as 
Project DELPHI, RAND scientists took their patron‟s needs to heart. 
Before this study came about, mathematicians in John Williams‟ department discussed 
what could be forecast and how to best forecast an event. Then, one of these mathematicians 
proposed examining horse races and the success of various professional forecasters. Used to 
quaint requests, the procurement official at RAND allowed them to subscribe to various horse 
racing journals. By trying out various combinations of horse race forecasters, the RAND 
mathematicians could not devise a system of turning a profit, – they weren‟t actually betting 
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money anyway – but they were able to reduce losses by statistically combining several 
forecasters.37  
The Delphi method was developed in the early 1950s, but many earlier ideas led up to 
this invention. Discussions on forecasting, the epistemic place of knowledge of future matters, 
and how to best approach studies of the future took place intermittently during the first few years 
of the RAND Corporation.38 Going back further, ideas such as systematizing predictions, 
changing opinions based on iterations of the same question, or the idea that the average of a 
group of experts is usually more reliable than a single expert were not novel by the time 
Helmer‟s team tackled Project DELPHI.39  
One ideological foundation with which RAND mathematicians justified their efforts to 
design a new consensus-building tool was a 1949 article on predicting social and technological 
events.40 The authors of that study, a UCLA philosophy professor, a Stanford mathematics 
professor and a RAND economist, asked individual experts to predict various economic, 
technological, or scientific questions. As these early futurists analyzed the responses, and 
participating experts‟ comments surrounding the multiple choice questions, the three 
philosopher-mathematicians questioned the validity and reliability of using experts. In particular 
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they found that an expert‟s confidence in a prediction did not correlate with success of the 
prediction.41 
The authors of this 1949 article and collaborators of the subsequent project Delphi were 
connected via the Berlin circle. A disciple of Albert Einstein, Hans Reichenbach was a key 
founding member of the Berlin circle and its publication Erkenntnis, and inspired the inventors 
of the Delphi Method with his work on probabilistic reasoning. According to Abraham Kaplan, 
one of Hans Reichenbach‟s and later Rudolf Carnap‟s students, Reichenbach wanted “man to 
look to the logic of science for a guide to belief and action.”42  Rejection of metaphysics unified 
the Berlin Circle and their endeavors, with which they sought to rationalize social and 
technological issues alike. 43  
The Delphi method as it evolved at RAND by 1951, started with a discussion of 
questions such as „how to best utilize a group of experts,‟ and „how to produce the most reliable 
forecast.‟44 In trying to systematize predictions, they wanted to minimize the human aspect of 
opinions by not only removing any face-to-face discussion, but also hiding the identity of 
participants from one another.45  Statistical group feedback between rounds (each iteration of the 
survey was called a „round‟) provided further distance from the individuality of opinions, as did 
the requirement of quantifying very complex issues. 
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When U.S. political and military authorities needed to suddenly come to terms with the 
existence of Soviet nuclear bombs, RAND mathematicians provided the answer; the best way to 
quantify and understand any potential threats was the Delphi Method. Conscientious of the 
complexity of their task, and free to design a new opinion technology, Helmer‟s team started 
“Project DELPHI.”  
Confronted with such a sensitive estimation problem, the mathematics division of the 
Santa Monica based think-tank chose not to rely on individual opinions or expert deliberation in 
a committee environment. The processes involved in a committee environment worried Dalkey, 
Helmer and others because of issues such as the leader problem – a charismatic speaker could 
dominate the discussion and sway the group‟s views towards his or her response to the forecast. 
Similarly, individual opinions could not be controlled or confronted as iterations of the Delphi 
questionnaire enabled the RAND facilitators. Given a scenario dealing with nuclear annihilation, 
these Cold War scientists instead devised a more controlled consensus-building tool, the Delphi 
method, which both reflected and shaped the Cold War mentality. Unlike a committee, 
participants of a Delphi study were unknown to one another, and only saw edited commentary 
and statistical averages of quantitative survey responses. Characteristic of almost all Delphi 
studies, the participants of this original project provided converging responses upon iteration of 
the same survey.  
The first use of the method in Project DELPHI attempted to estimate the destructiveness 
of a Soviet nuclear attack by asking forecasters to consider a scenario in which war between the 
“U.S. and the S.U. broke out on 1 July 1953.”46 In a dry and detailed manner, the scenario 
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described the economic reality at that instant: “on the assumption of no damage to our industry, 
under mobilization [the rate of total military production] would rise to 150 billion dollars by 
1954 and to 200 billion dollars by 1955.” After describing the nature of the enemy‟s strategic 
atomic bombing campaign, Helmer and his team asked seven participating experts to consider 
how many successful 20 kiloton Soviet atomic bombs would need to be delivered in order “that 
the cumulative munitions output would be held to no more than one quarter of what it otherwise 
would have been?”47 
The matter-of-factness with which this scenario addressed nuclear destruction was 
parodied memorably in Kubrick‟s Dr. Strangelove from 1964.48 In the movie, when talking 
about the possibility of a doomsday device, the character of Dr. Strangelove referred to a study 
he commissioned to the “BLAND Corporation,” whose experts had rendered the verdict that the 
Soviets (in the movie) had such a device capable of destruction on a global level, killing all 
human and animal life. No doubt this parody was inspired by RAND studies such as “Project 
DELPHI” aimed at analyzing Soviet nuclear capabilities.49 
Within their positivistic paradigm, Helmer and his collaborators viewed expert opinions 
as similar to natural phenomena; as having observable and quantifiable variations and statistical 
properties.50 Accordingly, experts opining on Soviet nuclear threats could be analyzed like any 
other population statistics – say, the height of the members of a community. This premise would 
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later cause much criticism about the validity of the Delphi method. A second cause of criticism 
that would be raised in the 1970s was the focusing of expert responses over the rounds. Iteration 
caused opinions to converge and become more similar. Warranted or not, this characteristic 
typically held true in most Delphi studies as it did with this original study. Initial survey 
responses to the question of how many 20 kiloton atomic bombs were needed ranged from 50 to 
5,000, while the experts converged to 159 to 494 by their fifth response to the same survey.  
Convergence of the bombing estimates most significantly impacted the outliers, but also 
led to changes by each of the seven experts. The expert who provided the initial estimate of 5000 
bombs, dramatically reduced his/her response to under 500 with the second iteration of the same 
question, and then remained close to this value over the remaining two rounds. The second 
highest initial response was 1000 bombs. This expert gradually decreased his/her estimates to 
800, then to 332 and finally to 314. The lowest “outlier” started with 50 bombs, and gradually 
increased to 89, then 153 and finally 159 bombs. While the remaining four experts changed their 
estimates only slightly starting with initial estimates ranging from 125 to 300 and ending with 
177 to 312. So, the three experts with the outlying initial estimates dramatically changed their 
responses to conform to the average of the group‟s responses.51 
A small but telling detail about project Delphi was that the coordinators of the project, 
Dalkey and Helmer, modified the outcomes of the final round of responses to obtain a narrower 
range of estimations. The further “corrected” round that incorporated consensus values for 
estimations leading up to the final number of bombs yielded a final prediction of 167 to 360 
atomic bombs.52 During Project DELPHI, the panelists had arrived at the final bomb quantity 
(the goal of the project) by multiplying the number of targets by an estimate of bombs per target. 
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Thus the project was complicated by two unknowns, each requiring intricate expertise to answer. 
Dalkey and Helmer argued that the final responses could be improved by substituting the 
individual quantifiers for number of bombs per target, by the panel‟s consensus quantifier. They 
noted that such a correction reduced the ratio between highest and lowest estimates from 3:1 to 
2:1, thus narrowing the range of the consensus.53 The importance of such a correction was not 
whether the coordinators were justified in substituting a consensus quantifier for each 
respondent‟s questionnaire. Rather the importance was that Helmer‟s team moved the studies‟ 
final outcome further away from each participant‟s response by trusting their panel‟s opinion on 
the quantifiers.  
In the fortunate absence of verifying facts, how did the experts, facilitators, and 
policymakers know that 167 to 360 Soviet 20 kiloton atomic bombs would have been sufficient 
to reduce the U.S. munitions output by the prescribed amount? Why not 5,000 bombs, as one of 
the seven Project DELPHI experts initially predicted before undergoing the Delphi rounds?54 
The philosopher-mathematicians who facilitated Project DELPHI, given their knowledge at the 
time, certainly believed the resulting estimate after the Delphi rounds was better than earlier 
estimates. In the quest for certainty amidst Cold War unknowns, Delphi fulfilled the urgent need 
to quantify and speculate. Perhaps because of the oracular name chosen for this method, it also 
promised to make forecasting more than speculation, even scientific.  
The idea of early RAND mathematicians working on opinion technologies sounds 
uncharacteristic of the think tank that gained fame for its work on rational decision-making. The 
inventors of the Delphi method had not intended for the nuts and bolts of their technique to be 
universalized, but thought that the method was “highly conducive to producing preliminary 
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insights.”55 Dalkey and Helmer hoped that opinion consensus, in the absence of direct empirical 
evidence, “would often turn out to be an acceptable substitute.”56 It was this statement that so 
encapsulated the Cold War dilemma: how to proceed on matters of vital national security without 
an established science to do so. 
 
 
d. Game Theory, Gaming, and Other Futurist Threads from Cold War 
Strategic Thinking 
 
Many futures methodologies had roots in the Cold War and WWII strategic thinking, 
with their use growing dramatically over the decades. Modeling real-life problems in order to 
understand and predict social and natural events, a goal of paramount significance to the 
futurists, became increasingly predominant in the twentieth century, especially in the post World 
War Two era. Prominent philosophers of science of the 1930s Vienna and Berlin Circles stressed 
logical positivism, which helped increase the drive to rationalize, quantify and model. After 
WWII, some futurists argued that decision-making became more properly a sub-field of 
mathematics. Through the Cold War, the futures studies movement, and especially with the 
application of computers, modeling flourished like never before. 
Futurists‟ goal would be to find order in an increasingly complex post-industrial society, 
or in the words of one leading futurist “confidence from chaos.”57 Problem-solving and 
forecasting approaches that futurists heavily relied on during their futures studies movement, 
                                                                 
55
 Norman Dalkey and Olaf Helmer, “An Experimental Application of the Delphi Method to the Use of Experts,” 
Management Science, Apr 1963; 9, 3 p. 466 
56
 Ibid., 467 
57
 Futures, “Confidence From Chaos” (1968) 1.1. pp. 2-3 
41 
 
 
 
including games, and scenario forecasts to name a couple, also had historical threads going back 
to the 1940s and 1950s. 
Game theory was another root of futures studies that did not have an established science 
at the end of WWII. The Hungarian-American polymath John von Neumann was one of the 
pioneers in establishing game theory as a subfield in mathematics. Though, similar to futurism, 
game theory did not become a widely known field until later in the 1970s. 
As Richard D. Duke argued in Gaming: The Future‟s Language, gaming emerged as one 
of the new modes of communication for futurists to use in solving business problems.58 In 1974 
Duke analyzed the field of gaming, with new publications, organizations and so on in the 1970s, 
as “new, not well-understood, poorly used, and in its infancy.”59 However, the history of modern 
modeling, gaming, and simulating began before the 1970s. The distinction of “modern gaming” 
from older endeavors, is similar to the distinction between “modern futures studies” and earlier 
attempts at future-casting. These distinctions include the field‟s definition and 
professionalization, as much as, and the increasing scale of intellectual exchanges through the 
emergence of publications, institutions, and conferences. 
Von Neumann played a key role in the definition of the field of game theory, among 
others ranging from computer science to nuclear physics. He was born in Budapest and had an 
industrious early career in a number of European universities, before leaving the University of 
Berlin for Princeton University in 1930. His first major contribution from these early academic 
years was the minimax theory, published in 1928 under the title “Zur Theorie der 
                                                                 
58
 Richard D. Duke, Gaming: The Future‟s Language (SAGE Publications 1974)  
59
 Ibid., 11 
42 
 
 
 
Gesellschaftsspiele.” This theory, as its name suggests, was based on minimizing maximum 
losses in a game.60 
In Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, co-written with economist Oskar 
Morgenstern, Von Neumann wrote about the mathematization of economic dilemmas and 
games.61 Stressing the limitations of mathematics when solving complex problems, the authors 
were careful to emphasize the heuristic and unripe nature of their theory. In order to build a 
foundation for their theory, von Neumann and Morgenstern focused on static scenarios that could 
easily be calculated, and gradually increased the complexity. They started with the maximum 
problem – for an individual the goal is to achieve maximum satisfaction, within a “Robinson 
Crusoe Economy,” which was a challenge to put into mathematical terms.62 Next they further 
defined basic concepts and mathematical axioms to approach simple two-player zero-sum games.  
To describe what a two-player zero-sum minimax game is, let me summarize an episode 
from Sherlock Holmes that Morgenstern and von Neumann provided as an example.63 Sherlock 
Holmes was being pursued by Professor Moriarty, and if caught Holmes knew he would die. In 
order to escape this fate, he boarded a train from London headed to Dover, via an intermediate 
stop at Canterbury, with the intent of going to continental Europe. Just as the train departed, 
Moriarty stepped on the platform and spotted Holmes, who in return spotted Moriarty. The 
scenario was further defined by the existence of faster trains from London either to Dover that 
would not stop at the intermediate station, or to Canterbury that would not continue further. At 
this point each of the two “players,” had two choices. Holmes could continue to Dover or get off 
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at the Canterbury station, and likewise, Moriarty could go to either of these two destinations. So, 
how should each party proceed?   
Although this was a very basic and controlled game, it was sufficiently difficult to solve 
mathematically. There were four possible outcomes: two of which resulted in the death of 
Holmes, one in each location, and two resulted with the escape of Holmes, again one in each 
location. The game theorists attached what they claimed to be reasonable numerical values for 
each outcome, and based on those values churned out decisions that minimized maximum losses 
– in their case, Holmes would have a 60% chance of survival at Canterbury, and 40% at Dover.64   
Von Neumann and Morgenstern expanded their theory by gradually adding slight 
complications. For instance, they considered three, four, or “n”-person games. Or situations, with 
slightly more complicated probabilities such as poker, but where the essential idea was the same: 
a player had to make a decision without knowledge of whether or not an opponent was bluffing 
or betting their hand. 
These collaborators‟ theory was static and investigated general equilibria. But von 
Neumann and Morgenstern argued that given the lack of research on gaming, it was a necessary 
foundation before beginning dynamic theories that would probably look at more specific 
situations and would be harder to generalize. As von Neumann concluded, in a very 
mathematical language, decision-making in two-person zero-sum games where there were 
definite solutions was relatively easy, while in more complicated situations where different 
parties were allowed to form coalitions or compensate for having alliances etc., was more 
difficult. As such, in games or economic problems with such complexities, he argued it was more 
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appropriate to talk about “strategies” instead of “solutions.”65 Put in other terms, social sciences 
were different, or harder to understand, than physical sciences. Modeling individual choices, or 
specific two-person decision making situations was one thing, however, modeling social and 
economic problems was quite another.  
The military-industrial complex heavily sponsored research in simulations and scenarios, 
not only as an end in itself, but with the goal of solving specific problems. Though as Phillip 
Mirowski and others have argued, the early years of game theory did not have direct usable 
applications.66 In Machine Dreams, Phillip Mirowski quoted game theory researchers in think 
tanks such as RAND Corporation, as saying this sub-field of mathematics stimulated the 
discussions, rather than actually providing any solutions.67 Given the complicated nature of 
military simulations and war-games this makes sense. In the civilian sectors and especially in the 
field of economics, game theory evolved rapidly after the 1960s, with economists such as 
Thomas Schelling highlighting its potential applications. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern‟s mathematical treatise, with relatively simple 
mathematics, stood out for three primary reasons. First, it was a sound theory that significantly 
contributed to mathematics, and helped define a sub-field in decision-making (or game theory). 
Second, it contributed significantly to a major social science, as it was co-written by an 
economist with problems of economic significance in mind. Although, their arguments about 
game theory did not necessarily involve situations of economic or business dilemmas, they were 
easily applicable. Finally and most importantly, more complex dynamic problems such as 
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economic planning, or military war-gaming were based on “virtual” or numerous simpler static 
decisions where Neumann‟s theory could be applied. Therefore, the work in Theory of Games 
and Economic Behavior laid a solid foundation for an explosion of works on game theory in the 
1970s.68  
Most importantly, the advent of the computer dramatically contributed to the field of 
decision-making. Similarly, the field of operations research combined the capabilities of the 
computer with the mathematical foundations of game theory toward many specific planning 
issues – for example, what route a delivery truck should take in order to minimize the maximum 
loss of fuel. Game theories based on mathematical solutions have been ubiquitously applied to 
such specific problems of varying complexities. A parallel to this history is the forecasting, or 
decision-making based on expertise, of problems that were too complex to model. 
Game theory as a mathematical field gained popularity during the Cold War to solve 
specific problems both in military and civilian sectors. The increasing specialization of scientific 
fields, coupled with extraordinary security pressures after the 1940s, placed game theory at the 
forefront of military sectors, and later also in civilian arenas.  
To be sure, not all motivations for modeling came from War, or military threats, but also 
from social and economic ones, as well as natural ones. In particular, modeling atmospheric 
conditions was a significant field of interest before modeling and game theory reached their 
prestigious places in statistics and mathematics respectively in the 1970s.69 With the assistance 
of John von Neumann the Meteorological Project in Princeton sought to quantify and predict 
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weather forecasts with the help of a computer.70 This project lasted from 1947 to 1952, after 
which, modeling of meteorological phenomena stagnated for about a decade.71 
 
 
e. Importance of Delphi within a Context of 1950s Conformity 
 
The period in which the Delphi method emerged is often characterized by historians as 
being a time of conformity. During the 1950s, industries welcomed consensus-building as a 
theme that transcended individualistic values. In the first half of the twentieth century, 
individualism remained strong amidst the “threat” of communism. The revolutionized Soviet 
Union, especially under Stalin, strongly reinforced sentiments against groupism within the 
United States.72 By contrast these postwar years in the United States were defined by 
conformity.73 Nothing embodied this sense of conformity better than the paving of highways, 
sprouting of suburbia, and televisions. In the 1950s, not everybody lived in mass-produced 
Levittowns, not all corporate men wore grey flannel suits, and not all women played the 
supporting role to their husbands, but these generalizations capture the spirit of conformity that 
defined the first decade and a half after the Second World War.74  
Delphi provided one way of making decisions by producing a singular answer that 
incorporated multiple views, while at the same time dampening outlying opinions. 
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Mathematicians designed the method such that control of defining the problem and managing 
responses remained in the hands of facilitators and not the experts. The facilitator coordinated 
rounds by interviewing the experts, framing the tentative survey, compiling responses and 
disseminating a statistical group-feedback for each subsequent round. Incorporating these 
elements furnished the Cold War scientists with control over complex post-nuclear-era problems. 
Their speculations on Cold War scenarios, and more importantly their impression of their 
methodology as scientific may well have contributed to the intensity of the arms race with the 
Soviet Union.75 
This opinion technology was not deterministic. „Technological determinism‟ has been a 
radioactive buzzword in the field of history of technology, and with good reason. Historians have 
rightly cautioned against the fatalistic notion that technological changes must necessarily impact 
society in a set fashion, and develop in a certain manner regardless of social factors. This 
argument can, however, be taken to an extreme, implying that technology has no influence at all. 
In Was the Nuclear Arms Race Deterministic? Alex Roland focused on the symmetry and 
proportionality of Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals and their delivery systems, and asked whether 
such technological competitions were deterministic.76 Following his discussion of the 
historiography surrounding this buzzword, Roland offered two alternative and more conventional 
buzzwords: “social change” instead of technological determinism, and “directional force” instead 
of technological imperative. 77 His argument was that even though technology did not determine 
actions of society, it provided possibilities that were not there before. This is important, for 
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example, because nuclear weapons created different social and military paradigms than existed 
before their inventions. 
So, how did the early efforts utilizing the Delphi method fit into this discussion of social 
change and directional force? Strictly speaking, the social change of the Delphi method as a 
technology was not so significant. Even at its peak, Delphi studies never reached the popularity 
of committees, or even experts, so this forecasting tool did not transform society by itself. 
Nevertheless, this forecasting tool thrived on the consensus-building mentality of the Cold War, 
and the futures studies movement that followed, and exemplified the faith placed in scientific 
thinking during this period.  
More fascinating, however, is investigating the impact of using this quantitative, 
“scientific” consensus-building tool on the directional force of technologies of greater import, 
such as the nuclear arms build-up. Project DELPHI and studies like it impacted Cold War policy-
making with their projections of United States‟ vulnerabilities to preemptive attacks by the 
Soviet Union. Resulting estimates such as the Soviets needing 167 to 360 atomic bombs may 
have fueled the scale of the arms build-up and impacted the directional force rather than the 
social change of nuclear weapons arsenals. The atomic and hydrogen bombs were technologies 
with tremendous social change. Atomic weapons and the new age they initiated not only caused 
RAND scientists to develop opinion technologies such as the Delphi method, but in return they 
continued to give them historical significance. Especially since the public showed disinterest in 
foreign affairs during the Truman administration, the military and their civilian advisers could 
influence policies related to atomic weapon production.78 The bipartisan Congress, similar to the 
public, proved to be malleable in the making of U.S. Cold War foreign policies, which funded 
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the Marshall Plan, the Military Industrial Complex, and played a major role in the escalation of 
nuclear arsenals.79 
The Delphi forecasting method, as an auxiliary technology to nuclear weapons, 
contributed to the directional force of the latter. The arms race was fuelled by predictions not 
because their results were scientific, or as accurate as possible, but because their facilitators and 
military authorities believed them to be such. Soviet ambitions and the accuracy of RAND 
mathematicians‟ consensus about potential destruction of Soviet bombs aside, once the “best 
possible estimation” existed, this acted as justification for further nuclear armament. 
For the historian, publications and methodologies of these forecasters have a dual value: 
they provide an insight into what and how futurists studied possible futures, but perhaps more 
importantly, these documents double as a genre of social commentary of their time. Some 
forecasts are valuable not for what they predicted – or the probability with which they predicted 
something – but that someone would have asked certain questions in the first place. Thomas 
Edison‟s forecast that future factories would have no manual labor nicely illustrates this idea. 
More important than the forecast – or when he thought such a future might arrive – the fact that 
he concerned himself with such a question makes clear the emphasis on the rationalization of 
factories in the early twentieth century. 
Accordingly, the emergence of the Delphi method during the 1950s conveys more than 
scientists working on a forecasting problem. Their invention of a method that quantified expert 
opinion and compiled several experts‟ responses into a consensus represented the early Cold War 
culture of conformity. This, however, is not to say the respondents to the original Delphi surveys 
conformed to the final consensus of the study. Because of the very design of the Delphi method, 
their responses were representations of a singular forecast.  
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As dominant as the historiography on Cold War culture and the uniformity and 
conformity of 1950s Americans was, some historians have cautioned against the simplicity of 
this notion.  The editors and contributors in Rethinking Cold War Culture, Peter Kuznick and 
James Gilbert, argued against the notion that the Cold War culture was conformist, that the Cold 
War culture was influenced not so much by the Cold War but much more so by economic and 
social realities.80 One of these contributors, Alan Brinkley argued that this unity was an illusion 
masked by a thriving economy, a media that was reliant on sponsors – and thus unwilling to 
alienate its audiences – and an increasingly bureaucratizing and growing middle class. Or at least 
the notion of a middle class, defined not so much by political power, but ability to purchase 
material goods such as cars and televisions. Brinkley argued that the typical 1950s TV shows 
were divisive rather than uniting, as they stereotypically portrayed the white male suburbanite as 
shouldering the responsibility for his nuclear family. So this image of conformity was an illusion 
rather than a representation of the 1950s culture. Regardless of the extent to which this illusion 
represented the actual culture of the 1950s Americans, it successfully defined the cultural image 
of this period. 81 
What is clear, however, is that the unity – or seeming unity – of the consensus of the 
1950s did not represent the social tensions, which the next generation reacted to in the 1960s and 
1970s. The counterculture rebelled against the notion that the nation was united behind the 
foreign and domestic policies supporting the military-industrial-complex and the continuing 
twentieth century trends of industrialization.   
                                                                 
80
 Rethinking Cold War Culture Eds. Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert (Smithsonian Institution Press: 2001) 
81
 Alan Brinkley, “The Illusion of Unity in Cold War Culture,” in Rethinking Cold War Culture Eds. Peter J. 
Kuznick and James Gilbert (Smithsonian Institution Press: 2001) pp. 61-73; or David Riesman, “Individualism 
Reconsidered” in Individualism Reconsidered, and Other Essays, (1954), 26-38 
51 
 
 
 
Conformity to consensus was a ubiquitous theme during the 1950s, and even later in the 
arena of studying the future. The theme of conformity was evident even in the science fiction of 
Isaac Asimov, a futurist who inspired and encouraged actors of the futures studies movement. In 
his widely popular Foundation series written in the 1950s, he invented the profession of 
psychohistorians; scientists who could forecast far into the future of societies, granted the society 
was large enough, and the society was unaware of the forecast.82 With the help of the hero of the 
series Hari Seldon, the inventor of psychohistory, Asimov captured the imagina tions of science 
fiction fans and made studying the future into a respected (fictional) scientific field, years before 
the emergence of the field of futures studies in the United States. The universe of Asimov‟s 
novels reflected the author‟s as well as the readers' desire to calculate the future. Furthermore, 
Asimov subtly echoed the criticisms of renowned Cold War social critics like William H. White, 
and David Riesman, by alluding to the dangers of conformity and giving the predictability of 
societies a scientific aura. The very premise of scientific forecasting of societies, as long as the 
society was not conscious of the forecast, assumed a deterministic existence. In The Lonely 
Crowd Riesman cried out against the diminishing of inner-directed people, and that people‟s 
worth was becoming more other-directed, or determined by the organizations and bureaucracies 
taking over and thus predictable.83 In Whyte‟s Organization Man he condemned the conformity 
of the 1950s culture of bureaucracy and the declining freedoms of individuals amidst societal 
pressures. The pressures of Hari Seldon tied individuals to a point where the society headed in a 
quantifiably deterministic trajectory. 
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f. Early Cold War Futurism and Chapter Conclusion 
 
The early stages of the Cold War were full of unknowns, not just about the future, but the 
present time as well. Policy-makers in the government as well as the military did not have 
established sciences to refer to when deciding on issues dealing with the use of atomic weapons 
or how the U.S. Air Force should function after the Second World War. These questions had just 
surfaced for the first time and necessitated new thinking. This epistemic crisis turned out to be an 
opportunity and a birth for the modern field of futures studies. The field was not well known 
outside immediate military circles or theoretically well defined by the late 1940s and early 
1950s, but this period inaugurated many of the ideas and methodologies that helped later 
forecasters gain wider influence and expand their scope of work.  
RAND philosopher-mathematicians developed the Delphi method during the 1950s, a 
time defined by images of conformity. Project DELPHI yielded not only an estimate of a 
potential Soviet threat, but a seminal intellectual contribution to futures methodologies. This 
Cold War exercise tried to bring about a consensus among seven anonymous experts in a 
controlled and structured procedure. Delphi panelists quantified their expert opinions, and the 
coordinators aggregated these numbers into statistical feedback to be shared with the 
participants. Iterations of such rounds led to convergence, the statistical properties of which 
made up the final outcome of the study. 
The Cold War strongly influenced futurism to be sure, but many other unknowns existed 
as well. Von Neumann‟s attempts to model meteorological phenomena in Princeton were part of 
a long struggle to make sense of how weather behaved. Scientist Fred Hoyle in a discussion of 
Sir Charles Darwin‟s Dire Prognostications, undermined the Cold War climate and “the 
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Communist-Anti-Communist issues” as far less important – even irrelevant – when compared to 
population forecasts.84 Harrison Brown, a California Institute of Technology geochemistry 
professor, wrote an influential book in 1954 titled The Challenge of Man‟s Future. Brown 
warned about the future, the world‟s diminishing resources, but especially about humanity‟s 
ability to manage itself at a global scale. Brown‟s possible futures advocated for long-term 
outlooks.85 Brown and Hoyle were examples of an early thread of eco-futurism that voiced 
concern over biological and environmental issues.  
Some of the many threads leading up to the specialization of the field of futures studies, 
newly emerged after the Second World War, while other threads existed before and continued to 
challenge thinkers about issues in the future. This new field was a response to the growing pains 
of a post-industrial society, and would become a forum for discussing the many problems and 
worries of a diverse group of thinkers. However, the intensity of Cold War pressures and military 
strategic thinking stimulated early Cold War scientists like Olaf Helmer to develop new 
methodologies for studying the future. The new realities of the post-WWII era prompted 
scientists and politicians to look anew at the future, and to defeat challenges such as “the menace 
of communism.” 
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Chapter 2. Imagining and Implementing the Future – Deterministic Visions 
 
Futures studies continued to emerge as an informal field during the second decade of the 
Cold War. Futurists gradually continued to define their field, refine their methodologies, and 
envision the dangers and possibilities of their futures. This chapter looks at the impact of nuclear 
and space exploration developments on the outlooks of futurists, and the beginnings of the 
application of futures methodologies such as the Delphi method on problems other than 
scenarios involving Third World Wars. Instigated by Cold War pressures, futurism was 
beginning to shape up as an activity, though it was not recognized as a formal field of study. 
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, optimism and wishful determinism thrived among 
U.S. futurists. In the military as well as the civilian arenas, the possibilities of atomic energy 
stimulated futurists and scientists through the 1950s. Although they did not receive funding 
many designs showed the enthusiasm of American scientists with this new technology. For 
example, “Project Orion” incorporated nuclear explosions for long-range space exploration, or 
Edward Teller‟s “Project Plowshare” suggested the use of atomic bombs to clear ground for 
large harbor and canal projects.  This chapter samples some of the colorful visions of the future 
during the second decade of the Cold War. In particular, a 1963 forecasting study, facilitated by 
RAND Corporation mathematicians, represented the optimism and determinism of the times, as 
well as the systematization (but also creativity) needed to peek into long-term futures. 
The civilian philosopher-mathematicians sought to understand, and more importantly, to 
build a science of exploring the future. Certainly not as rigorously as Hari Seldon‟s 
psychohistorians did, but they nevertheless considered opinion technologies as scientific and 
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desirable methods. Consequently, data gathered by questioning experts about the future produced 
valid data sets that could be analyzed in a scientific manner. 
Not everyone was quite so aggressive with regards to studying the future. Many simply 
imagined the future, used it as a vehicle for raising awareness or making social commentary. 
Robert A. Heinlein, another of the big three of science fiction writing, wrote some of his more 
significant works during this time. For example his 1961 book Stranger in a Strange Land put 
the spotlight on sexual and religious issues of the time. The approaches of futurists and science 
fiction writers overlapped greatly. Both were motivated by contemporary issues and post-WWII 
pressures, and both were interested in the other‟s efforts, that is the big three writers participated 
and encouraged the developments of futures researchers, and futurists keenly followed science 
fiction works. 
After the first decade of the Cold War, and the invention of the hydrogen bomb, the 
world started out the second decade of the atomic age without entering a third world war. 
Despite tensions with the “Eastern Bloc” such as the Berlin airlift, the Korean War, and the anti-
communist sentiments of the McCarthy era, the day-to-day lives of most Americans in the 
United States continued to prosper in the 1950s. The post-WWII economic growth did not slow 
down as many had predicted. Though a formalized field of forecasting did not exist, planners and 
prognosticators in all government departments, in businesses and in the military, all tried to deal 
with the fast changes of the second half of the twentieth century.  
The cultural image of conformity, and the perception of unity among Americans – against 
communism or other evils – continued into the 1960s until the counterculture period. The space 
race united anti-communist sentiments and continued the ideological divisions that so defined the 
Cold War, as had (and continued to) the nuclear weapons race of the previous years. 
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Stereotypical images of a conformist culture continued as popular media outlets, which were 
more dependent on sponsors than in later years, wished not to broadcast offensive content.1  
Many Cold War historians argue that the Cold War peaked during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, after which the weapons and test ban treaties between the Soviet Union and the United 
States eased into a détente. According to one prominent historian, it is even fair to consider the 
Cold War to have ended after the 1962 crisis that temporarily heightened the possibility of 
nuclear bomb exchanges between the two superpowers.2  
Despite this notorious escalation, détente was already underway. With the signing of the 
partial test ban treaty on atmospheric nuclear tests one year later, the most trigger-conscious 
times of the Cold War were passing. The changes appeared most visibly to the public in the 
image of the Doomsday Clock, an idea initiated by University of Chicago scientists in 1947 to 
assess and communicate the threat of global nuclear war, was on a steady decline ever since the 
initial hydrogen bombs. Experts moved the clock hands to signal increases or reductions in 
international military tensions; the closer the clock was to midnight, the closer they predicted the 
world to be to irrevocable devastation. With the detonation of the first U.S. H-bomb, the clock 
was set to two-minutes to midnight, but a decade later, with the finalization of the test ban treaty 
and increased international cooperation, experts judged it accurate to move the hands back to 
twelve minutes to midnight.3 
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a. Designs of the Future 
 
In the military arena, futures-thinking continued to prevail. The U.S. Air Force continued 
to conduct long-range planning, in order to be ready for their anticipated battlefield and against 
anticipated weapons of the future. The future served as a motivation to devise new technologies 
and improve older ones. For example, during the early Cold War decades, each of the U.S. 
military branches had ambitions to utilize nuclear power. Planners optimistically sought to build 
submarines, tanks, and planes that could operate for extremely long periods at a time. The army 
designed an atomic powered tank and a compact nuclear power plant that could be transported to 
provide power to the troops anywhere. The tank never was built, and the Army Package Power 
Reactor (APPR) did not make it beyond a prototype. By contrast the Navy succeeded in 
implementing its vision of a nuclear fleet including submarines (first one in 1954), a cruiser, a 
frigate, and an aircraft carrier. 4  
The Air Force ambitions for a nuclear bomber, like the Army plans for a tank, did not go 
much beyond the design stage. In 1956 a nuclear powered engine was built and tested on the 
ground, but it did not generate nearly enough power for lift off. President Eisenhower‟s policy 
decision to fund intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 1955 as a means for deterrence 
effectively ended the Air Force ambitions for a nuclear bomber. Finally President John 
Fitzgerald Kennedy ended all research on nuclear flight in the early 1960s. 
Throughout the decade when Project DELPHI remained classified (until the early 1960s) 
the Soviet Union zealously pursued to surpass the U.S. weapons by increasing nuclear tests and 
nuclear weapons‟ yields. Cold War tensions and attempts at conciliation ebbed and flowed with 
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crises such as the U-2 incident in 1960 and the Cuban missile Crisis in 1962. The U2 was a 
technological wonder of the time – a spy plane which could fly above the Soviet anti-aircraft 
defenses. It had been developed to gather data to ascertain what the Soviet bombers and missile 
capabilities were, so as to have realistic estimations of the threats. Cold War historian John 
Gaddis described the surveillance products of U2 missions as an “intelligence bonanza.”5 The 
incident began when the Soviet defenses caught up and were able to shoot down one of the U2s 
during one of its last flights. The crisis escalated after President Eisenhower, believing the plane 
and pilot would not have survived being shot down, lied that the American plane was a weather 
craft that had experienced technical troubles. Khrushchev, however, had shrewdly manipulated 
the situation by holding back the information that the plane was recovered in good enough a 
shape to reveal its purpose, and that its pilot Francis Gary Powers was alive and well.6 
Within one year of the declassification of Delphi, however, Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev was ousted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, to be succeeded by Leonid 
Brezhnev. Khrushchev lost his party‟s favor partially due to his inconsistent personality, but also 
due to social and agricultural crises plaguing the Soviet nation. As one of the key actors of the 
Cuban Missile crisis, Khrushchev also suffered from the ambiguous resolution to this Cold War 
conflict.7 As the Soviet Union otherwise slowly returned to pre-WWII politics, nuclear 
technologies had dramatically changed international relations. 
A second Cold War race that heated up later in the 1950s was the space race. Although 
this technological contest did not risk the end of the world, unless lasers and nuclear weapons 
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were delivered via space vehicles, the space race nevertheless required concentrated future-
minded thinking.8  
Soviet scientists sent the first satellite, Sputnik I, into space in 1957. Although this little 
four-legged black ball did not do much else than emit a simple signal, this was one of the 
greatest scientific feats of the decade, certainly within the field of space exploration. While itself 
not the most threatening piece of technology, Sputnik represented Soviet domination of space 
and thus the skies, which made Americans uneasy.  
During the following decade, Soviet‟s and United States‟ space programs raced to one-up 
each other, as if the space was another proxy war or a new domain to colonize. In 1961 Soviet 
cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space, and immediately a world celebrity. The 
Soviet space program continued to accomplish many firsts including the first woman in space, 
the first space walk, and the first docking of two ships in space. Although Americans took notice 
of these technological successes of the communist superpower, it took a few years for an 
organized reaction.  
The reaction to these developments was spearheaded by President John F. Kennedy as he 
urged the U.S. to explore space. These prestigious technologies, and the science behind such 
developments, strongly influenced Americans, but the fear of communists exploring this new 
frontier of space and landing on the moon sooner than the U.S. was an even bigger motivator. 
Kennedy argued in a special message to the Congress in 1961 that the technological 
developments of the past four years, beginning with the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite, 
created the urgency for America to gain mastery of space. In this special message, he asked for 
several billion dollars of additional spending for an array of new programs for the coming years.  
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President Kennedy believed that “this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, 
before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth.” 
This astute politician carefully crafted his argument not as the will of a leader, but instead a 
suggestion to own by the entire nation. If his proposal were judged affirmatively, it would not be 
“one man going to the moon … [but] an entire nation.” Kennedy argued “For all of us must work 
to put him there.”9 Unlike of the secretive programs in the Soviet Union, where few were privy 
to the developments until they were chosen by the Soviet authorities to be publicized, Kennedy 
galvanized the United States to work together. 
 
Other visions of American futures studies during this second decade of the Cold War 
included the World Fairs, especially the Futurama exhibits by General Motors, and also the 
Disney World in Florida. An interactive exercise of futures studies, as envisioned by 
entertainment authority Walt Disney was the idea of the community of the future. Displeased 
with some of the aspects of the 1955 theme park Disneyland, such as the shoddy atmosphere 
surrounding the park, Walt Disney sought to build a second theme park over the following 
decade. Plans began in earnest in the early 1960s, and by 1965 Disney‟s team had decided on the 
location and had purchased more than 27000 acres of land in Florida. The second park, named 
Walt Disney World Resort, differed significantly from the first one that had been built on 160 
acres, not only in scale, but also in its vision. The defining feature would be EPCOT, abbreviated 
for “Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow,” began as an idea in the late 1950s. This 
prototype community would allow residents to experience first-hand the technological 
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innovations of the future and provide visitors a window into the city of the future.10Although 
EPCOT was not finished until the 1980s, and not according to Walt Disney‟s visions, it 
nonetheless was a part of the increasing twentieth century fascination with the future, and how 
everyday life might be in that future.  
The second Futurama exhibit during the New York World Fair of 1964 captivated 
millions with its visions of some sixty years ahead. The original Futurama exhibit of 1939, also 
sponsored by General Motors, had portrayed the city of 1960 with large networks of highways as 
a prominent feature. Similarly Walt Disney wanted EPCOT to influence the American vision of 
the future, and the future city. Although his company did not create the GM exhibits about the 
future, Disney had been involved in designing films, acts and displays for both New York World 
fairs as well as other fairs in between.11 
Both of the GM Futuramas imagined the future to be better, with more advanced 
technologies, more mobile transportation possibilities, and an increased standard of living all 
around. They weren‟t simply outlooks into future automobiles and roads, but an idea about the 
future of American culture. The 1939 Futurama looking into the year 1960 envisioned science 
aiding farmers and reducing the risks of agriculture. This vision included a better life with more 
leisure time. The highways had divided lanes, so that automobiles of different speeds would 
travel separately. Those in the same lane were also restrained from driving too close to one 
another, through radio controls. In addition to improved safety with higher speeds, the highways 
were designed for selective accessibility so as to avoid undesirable areas such as slums or old 
industrial areas. As the concluding remarks of the documentary declared deterministically, “all 
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the activities of science lead us onward to better methods of doing things.”12 Futurama II 
continued the trend of deterministic futurism and saw technology as the solution to the ever 
growing world population. 
 
 
b. Worries of the Future 
 
Commentators in Cold War America increasingly looked ahead to the approaching third 
millennium, as if the year 2000 prompted them to predict what life would be like then. Many 
thoughtful projections looked ahead to the decades to come, some motivated by nuclear 
holocaust, others by the impact of humankind on the environment, and yet others at the myriad 
technological possibilities.  However, as historian Lawrence Samuel described in his book 
Future, many sought to ride the bandwagon of forecasting to turn a quick profit as well.13 
The possibility of nuclear annihilation motivated U.S. and international thinkers to 
project into possible futures. As the defining technology of the Cold War, nuclear bombs and 
their delivery systems triggered many concerned futurists to contemplate about the outcomes of a 
World War III. A leader of 1950s movements against banning nuclear tests and for global 
nuclear disarmament, Bertrand Russell, wrote in 1961, Has Man a Future? This book advocated 
for a world government to lead nuclear disarmament efforts as the best possibility to avoid 
nuclear warfare, since individual governments were hypocritical in their officia l stances.14  
One of the early futurists in Germany, Fritz Baade, worked on economic and energy 
planning, especially on the planning of nuclear power plants. In 1960, Baade wrote The Race to 
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the year 2000: Our future: a paradise or the suicide of mankind, in which he weighed the 
dangers and advantages of atomic energy.15  
But the most straight- forward and popular commentary warning about nuclear world 
wars came from the colorful futurist Herman Kahn. This RAND physicist wrote and spoke out 
about the possibilities of nuclear warfare in his 1960 book On Thermonuclear War.  In this book 
Kahn candidly articulated nuclear warfare, how it could be won, and its aftermath. His 
discussion of how megadeaths might affect military strategy and how they might impact 
humanity were unapologetic. He quickly became one of the controversial warning calls of the 
Cold War.16 
On Thermonuclear War successfully stimulated discussion not only among the military 
strategists or analysts, but also the futurists. It was an event, one observer noted, not just for its 
controversial ideas, but also due to its reception and popularity.17 Military and government 
officials regarded this book as a must-read of their time, and Kahn made waves across the 
political spectrum and gained the support of defense as well as peace activists. Although Kahn 
never worked to define and formalize the field of futurology, or build on and improve its 
methodologies, he was familiar with and ably used the tools in the emerging futurist toolbox. His 
visions of a Third World War became one of the most popular studies of futures of the Cold War 
period. 
The field of futures studies, however, was not solely the domain of visionaries who asked 
the tough questions, but also forecasters who planned increasingly for the complicated needs of 
governing. A 1960s highway engineer could survey a new road in the spring of one year and see 
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the project completed before the following year ended.  Two decades later the time required for 
the planning and preparation of a similar project grew nearly tenfold. In part this increasing 
bureaucracy and planning caused the role of the expert to change; the increasing drive to ensure 
that the needs of all citizens were being met, translated to an increased consciousness of 
standards and planning. 
Energy experts, like highway engineering experts, voiced optimistic and deterministic 
outlooks in the 1950s. Palmer Cosslett Putnam was one of the early Cold War futurists studying 
energy outlooks. Putnam was an engineer who designed new wind turbines and consulted widely 
as an energy expert. His 1954 work Energy in the Future proposed various forecasts of the state 
of the world in the coming decades with a specific focus on different energy sources.  18 For 
instance, his world population forecast for the year 2000 was four billion, an undershot outlook 
even though he assumed the third world would see dramatic population growths. Putnam focused 
extensively on renewable energy sources, in particular wood and solar energy for heating. As 
enthusiastic as he was about renewable energy sources, Putnam did not forecast that solar and 
wind power would make a dramatic contribution to the energy demands of the twentieth century, 
and even into the twenty-first century. One estimate Putnam clearly overshot was about the 
contribution of shale oil in the U.S. supply of energy. This resource proved to be too cost-
prohibitive for extraction and use as fuel.   
The forecasting approach Putnam used was indicative of the weight placed on expertise 
during the early post-World War II period. Expert opinion was revered, regardless of whether or 
not such predictions turned out incorrect. Forecasts from all eras, when evaluated retrospectively, 
produce a large quantity of off-the-mark predictions. What was interesting during the forecasts of 
                                                                 
18
 Palmer Putnam, Energy in the Future (London, Macmillan, 1954) 
65 
 
 
 
the 1950s and certainly the 1960s was the place of the expert as a prestigious source of 
knowledge of systems, and their often deterministic and optimistic look into the future.   
The second decade of the Cold War period saw a continued employment of civilian 
contractors working for the Department of Defense. President Dwight D. Eisenhower‟s military-
industrial complex was thriving through the 1950s. 
The Special Operations Research Office (SORO) was born out of a need to better 
understand social issues and their impact on warfare and strategy. Based in the American 
University in Washington D.C., this office employed researchers who used their expertise in the 
social sciences to aid the military.  These social scientists employed at SORO worked on area 
studies, assessments of psychological strategy in dozens of foreign nations, and analyzing causes 
of revolutions. Their approach to use social knowledge in a technocratic way led to efforts such 
as “Project Revolt,” and “Project Leader.”19  
These “policy scientists” dedicated themselves to impacting the real world, rather than 
just understanding it as social researchers did.20 Project Revolt, a series of studies started in 
1960, aimed at forecasting and preventing communist revolutions. Besides contributing to the 
knowledge base of the sociology of modern revolutions, these policy scientists also furnished the 
military with information about what to look for to anticipate a revolution and how to prevent it. 
One of these measures came in the form of Project Leader, which studied the kind of leaders that 
could lead anti-communist groups. 21  
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c. Return of the Cold War Philosopher-mathematicians 
 
The civilian philosopher-mathematicians at RAND continued to utilize expert opinion as 
they had in Project DELPHI during the early 1950s. As the future was becoming an increasingly 
popular theme, the civilian philosopher-mathematicians of the U.S. Air Force social science arm 
RAND Corporation also continued devoting attention on how to rationalize thinking about the 
future. They intermittently focused on methodological questions such as the validity of opinion 
technologies. But, they also worried about the technological developments of the future and their 
social impacts, as evidenced in the 1963 study conducted by Olaf Helmer and Ted Gordon. This 
interdisciplinary and collaborative study took place at a time of change in the research climate of 
the RAND Corporation. 
The climate at RAND, aside from its size and domain, had changed over the years. The 
emphasis on interdisciplinarity and collaboration was diminishing, and the two-decade old think 
tank started to have generational differences. When first established, the staff was young, had a 
high proportion of advanced degrees with very attractive working conditions. Reflecting on the 
culture, one commentator described it as “pay and working conditions were very attractive, 
especially the opportunity to think and develop in a freewheeling way… imagination was 
welcomed.”22 By 1966 the corporation amassed about 1100 employees. 23 With the size and 
makeup of its people, the advisory institution‟s focus also changed from systems analysis of a 
narrowly technical product to looking at broader policy problems.24  
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According to the RAND veteran Olaf Helmer, there was a gradual trend of groupism. He 
thought “some people wanted to have less intervention from people in different fields,” 25 along 
the lines of a political scientist not thinking mathematicians or engineers understood political or 
social issues. The collaborating atmosphere, he claimed, was being replaced by a university- like 
environment, where members of each discipline comfortably communicated only with each 
other. Helmer, who had been a strong advocate of the expansion of RAND‟s theoretical division 
beyond the realm of mathematics and into the social sciences during the early years, was 
doubtful of its benefit down the line. He reflected, “in principle it was a good idea,” but down the 
line “began to develop this kind of split into separate groups. We didn‟t talk to each other as 
much as we should have.” 26  
The conflicts between rationalist mathematicians in the RAND Corporation and others 
also filtered out to the public in increasingly popular ways during the 1960s. Although criticisms 
of the think tank became vocal during the 1968 protests and the height of U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam, earlier commentators put the spotlight on the incongruence between the technologists 
of RAND and humanists.27 Malvina Reynolds wrote and composed Rand Hymn which folk 
singer Pete Seeger also later sang and popularized.28  
The lyrics of Rand Hymn satirized RAND‟s quantification of people in doomsday 
scenarios while highlighting the paranoia of the thinkers of such scenarios more so than the 
average person. The song started with: “They think all day long for a fee,” “They sit and play 
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games about going up in flames;” “For counters they use you and me.” 29 By its end it expressed 
worries against the think tank being an enemy within: “With a touch of the push-button hand;” 
“We'll be saved at one blow from the designated foe,” “But who's going to save us from 
Rand?”30 
Toward the end of the decade, RAND hosted an artist-in-residence, John Chamberlain, 
who used questionnaires to take the pulse of the organization. Historian Stephanie Young has 
nicely examined the tensions between the RAND scientists and the artist, and the product of his 
time at the think tank, a short booklet of statements and questions called Rand Piece. The 
awkward employment of Chamberlain, his art, and his contempt of the scientists who, according 
to the artist, had “sort of dumb fifth grade attitudes about everything,” also portrayed the 
incongruence of RAND‟s rational thinking and popular sentiments.31  
The changing image of RAND not-withstanding, the civilian philosopher-mathematicians 
who had been involved in Project DELPHI continued to work on thinking about the future. 
Helmer and others thought of their method as a desirable approach that yet needed to be studied 
and refined. To be more scientific, opinion technologies such as the Delphi method needed to 
establish a solid foundation, and resolve concerns about their validity and reliability.   
In 1959 Helmer and Rescher wrote an article intended to fill some holes in the 
ideological foundation of opinion technologies, titled “On the Epistemology of the Inexact 
Sciences.”  These philosophers of science argued that experts could be treated in the same way 
that scientists treated phenomena observed in nature. This work helped establish a theoretical 
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justification for using the Delphi method as an opinion technology that could forecast by using 
experts in preset systems and methodologies. 
 
 
d. Future Technologies Impacting Future Societies 
 
One significant milestone in the history leading up to the formalization of the field of 
futures studies was a 1963 Delphi forecasting study conducted by RAND mathematicians Olaf 
Helmer and Ted Gordon. This was a serious effort to quantify and understand future societies, 
and a project that helped spark the futures studies movement in the United States later in the 
1960s.32 
Conducted a decade after Project DELPHI began, Helmer and Gordon‟s study pursued 
over a hundred experts of which eighty two experts agreed to participate. About half of these 
eighty two respondents were affiliated with RAND - either as consultants or research staff - and 
six were European.33 Notably, French futurist Bertrand de Jouvenel and Hungarian scientist 
Dennis Gabor were two of these international participants. Communicating with these experts, 
Gordon and Helmer asked respondents to predict if and when certain technological developments 
might transpire. Their analysis of the responses benefitted from commentary and critique by 
Delphi co-inventor Norman Dalkey, game theorist and economist Oskar Morgenstern and others 
prior to publication. 
As Helmer and Gordon acknowledged, the fact that most of the participants worked at 
RAND influenced the nature of the study. RAND thinkers considered “plans and policies 
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affecting the rather distant future” on a daily basis. With such future-minded thinking, these 
Delphi participants sought to forecast technological events ten to fifty years ahead. True to the 
spirit of multiple futures, the authors defined forecasting as “mapping out possible futures,” 
rather than predicting a “single future.”34 Furthermore, they cautiously sidestepped the issue of 
reliability by making no claims of whether the resulting forecasts ought to be considered reliable. 
Though they certainly believed that “explicit, reasoned, self-aware opinions” to “lessen the 
chance of surprise and provide a sounder basis for long-range decision-making than do purely 
implicit, unarticulated, intuitive judgments.”35 In other words, they strongly believed the Delphi 
methodology to be an improvement versus any alternative means of long-range forecasting. 
Desiring to provide broad “coverage of the most important determinants of the society of 
the future” Gordon and Helmer divided the study into six subject matters, each with a separate 
panel of experts. These subjects were scientific breakthroughs, population control, automation, 
space progress, war prevention, and weapons systems. The developments considered within the 
first subject, scientific breakthroughs, ranged from “economically useful desalination of sea 
water,” to “implanted artificial organs made of plastic and electronic components,” and from 
“biochemical general immunization against bacterial and viral diseases,” to “breeding of 
intelligent animals (apes, cetaceans, etc.) for low-grade labor.” The participating forecasters 
provided numerical responses as to when any of thirty one developments would occur, from the 
1960s to “never.” Gordon and Helmer acknowledged the lack of meaning in responses that were 
very distant in the future, say 2615, and accordingly shortened their graphical representations of 
the statistical feedback with the participants to jump from 2020 to “never.” 
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Instead of predicting the occurrence of various developments, the expert panel on 
population primarily focused on predicting the world population up to the year 2050. When the 
expert responses were considerably lower than trend extrapolation, facilitators Gordon and 
Helmer asked for justification. In their calculations, participants of the second panel assumed an 
increase in the acceptance of birth control measures. In their report, the facilitators 
acknowledged that while the availability of fertility control measures may be somewhat easier to 
estimate, the acceptance of these developments for common use was more uncertain. 
The remaining panels forecast a list of specific developments, similar to the first group 
that forecast scientific breakthroughs. The panel on automation covered topics of transportation, 
computation, education, and sanitation systems. By considering and forecasting the automation 
of things like air traffic controlling robots or ones that serve as “house slaves” (expected to be 
widespread in the late 1980s) the primary concern of the facilitators was unemployment. Almost 
all the participants regarded the unemployment caused by automation to be serious and to be 
accompanied by social upheavals that could be alleviated by “suitable counter-measures” of 
preventative or therapeutic nature. The proposed measures included : shortening the work week, 
increasing education, aid programs, or legislation protecting certain jobs from automation. The 
panelists then grouped these measures based on their expected effectiveness, desirability, and 
probability. For example, a legislation protecting household and service jobs from automation 
had minor effectiveness, negative desirability, and minor probability of happening, whereas the 
creation of new types of employment ranged in moderate to high in each of the three 
categories.36  
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One of the questions on this panel asked the experts to estimate the year when a machine 
would become available that would comprehend standard IQ tests and score above 150 points. 
From an initial round of responses ranging from 1975 to 2100, the final estimate was given as 
1990, with this range narrowed as 1985 to 2000.   More important than the experts‟ opinions 
about when such a machine would be invented, the notion that such a machine could (in the near 
future) exist and successfully read English and comprehend diagrams to solve puzzles shows the 
importance placed on automation and computation.37 
Forecasters of the space progress panel dealt with 48 potential technological events. 
Studying the future of space exploration in the middle of the space race, these experts agreed that 
very little time needed to pass before reaching milestones such as Soviet and U.S. lunar fly-bys, 
rescue of stranded astronauts, or the building of a 10 person orbital science station. Their 
enthusiasm carried further into manned Venus and Mars fly-by‟s prior to 1980, manned landing 
on Mars and return by 1990, and a median consensus for a permanent Mars base (for, say, 10 
men for an indefinite period) around 2006.  
The last two panels studied war prevention and weapons systems. The former initially 
estimated the probability of war in the future, and then proposed preventative measures that the 
panel rated for desirability, effectiveness, and probability of implementation. These preventative 
measures ranged from increasing the conventional forces of specific countries to various 
alliances or the intervention of the United Nations in economic military or societal avenues, such 
as instituting population control.  
The latter panel on weapons forecasting considered developments of future systems. For 
example, the panelists produced opinions about the likelihood of weather control for flooding 
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that threatened to ruin crops (estimated to become a reality between 1987-2000), or putting 
military forces on the moon (estimated never to happen, even though some experts predicted this 
would happen within the twentieth century).  
The facilitators built on these Delphi results by abstracting three potential future societies 
that could happen by the years 1984, 2000, and 2100. According to their 1964 report, Gordon 
and Helmer synthesized the various quantified predictions of future developments to deduce that 
the world population of 1984 would increase to 4.3 billion, unless a WWIII took place. To 
support this population, agriculture would be aided by the availability of desalinated sea water. 
Also in 1984, “effective fertility control will be practiced, with the result that the birth rate will 
continue to drop.”38  
In the year 2000, the world‟s population would increase to 5.1 billion, new food sources 
would include synthetic protein and large-scale ocean farming, and according to Gordon and 
Helmer, “correction of hereditary defects through molecular engineering will be possible.” By 
the turn of the millennium, various other technological developments would happen, including 
effective anti-ICBM defenses that could stop inter-continental ballistic missiles using energy 
beams and air-launched missiles. The year 2000 would also bring about commercial mining and 
production of propellant materials on the moon. 39 
The study‟s facilitators changed to a more cautious tone when discussing the outlook for 
the year 2100. Instead of predicting when an event would happen, Gordon and Helmer added a 
disclaimer that their synthesis was “an indication of what a number of thoughtful people regard 
as conceivable during the next few generations to come.” Their portrait of 136 years ahead 
included assessments such as the possibility of chemical control of the aging process for raising a 
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person‟s life expectancy to over 100 years, and that international agreements based on the 
abundance of new sources of energy and raw materials would solve problems of adequately 
providing the necessities of life for all peoples of the earth. Last but not the least; they claimed 
that “two-way communication with extra-terrestrial intelligent beings is a definite possibility.”40 
Looking back, it is easy to discredit their effort and wonder if these forecasters, and also 
the facilitators, were science fiction writers rather than scientists. Despite the close connection 
between futures studies and science fiction writing and even the similar skill sets they sometimes 
utilize, these were scientists charged with reasoning probable responses to when certain events or 
developments would come about, if ever. The fact that in the 21st century we still do not have a 
permanent lunar base is not really the lesson to be drawn. Rather, the content of their original 
questionnaires and these mathematicians‟ motivation for conducting the study are more 
significant. This study was conducted six years after Sputnik was launched and six years before 
the first moon-landing, amidst a heated space-race. The space-related forecasts exemplify a 
significant theme: the predictions reflect a deterministic outlook. Or in Alex Roland‟s terms, 
these scientists assumed that the directionality of space research would remain the same, and that 
it would be at the forefront of social priorities. So, it was conducted during a high growth era for 
technological innovations, and many of the forecasts assumed technologies would necessarily 
become better and better. 
A second theme that emerges in this report is the occidental nature of the experts, and 
content. The range of their population forecasts were low (4.3 billion by 1984, 5.1 billion by 
2000, 8 billion by 2100) in part because of their enthusiasm and assumption about the increased 
effectiveness of population control methods in the future. The participants and facilitators were 
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Westerners, and arguably so were some recurring topics such as population control, correction of 
hereditary defects through molecular engineering, or wanting to achieve a life expectancy of over 
a hundred years. 
A third and final significant theme, one that is built-in to the Delphi method is the 
quantification of human traits, or complex social problems. Some developments selected for 
projection dealt with raising intelligence, using personality control drugs, eugenics, and other 
social, economic, and political topics. The quantifications of this 1963 study are part of the post-
WWII trend to gather data, rationalize and model society, a trend that was fuelled by thinkers of 
the Vienna and Berlin circles of the interwar period.  
Quantification of complex issues was one thing, interpreting and analyzing the resulting 
predictions was something else. The convergence of estimates over the course of the 
questionnaire‟s iteration led to a range of possibilities that usually made up the panel‟s 
consensus. Helmer and Gordon regarded consensus as a positive thing, because to them, a 
narrow range of predictions meant that the experts had worked through the problem and reached 
the same conclusions without coercion. These futurists saw consensus as a desirable thing not 
necessarily because they were opposed to non-conformist ideas, but rather because they viewed 
the method as a valid scientific tool, granted the experts were indeed experts.41 
These data were not merely numbers placed next to briefly defined concepts, but emerged 
from genuine concern over the impact of foreseeable technological developments. The 
deterministic, Western, and quantitative nature of the results provide insights into the optimism 
and focus of 1960s America. Furthermore, in the coming years when the field of futures studies 
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became a formal field, futurists regarded this study as an inspiration showing the possibilities 
that the rational approach of the Delphi method enabled. 
 
 
e. Methodologists and Philosophical Foundations of Futures Methods 
 
RAND work on improving futures studies methodologies continued intermittently. In 
1966 Helmer wrote about the systematization of expert opinion. He continued to champion the 
validity of opinion technologies and the Delphi method in particular, as scientific approaches for 
complex problems requiring expertise.  
Although a mathematician and logicist, Olaf Helmer often devoted his attention to real 
issues, and not only on abstract mathematical theories. Strategic and military concerns had led to 
the invention of the Delphi method in the early 1950s; however, by the early 1960s Helmer 
devoted much of his thinking to social issues. He advocated for the application of opinion 
technologies such as the Delphi method for public policy planning. Issues such as the “wars” on 
poverty, crime, pollution, disease etc., or the planning of the futures of education, agriculture and 
so on were complex and without a proven best approach. Helmer delineated commonalities 
among the planning of all such public policy issues. They all were long-range, cross-disciplinary, 
urgent problems, which lacked a theoretical foundation to address their solution.  
Describing the lack of established sciences for attacking such issues, Helmer proposed 
two options: “we can either throw up our hands in despair and wait until we have an adequate 
theory … or we can make the most of an admittedly unsatisfactory situation and try to obtain the 
relevant intuitive insights of experts and then use their judgments as systematically as 
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possible.”42 The urgency of the issues mentioned above made Helmer quickly discard the first 
option, stating plainly, “public policy decisions must be made promptly, or they will be made by 
default.” 
So, instead of resigning himself to the complexity and difficulty of forecasting the 
possibilities in public policy planning, he argued that the future – and expert opinions of future 
events/decisions/issues – ought to be studied “as systematically as possible.”43 Helmer urged 
social scientists to explore the possibilities that operations-research had to offer. Comparing the 
operations analyst to scientists, he acknowledged the former to be pragmatic and more tentative. 
While scientists developed theories that explained the reality, operations analysts helped 
decision-makers with ascertaining the best courses of action. Yet, Helmer claimed both worked 
off of mathematical models, and although the operations analyst did not work with models that 
were a part of a well-confirmed body of accepted scientific knowledge, the use of successive 
approximations as an operational decision-making aid had been “spectacularly successful.”44  
Helmer realized that expertise was a hard to evaluate concept, yet given complex and 
urgent policy issues, a necessary one. Opinion technologies such as simulations allowed for 
experimentation within models of the issues, while the Delphi method allowed further for the 
combining of diverging opinions without apparent personal biases. The goal of removing the 
committee interactions or any face-to-face communications was to remove the “leader effect,” 
which cautioned against the influence of vocal and charismatic members biasing a committee.  
According to Helmer, one of the ways in which forecasts could be improved was to have 
participating experts weigh their confidence levels for each of the questions asked. Other 
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members of Project DELPHI, especially Norman Dalkey, sought to evaluate predictions based 
on experts‟ confidence in self-evaluations. This is interesting, especially since one of the primary 
studies Helmer cited as the ideological foundation for the Delphi method argued against a 
correlation between an expert‟s self-evaluated confidence level and the reliability of the expert‟s 
judgments.45 It was as if they asked the same questions over and over again because the 
approaches for studying the future were inherently limited.  
 
 
f. Beginnings of a New Field? – Chapter Conclusion 
 
In the dawn of the revolutions of the late 1960s, futurism was not that well known as a 
distinct field of inquiry, yet it was gaining in popularity. Visionaries such as Herman Kahn and 
his On Thermonuclear War, or the RAND mathematicians‟ multi-topic forecasting study of 
future technologies and their social impacts generated discussion of the futures of 1960s thinkers, 
but also on futurism as a subject itself. RAND‟s philosopher-mathematicians had been mulling 
over questions of how to best forecast a complex problem, or how to best utilize expert opinion, 
and their works started to be declassified and published during the 1960s.  
The 1964 Helmer and Gordon study inspired futurists to imagine the future, but more 
importantly to expend effort in studying how to study the future. They believed that the endeavor 
to study the future was clearly a scientific one, despite its inherent limitations. Once quantified, 
they rationalized, future data could be considered as equal to data from the past or the present, 
and therefore that its variations and statistical properties could be analyzed in the same manner. 
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The positivism of the 1930s continued through the help of the junior member of the Berlin circle, 
Olaf Helmer. 
According to revisionist histories of the Cold War, life went on in much the same way in 
the United States before WWII as after. Tracing the history of U.S. politics and especially the 
U.S. presidents, from the progressive era to the end of the twentieth century, Leo P. Ribuffo 
downplayed the impact of the Cold War during the post-WWII years. Ribuffo argued that 
Sputnik caused wonderment as much as anxiety and that the communist scare was more a matter 
of political rhetoric, rather than everyday concerns of people. Highlighting continuities 
throughout the twentieth century, he continued to downplay the impact of young people during 
the “Sixties” (a term describing roughly the third decade of the Cold War, from mid-1960s to 
mid-1970s).46  
After the early Cold War period, RAND increased its research staff of social scientists 
and developed into a social science think tank, a shift that brought about tensions and groupism 
between the scientists and social scientists. As this environment gradually changed in the 1960s, 
some of the qualities of collaboration and interdisciplinary research that had defined RAND in 
the 1950s found a home in the field of futures studies. Futurists applied the methodologies of 
Cold War military strategists to social problems both local and global. In their quest for a better 
future, these social scientists‟ inquiries closely followed the social and political questions of their 
time, which is the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3. The Many Motivations of the Futures Studies Movement 
 
If the military- industrial(-academic) complex and strategic fears had a lot to do with the 
inception of futures studies early in the Cold War, peace-studies and civilian issues dominated 
the forum established by the futurists during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Indeed the forum 
seemingly emerged to satisfy a demand/hope for a peaceful future. A decade after his resignation 
from office, President Richard Nixon wrote that “short of changing human nature, … the only 
way to achieve a practical, livable peace in a world of competing nations is to take the profit out 
of war.”1 While the counterculture could not will peace onto humanity, it succeeded in 
questioning the establishment and put the spotlight on the link between the military industrial 
complex and academia. 
The young generation responded strongly to the social pressures, conformist culture, and 
the inequalities of their time in the first couple of decades after the Second World War. One of 
the many developments during the counterculture period was the emergence of the field of 
futures studies. While the historical threads of studying the future have more continuity than 
discontinuity, futurists of the late 1960s and early 1970s stood out with their diverse and spirited 
debates, their enthusiasm and organization in formalizing and spreading their field.  
The futures studies movement was a surge in popularity of forecasting among many and 
diverse groups of futurists. The field of futures studies enjoyed so much popularity during the 
1960s and 1970s that some commentators reflected on this period as “the futures studies 
movement,” or as “the golden age of futurology.”2 
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Futures Studies emerged as a distinctive field of social and technological inquiry after the 
Second World War. Defined by a concern for the future of humanity, this broad field surfaced 
with notable momentum in the mid to late 1960s as a result of many interweaving historical 
threads and the efforts of a group of futurists of sundry backgrounds. As defining as the Cold 
War period was, historians, economists, and sociologists were still trying to come to grips with 
an industrial society, let alone a nuclear one.3 Futures studies provided a forum for scientists as 
well as social scientists to debate contemporary issues, where the connecting thread was a 
concern for humanity‟s future.  
The Cold War was an intense period of angst that inspired forecasting. Worrying about 
nuclear mega deaths yielded to concerns about the shortage of food, population growth, civil 
liberties, energy concerns, and so forth. The idea that people were in charge of their future and 
should be conscious of their options was not original, but the 1960s and 1970s had a uniquely 
intense focus on the future when hundreds of social scientists, scientists, and concerned citizens 
enthusiastically established the field of futures studies as a framework with which to address 
their many fears.4 
The most fascinating feature of futurism during the counterculture years was the 
differences among the voices and their motivations. Leaders of the counterculture, such as the 
eco-futurist Stewart Brand, used the future as an argument, as much as conservative, anti-
counterculture personalities such as Alvin Toffler or Herman Kahn. The salient point of the 
golden age of futurism was not that they had one mission and one motivation, but many. Futures 
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studies became a forum for voicing the many fears, hopes, and approaches for studying the 
future of anything.  
As futurism grew more popular, the newly inaugurated journals, newsletters, and 
organizations provided the methodologists with outlets for discussing futurist‟s tools. The 
methodologists, futurists who primarily thought about how to study the future and how to 
establish a strong epistemic foundation for the field, were one of the many voices during the 
movement. 
Although some futurists referred to their lively activities in the late 1960s as a movement, 
other commentators scoffed at the designation as inaccurate.5 Those skeptical of the term 
“movement” argued that the field of futures studies gained momentum and grew in numbers 
during the decade between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, but that the futurism of the period was 
nothing like a social movement.6 Aspects of futurism certainly reached popular culture; however, 
the impact of this field was more of an underlying change in the organization of governments, 
businesses, and military forces. Despite gaining a sizeable following in the tens of thousands, the 
futures studies movement never defined the times on a national or popular level. Nonetheless, I 
use the “movement” designation to emphasize the extraordinary interest in futures studies, and 
its wide-ranging influence. According to one futurist, Edward Cornish of the World Future 
Society (WFS), the reason futures studies did not take form as a social movement was that there 
was no enemy, save for “technological progress,” to galvanize people.7 Unlike the “white 
culture” in the civil liberties movement, or the “man‟s world culture” in the feminist movement, 
the future was too inclusive to rebel – or to start a popular movement – against.  
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Social or not, the height of the field of futures studies rightly qualifies as a 
scientific/intellectual movement (SIM) as theorized by sociologists Scott Frickel and Neil 
Gross.8 These authors defined SIMs to be “collective efforts to pursue research programs or 
projects for thought in the face of resistance from others in the scientific or intellectual 
community.”9 Futurists gathered and pursued ideas, programs, projects, and political goals, and 
challenged the status quo of established academic and intellectual communities. Frickel and 
Gross laid forth four propositions that help enable a scientific/intellectual movement: high status 
actors‟ involvement/criticism, securing resources, access to new recruits, and framing movement 
ideas in ways that resonate with relevant intellectual communities.  
The futures studies movement mostly fit Frickel and Gross‟ propositions. It had many 
high-status actors ranging from prolific writers to politicians, and the movement was able to 
secure moderate funding from a variety of sources including businesses and different levels of 
the government. Many futurists were academics, and starting in the 1960s, worked to establish 
futures studies as a recognized formal field with departments, students etc. As futurists were still 
in the process of establishing their field, the futures studies movement did not fit neatly into 
Frickel and Gross‟ fourth proposition. Since futures studies was more than a SIM within a field, 
but it was a SIM about a newly emerging one. 
After contextualizing the third decade of the Cold War, I trace the transition from Cold 
War futurism which focused on strategy to the open forum that the field transformed into. 
Futures studies became a formalized field so far as it established organizations, with ways of 
disseminating and adding to their knowledge-base, and had a connecting vision across its 
constituents. Granted, the connecting vision was a rather general idea of being mindful of future 
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possibilities so as to decide on the best course of action in the present, with many voices and 
possible futures. The field was an open forum that catered to diverse views and allowed for a 
lively discussion. 
Futurists of the period ranged from scientists such as Olaf Helmer or Paul Baran of 
RAND Corporation, to social scientists such as Jim Dator, a political scientist at the University 
of Hawaii, or the influential sociologist Daniel Bell; from concerned citizens such as Ed Cornish 
and Alvin Toffler to strategic thinkers such as Herman Kahn or future-minded politicians such as 
U.S. Senators Al Gore and John Culver, among many others.10 These varied intellectuals came 
from different political and economic backgrounds and founded a field that resonated with many 
intellectual communities, including more traditional academic fields of economics, engineering, 
and political science. 
This chapter surveys the constituency and looks at the different motivations of futurists 
during this intellectual movement. They established institutes, produced abundant and ongoing 
literatures, and developed university courses and programs, but nonetheless remained on the 
margins of traditional fields of scholarship. Then, chapter four looks in more detail at the specific 
organizations, publications, conferences, and academic involvements of the futures studies 
movement and beyond.  
 
 
a. Counter Culture, Détente, and the Military-industrial-academic Complex 
 
The counter culture generation was unified under the banner of non-conformity, and the 
rejection of traditional values and injustices. Although the counter culture reacted against the 
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Vietnam War, the military- industrial-complex, and other features of the Cold War culture, it was 
also defined by post-industrialism, rejecting tradition and traditional motivations.11  
Theodore Roszak popularized the idea of a counter culture in his 1969 book The Making 
of a Counter Culture. In it he divided the counter culture, which was trying to come to terms 
with post-scarcity, as belonging to “reversionists” or “technophiles.”  The former desired and 
sought the answers to post-industrialism in simpler times, while the latter in technological 
inventions.12  
Roszak was not the only commentator of the time trying to define the zeitgeist of the 
post-WWII world. Daniel Bell, a Harvard sociologist, successfully commented on, and 
popularized the term “post-industrial society.” In his The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A 
Venture in Social Forecasting, Bell proposed a new paradigm, a different social construct with 
which to analyze the emerging culture. As opposed to an industrial society, in a post-industrial 
society people worked in service rather than manufacturing. In Bell‟s paradigm for the post-
industrial society as the new dominant social system, knowledge production, innovation, and 
science-based industries would be based on new standards of technology and education-based 
meritocracy.   
Daniel Bell‟s work transcended Cold War concerns and indicated the societal changes of 
the time. Bell was one of the prominent futurists who bridged the technocratic and liberal ends of 
the ideological spectrum, which is hardly surprising, since his 1960 book The End of Ideology 
had predicted the end of communism and a shift towards a more local focus in politics.  Aside 
from forecasting technologies of the future and their social impacts, this sociology professor was 
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a futurist who helped provide some of the philosophical foundations for the existence of futures 
studies. The end of ideology was the beginning of futurology.13 
As Cold War tensions gave way to détente later in the 1960s, forecasting efforts 
increasingly concentrated on humanitarian concerns. Significantly, the forecasters changed as 
much as the content that was forecast. Futurists called for a democratization of opinion 
technologies and argued that the future belonged to everybody, not just the strategic thinkers 
behind the scenes. Referring back to Mankind 2000, the influential Austrian futurist Robert 
Jungk pointed to a change in direction, in which the powerful tools of futurists were not 
restricted to technocratic elite, but to everyone, “for the future belongs to all of us.” 14  
Tools such as the Delphi method became democratized, declassified and made available 
for anyone who wanted to use it, during the futures studies movement.15 Internationalization, a 
topic covered more fully in chapter five, paralleled this “democratization,” – or proliferation – of 
futurists‟ tools. Many European and Soviet futurists used and discussed the Delphi method over 
the subsequent years. 16 Japanese institutes went on to conduct perhaps the most extensive and 
influential Delphi surveys that produced regular national outlooks of future technological 
trends.17 This opinion technology continued to be influential globally, long after its popularity 
declined in the United States. For example, in her introductory 1993 survey of futures studies, 
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past WFSF president and influential futurist, Eleonora Masini covered this opinion technology, 
as one of the primary futurist methodologies.18 
In tackling complex social problems from the mid-1960s onward, futurists keenly utilized 
Delphi, more so than scenarios or other forecasting methods, because of its association with 
science and its aura of objectivity. By quantifying opinions and removing personal interactions, 
and incorporating a diverse group of panelists, the Delphi method quickly earned recognition as 
the most appropriate forecasting tool among managers, academics, and government experts alike. 
Futurists prized the quantification of past and present social values, from which they tried to 
clarify issues of the future; how to forecast and understand them, and ultimately how to change 
the trends for the better.  
The futures studies movement was born out of strong Cold War influences that gradually 
diminished. The “communist menace” stimulated many into contemplating future threats and 
possibilities. For example, before pioneering the 1965 newsletter, The Futurist, Ed Cornish 
worked as a journalist for several years and had a secure job at the National Geographic Society, 
when he felt compelled to become a futurist. What drove Cornish to the detailed study of the 
future was his “existential dread of thermonuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United 
States.”19 Fearful of thermonuclear war and Cold War tensions, this journalist sought to bring 
together influential and concerned people, in which he succeeded with his active involvement 
with the World Future Society (WFS) as detailed in the next chapter. As the Cold War calmed 
down in the 1960s and 1970s amidst nuclear non-proliferation and test-ban treaties, so did the 
discourse on Cold War related futures. 
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b. A Transition from Military to Civilian Patronage and Outlooks 
 
As academics, government officials, and business managers focused on their respective 
futures, the field‟s focus grew to encompass, or rather shifted toward, civilian subjects. Futurists 
moved from Cold War forecasts to social, natural, and humanitarian outlooks. In the post-WWII 
world, the challenge of analyzing Soviet nuclear threats had compelled the engineering of 
experts‟ opinions in accordance not only with the U.S. military but increasingly also U.S. social 
expectations. The original Delphi study estimated U.S. vulnerabilities against a surprise-attack 
by the Soviets, but opinion technologies – including scenario forecasting, simulation, cross-
impact analysis, or war-games – increasingly transcended the Cold War military realm, 
especially during and after the counter culture period. The field of futures studies – also strongly 
influenced by WWII military thinking – similarly gained momentum during the 1960s and 1970s 
as a way of responding to post-industrial growing pains. 20 Futurists prided themselves in being 
open-minded to alternative futures, and aspired to found a science for systematically planning 
and intervening to achieve desired possible futures. 21 Many futurists, including popularizers 
such as Alvin Toffler, ambitiously aspired to revolutionize decision-making at all levels of 
policymaking. They advocated for national economic planning boards as well as “future-
consciousness” at local levels of government, and established numerous national and 
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international think-tanks, societies, journals, and even university courses dedicated to studying 
the future. 22 
In From Warfare to Welfare, historian Jennifer Light made a strong case for how the 
defense intellectuals failed to transition into non-defense projects. In particular Light traced the 
involvement of civilian advisory groups such as the RAND Corporation in a context of urban 
planning, and noted that by and large their methods, approaches, and insight fell short of 
expectations and was therefore short-lived. 23 
When examining the parallel history of the futurists‟ prized Delphi forecasting method, 
the timeline was similar. This forecasting tool was invented by defense-intellectuals who worked 
on military strategy related problems and tried to spread and use this approach for non-military 
issues later in the 1960s and 1970s, and lost its popularity in the late 1970s due to criticisms. 
However, Delphi did not fully fit Light‟s paradigm, because it succeeded in spreading beyond 
the bounds of the defense-affiliated and funded studies.  
While the Soviet nuclear ambitions had originally impelled RAND mathematicians to 
design the Delphi method, this consensus-building opinion technology became a heavily-utilized 
forecasting tool for non-military issues. Such social forecasts often came with a disclaimer of 
resting their assumptions on the non-occurrence of war. In his presidential address to the 12th 
North American Peace Science Conference in 1974, R. C. North urged the need for scenario 
forecasts that revealed “some of the dynamics of large-scale violence and widen[ed] our 
perception of policy alternatives.”24 
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As the treatment of military doomsday scenarios decreased, discussion of social and 
environmental catastrophes increased. So much so that in 1974 Yehezkel Dror of the Institute for 
the Future (IFTF) editorial board criticized his fellow futurists for neglecting “serious analyses of 
the futures of war and other forms of violence.” 25 Along the lines of Toffler‟s criticism of the 
counter culture, Dror listed several criticisms of the state of futures studies. He suggested that 
futurists and their research concentrated on “subjective taste and personal concerns,” and desired 
to “build cross-ideological bridges” leading to the avoidance of controversial topics such as 
violence and war. Dror argued that “wishful thinking” was one of the main reasons for this 
negligence, and continued: “the future is tragically rich in potential wars and violence [in which] 
new technologies and new sensitivities increase the potential impacts” and endanger “the future 
of humanity itself.” He called on futurists to devote much more attention to the hard issues of 
war and violence, particularly because “the possible impact [was] so terrible as to justify 
maximum efforts to contain, reduce and abolish wars and violence.”26 
Few heeded Dror‟s warning. One of the exceptions, publishing on war strategy, was a 
1970 article by Geoffrey Jukes. Jukes concluded that there were no foreseeable developments 
until 1983 that would “significantly diminish the „assured destruction‟ capability possessed by 
the USA and the USSR, and no other country could acquire super-power status,” although he 
stressed the possibility of China moving in such a direction.27 Another futurist investigated the 
sources of error in predicting the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and USSR.28 Olaf Helmer 
criticized the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the “unquestionably wasteful use of resources in 
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the continuing war effort.” Instead, he argued, those funds should be used for institutions that 
“facilitated public/private cooperation in the creation of cities that [were] fit to live in.”29 
As Joseph Corn and Brian Horrigan argued in Yesterday‟s Tomorrows: Past Visions of 
the American Future, the military industrial complex was a self-perpetuating machine. Just as 
automobile manufacturers worked toward an improved and better-looking car each year, military 
contractors encouraged quick technological change and obsolescence.30 
SORO, the Special Operations Research Office based at the American University, was 
one of the casualties of these protests. SORO research such as “Project Camelot,” which 
attempted to predict communist revolutions in Latin America, fueled the growing perception that 
militarism was subverting social science research and the government.31 SORO cancelled Project 
Camelot amidst the bad press surrounding these efforts in 1966, and towards the end of 1969 the 
American University officially terminated its ties to this office. 
The story of SORO and the American University was not unique. Many students 
protested their universities‟ affiliations with the military- industrial complex, including those at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New York University, among others. 32 The 
counterculture was unified through anti-war sentiments, but it also embodied the widespread 
resentment of the military- industrial complex, and its spread into academia.33  
University students protested and stood up against the Vietnam War, social and economic 
injustices in the U.S. The intensifying tensions between the government and American students 
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led to the Kent State University incident, when National Guardsmen shot and killed four students 
on May 4, 1970. Protest songs such as “Ohio” by Crosby, Stills, Nash and Young memorialized 
these killings and kept the non-conformist spirit alive. 
However, as historian Joy Rohde pointed out, the victory of the counterculture movement 
strengthened the military- industrial complex, and only served to sever ties between the complex 
and academia. According to Rohde, the “old purveyors of expert democracy … continued to lend 
legitimacy to the national security state,” 34 but with more limited circulation. The researchers 
continued their efforts within a contract research agency called American Institutes for Research. 
Separation from academia limited the policy scientists‟ exposure to students, classes, and their 
contributions to scholarly journals. Rohde argued that this disconnection from academia 
intensified the contract researchers‟ ties to the national security state, as they did not keep up 
with the developments of their respective fields.  
 
 
c. Diverse Participation in the New Forum of Futures Studies 
 
The meaning of the term “futurist,” which came into popular use after the Time magazine 
article in 1966, was an issue of contention. While some defined a futurist to be a person who 
specialized in mathematics and statistics, and excelled at forecasting reality via models, others 
had broader conceptions of the designation. Futurists also included forecasters that did not base 
their work on scientific principles, such as a science fiction writer, or else an expert of a subject 
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matter other than forecasting, or someone in a position of authority of an institution that 
produced forecasts a futurist.  
Futurism was a broader rubric than modeling, or forecasting. Futurism, or futures studies, 
was a diverse field to investigate all aspects of studying futures. This vague and all-
encompassing nature of futures studies often troubled futurists. But within this broad mission, 
there were specific strands of futurists. Some of the more distinguishable strands were the eco-
futurists, methodologists, planners, and strategists. Eco-futurists focused on the future from 
ecological, methodologists from epistemological, planners from practical, and strategists from 
defense perspectives.  
A complicating factor was that some people who considered themselves futurists were 
not and others, who tried to distance themselves from the label, were futurists. Similar to the 
famous story of Thomas Kuhn yelling “I am not a Kuhnian” during a conference, there were 
forecasters who did not want to be regarded as futurists.  
For example, one futurist who tried to distance himself from the label was Stewart Brand, 
a pioneer of the appropriate technology and environmentalist movements. Brand considered the 
futurist image to be too much of a crank. Another author, who explicitly stated he was not doing 
futurist work, was Zbiegniew Brzezinski, who later became Jimmy Carter‟s national security 
adviser. 35 In his 1970 book, Between Two Ages, Brzezinski laid out the impact of science, 
technology and education. Accordingly, the 20th century preeminence of the U.S. was a result of 
what he called the technotronic (a neologism derived from technology and electronics). This 
futurist, who did not like the label, nonetheless studied the future. He stated, “as a sweeping 
generalization, it can be said that Rome exported law; England, parliamentary party democracy; 
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France, culture and republican nationalism; the contemporary United States, technological 
scientific innovation and mass culture derived from high consumption.”36 Brzezinski continued 
to argue that the assassinations of the Kennedys, MLK and the social and racial tensions of the 
1960s and the Vietnam War had all diminished the image of the United States, but that the 
United States nevertheless would retain its leadership in scientific innovation and popular culture 
in the then foreseeable future.  
As the field grew in number of memberships in formal organizations, directories listing 
professional futurists also grew in size. These regularly published compilations allowed futurists 
to communicate with their peers of widely ranging interests. One such directory listed nearly 800 
futurists, specified with over a hundred subject areas. Futurists included specializations in 
chemistry, history, energy, or family. 37 The editors of the publication commented that this listing 
was not exhaustive. Many were omitted, because “the study of the future is a multidimensional, 
rapidly evolving and growing field.”38 
The discussion of institutions and meetings of futurists in the fourth chapter provides a 
deeper understanding of the movement‟s impact. The late 1960s and early 1970s boast the 
creation of many organizations, societies and publications dedicated to studying the future, but 
more importantly, the period produced many visions, ideas, and approaches related to the 
possible futures of the contemporary futurist.  
Some of these visions with a more ecological motivation constituted an eco-futurist 
strand in the movement. Eco-futurists came from different ends of the political spectrum but they 
were primarily interested in humanity‟s impact and future impact on ecology.  
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One of the leading eco-futurists of the counterculture period, and arguably one of the 
most influential futurists, was Paul Ralph Ehrlich. Ehrlich was a biology professor at Stanford 
who studied butterfly populations. In 1968 he wrote The Population Bomb, which renewed 
Malthusian concerns of overpopulation leading to inevitable starvation of humans at a large scale 
of “hundreds of millions.” He dramatically forecast that such limits would be reached around the 
1980s, a comment which succeeded in arousing the interest of the public and raised awareness of 
overpopulation.39  
Ehrlich strikingly quantified and wrote about hopeless future scenarios where starvation 
was inevitable, given population growth trends of the time. He potently used linear trend 
analyses by providing examples such as how the surface of the world would be completely 
covered in people within so many years if the population growth trends of the pre-1968 years 
continued. One of Ehrlich‟s main ideas in The Population Bomb was that population multiplied 
by affluence and by technology equaled impact. In other words, his pessimistic vision stated that 
wealthier and more advanced populations left a larger footprint and produced more ecological 
harm than less advanced and poorer populations. 
One of the significant trends of the counterculture era was the appropriate technology 
(AT) movement. AT, basically argued for the use of technologies that were appropriate for the 
context in which they were used. Stewart Brand, student of Paul Ehrlich, started and edited The 
Whole Earth Catalog in 1968, which promoted sustainable solutions. Brand was one of the main 
popularizers of AT along with Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, a German-born economist who also 
popularized AT with his 1973 book Small is Beautiful. The primary motivation for Brand and 
Schumacher was to fight the technocratic top-down thinking they feared was recklessly depleting 
finite resources, and to produce innovative local approaches.  
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Brand was one of those futurists who tried to distance himself from the label. He thought 
the image of futurists in the popular media was too tainted by its association with utopians and 
cranks.40 Regardless of the label, he led the American counterculture environmentalism with his 
innovation and spotting of emerging trends. In tune with historian of technology Melvin 
Kranzberg‟s first law which stated “technology is neither good, nor bad, nor is it neutral,” Brand 
argued that technology could be good for the environment.41 Unlike his biology mentor at 
Stanford, Paul Ehrlich, Brand did not think that population multiplied by affluence and by 
technology equaled its impact. Instead he argued the reverse could be true, that “population times 
technology equals reduction of impact.”42 
The Club of Rome was an international sensation and influential wave-maker during the 
futures studies movement. Initially gathered in 1968 at a villa in Rome, by the Italian 
industrialist Aurelio Peccei, this was a small but diverse group representing academia, 
diplomacy, civil society, and industry. 43 The Club‟s call-to-arms, a proposal called The 
Predicament of Mankind, embodied the futurist mode of the time that “now more than ever” 
things needed to change. This seminal brochure argued that recent approaches to understanding 
the complexities of the times, of the “situation,” were woefully inadequate, and demanded out-
of-the-box thinking.44 It demanded emerging methodologies such as “situational modeling.”  
The proposal‟s laundry-list of forty nine continuous critical problems, which included 
things like wastage of natural resources, population growth, poverty etc., served as a prequel to 
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the best-selling 1972 report The Limits to Growth. Along the bleak lines of Ehrlich‟s Population 
Bomb, the Club‟s Limits report argued that unrestrained growth of consumption clashed with the 
world‟s limited resources. Its social, political, and economic message spread far and quickly, 
selling over twelve million copies in thirty languages.45 
A veteran futurist, Buckminster Fuller continued to follow trends and provide solutions 
during the futures studies movement. He was most well-known for his geodesic dome designs 
and other architectural designs such as the Dymaxion House. The Dymaxion House (Fuller used 
this collage of the words dynamic, maximum, and tension for a variety of projects) was an idea 
that emerged during the interwar years, but he continued to work on it throughout the Second 
World War, and advocated for the mass-production of these aluminum standard houses of the 
future. However, this idea, unlike his geodesic dome designs, was never realized. Although 
significantly different in design, materiel etc., the 1950‟s Levittowns were the closest that came 
to Fuller‟s idea of mass-produced standard housing.46  
At the 7th Congress of the International Union of Architects in 1961, Fuller called out to 
his field to devote the next decade to making resources serve all of humanity, and called it the 
“World Design Science Decade.”47 Through the 1960s and into the early 1970s Fuller published 
various articles towards this goal, some co-authored by artist and fellow futurist John McHale 
and others. In a 1963 letter to architecture students, Fuller urged for “comprehensive, 
anticipatory, design scientists” to deal with the lethal dilemmas of the time. He introduced his 
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philosophy and vision of the decade of world design, optimistic that the next generation of 
architects would be capable of bringing about change.48  
Fuller later extended the theme of world resources serving 100% of humanity as a 
response to the environmental crisis of the 1970s. His proposal was that national and world 
leaders should learn by playing games simulating the distribution of resources. Through such 
game scenarios on the “Dymaxion World Map” that Fuller created, he intended that players 
would see two things: where inequalities were – thus his mission to change things – and secondly 
that there was plenty to go around if properly managed. 49 
Herman Kahn and economist Anthony J. Wiener wrote The Year 2000: A Framework for 
Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years.50 This outlook to the end of the millennium 
contained many technological and social projections, most of the ideas of which came from 
Kahn.51 As with On Thermonuclear War, Kahn was unapologetic with his analysis of future 
scenarios and his many forecasts.  
Futures studies became a forum open to all people during the movement. Whether it was 
the optimism of Fuller or Brand, or the pessimism of Ehrlich or Toffler, the future-thinkers of the 
movement had a variety of visions of what was to come. Some of the voices fit with the counter 
culture designation of Roszak, while others, such as Herman Kahn, had more conservative, 
“counter-revolutionary” convictions. The predominantly optimistic and deterministic forecasts of 
the first couple of decades of the Cold War led to an explosion of futures research, and futures 
researchers.    Among the many and colorful voices of the futurists, also were the methodologists 
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like Olaf Helmer and Norman Dalkey who continued to solidify the intellectual foundation of the 
field.  
The futurists of the movement argued there was a lot at stake, about the future of nature, 
of national security, of policy-making, and so on. They developed their field of futures studies 
into a forum and actively organized to find the best ways to look into their respective strands of 
futures studies. 
 
 
d. The Science of Studying the Future 
 
Asimov‟s idea of psychohistory was a far-fetched science fiction notion that futurists did 
not actually strive for. However, many futurists, and especially the methodologists, wanted to 
develop a science of studying the future. Some futurists argued that, as with any science there 
would be “gurus” and “futurists.” The former envisioned the future and synthesized the 
information to intuit trends. The latter did the day to day science stuff: futurists were the lab 
techs of policy-making.52 The methodologists wanted to claim their field from soothsayers, 
fortune tellers, or the arbitrary expert, and provide guidelines and methods for the futurist at 
large.  
The history of forecasting is closely linked to the history of the mathematical concept of 
probability to the extent that it influenced decision-making about the future. While this history of 
statistics is outside the scope of this dissertation, there were relevant ideas and methodologies 
that futurists utilized. One of the pre-Cold War historical roots of this field goes back to 
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Bayesian inferences as they incorporate newly emerging data.53 Statistical tools such as trend 
analysis via regression were among the first tools futurists used to study the future. 
However, the most significant scientific contributions for forecasting came during the 
Cold War period – namely the emergence of time-series analysis, as a separate field from 
descriptive statistics. Instead of basing probabilistic predictions about a population on samples 
from that population, times-series analysis based predictions of timelines on data from that time-
line. Statisticians modeled temporal data often by combining in some way or another the data‟s 
moving average and autoregressive function. The main pioneer of such methods was an English 
statistician named George Box, who helped invent the well-known Box-Cox transformations and 
Box-Jenkins modeling method during the 1960s and 1970s. Importantly, analyses using the Box-
Jenkins method tried to understand the probability with which these models predicted the 
extension of the timeline into the future.  
While the use of time-series analysis revolutionized engineering methods and statistical 
quality control, their impact within the futures studies movement was only moderate. Futurists 
frequently used trend extrapolation, or time-series analysis, but they were more interested in 
long-term forecasts that could not be reliably reached with such statistical models. They 
contemplated the future of humanity decades ahead, instead of the probability of a consistent 
piece of machinery manufacturing widgets at 95% capacity for ten minutes into the future. 
Because of the complexity of their goals, futurists often relied on the expertise of leading 
researchers within the subject matter that was being forecast. Nonetheless, statistical methods 
were a part of the futurist‟s toolbox, and perhaps more significantly the post-WWII drive for 
increased quantification, modeling, and analysis of social and economic data. Statistics became 
deeply entrenched in the ways of thinking, of futurist and non-futurist scientists alike. 
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By the 1970s forecasting became a more dynamic endeavor. Just as John Forbes Nash, Jr. 
took John von Neumann‟s static game theory models and applied them to changing situations, 
likewise, futurists started to think of forecasts not as a singular prediction, but a range of 
probable values. They conceived of their models and scenarios with intervals for the factors 
involved in their study, rather than single values. Such complexity notwithstanding, one 
commentator argued forecasters of the late 1970s were no better off than those of the 1950s. 
Commenting on a number of energy forecasts from over two decades ago, A. Ferrari claimed 
that “personal intuition is crucial to the prediction of major shifts, in technology, discovery of 
natural resources, etc, and there is no reason to believe that our intuition is any better 
developed.”54 
 
 
e. Explosion of Futures Methodologies 
 
Although futures studies became less tied to the Cold War by the end of the 1960s, one 
connection that remained was methodological. Futurists embraced and extended methods that 
had originally been designed for strategic military problems, and developed by distinctly “Cold 
War” think tanks such as the RAND Corporation or Stanford Research Institute. Futurists 
utilized tools such as the Delphi method, scenarios and policy alternatives, game theory, and 
operations research and applied them to an array of social issues.   
The Delphi method in particular struck a chord with futurists because of its association 
with science and its aura of objectivity. By quantifying opinions and removing personal 
interactions, and also incorporating a diverse group of panelists, the Delphi method quickly 
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earned recognition as the most appropriate forecasting tool among managers, academics, and 
government experts. The goal of scientifically predicting the uncertain captured the attention of 
many, and Delphi seemed to fulfill this promise. The inventors of this method felt that, when 
estimating an unknown, collective effort was better than individual effort, and they prioritized 
the anonymity of Delphi panelists as a means to ensure freedom of speech, and also to minimize 
personal biases. This method allowed the facilitators to manage the reliance on expertise 
necessitated by twentieth century problems. Therefore it had a broad resonance and applicability 
with diverse groups even in the business world. 
Governmental, academic, and business managers regarded the Delphi method as a 
scientific and respectable forecasting tool for a wealth of reasons. The use of statistical and 
quantitative mechanisms as a means of combining the interaction of experts, the control given to 
the facilitators over the extent of detail and the discussion surrounding a given problem, and the 
possibility of incorporating a diverse range of experts were some of the features that particularly 
appealed first to military and later to non-military leaders.  
The history of the Delphi method was one of the many threads that tie the early Cold War 
origins of futurism to the movement that influenced numerous books, magazines, journals, and 
produced several institutions. This consensus-building tool originated under the extraordinary 
political pressures of the early Cold War period as strategic forecasts attempted to quantify and 
predict the outcomes of nuclear warfare, authorities sought the most controllable and scientific 
ways of predicting as possible.  
Military authorities desired the Delphi method in particular because it allowed for an 
anonymous discussion of topics that bypassed of the chain of command, plus it was a way of 
forming a quantitative consensus. A superior military authority may not so willingly listen to the 
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expertise of a technician with a lower rank, but a Delphi study inherently fixed that problem. 
Also it always, even when a narrow consensus was not reached, Delphi always produced a 
quantitative estimate which could aid decision making. Thus, the outcome of any Delphi study 
provided additional data at the disposal of the operational decision-maker, which according to 
Helmer had proven “spectacularly successful.” For whatever its shortcomings, military 
authorities viewed Delphi as a scientific and controlled framework to examine complex nuclear-
era problems, and futurists continued to view this technique as a scientific tool – the best way to 
study the future. This belief, that forecasts could be scientific and reliable, increased the 
credibility of futures studies and played a weighty role in policy-making.  
Like the military strategists, the futurists also wanted their forecasts to be more 
controlled, quantitative, and scientific. So they also turned to many of the methodologies 
invented by the military efforts from the early Cold War period. 
The declassification and publication of the Delphi method in the early 1960s invigorated 
further investigations of this consensus-building tool as well as futures studies for the next 
decade and a half. Journals such as Futures published dozens of articles about using or 
improving this opinion technology.55 Meanwhile, the RAND Corporation, which only worked on 
a handful of Delphi studies in the late 1950s, also published dozens of Delphi studies varying in 
topic from health to education and energy. 56 During the energy crises of the 1970s, RAND 
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conducted more than a dozen studies forecasting major trends in energy consumption in 
California alone.57 
Praising the Delphi technique for clarifying the interdisciplinary developments that were 
hard to observe, a futurist from the University of Cologne, Dr. Klaus Lompe, wrote that Delphi 
allowed for long-range prognoses that carefully considered all directions.58 Scientifically 
predicting the uncertain captured the attention of many, and Delphi seemed to fulfill this 
promise. The inventors of this method felt that, when estimating an unknown, collective effort 
was better than individual effort, and they prioritized the anonymity of Delphi panelists as a 
means to ensure freedom of speech and minimize personal biases.  
Another methodological contribution by Olaf Helmer to the futurist toolkit was his work 
on cross-impact matrices. He pioneered the quantification of different futures through a 
probabilistic matrix that provided data along the lines of “if this, then that” at different 
probabilities. This futurist tool basically allowed the researcher to quantify the impact of certain 
future developments on others, and proved especially useful in analyzing long-range scenarios, 
but could be adapted in Delphi studies as well.  
The history of modern computing closely paralleled that of futures studies. Computers 
increasingly allowed futurists to model and analyze complex systems, starting with world models 
in the 1970s. Similar to the Delphi method, the application of computer models for complex 
systems can be traced from the early Cold War strategic developments within the U.S. military to 
the civilian arena. One of the significant characters in this thread was a Massachusetts Institute of 
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Technology engineer named Jay Forrester. 59 After decades of work for military supercomputers, 
Forrester simulated “world models.” Another influential character in this history was the futurists 
John von Neumann who modeled meteorological phenomena, among other things.  
Armed with a growing selection of methods from game theory, statistics, computer 
modeling, and opinion technologies to choose from, futurists set out to understand, anticipate, 
and plan for what was to come. As the president of the World Future Society Edward Cornish 
called out to 1970s futurists, “We cannot go on letting the future just happen to us.” 
 
 
f. Futures Studies in Policy-making 
 
Futurists often regarded themselves as the brains that thought before acting or making 
major decisions, and thereby as the ones that enabled technological and scientific developments. 
60 Futurists thought about developments in automation, developments in extracting energy 
resources and development of new technologies.  
According to one commentator, futures research emerged in the early 1950s as an 
advanced management tool primarily for the military, which futurists later popularized in the 
1960s. The field increasingly then spread into the leading industries and was picked up 
internationally by governments of different countries. 61  
Although futures studies largely emerged out of military policies, futurism as a discipline 
had much further-reaching influences in the areas of domestic and corporate policy-making. In 
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the former, futurists inspired national legislations for the planning of the economy, industries, 
cities and the environment; in the latter, they inspired various decision-making methods. 
Futurists‟ interdisciplinary ambitions aimed at revolutionizing all forms of policy-making. They 
prescribed the idea of planned and reasoned decision making, with which they wished to 
transform policymaking in all areas: foreign, military, domestic, and even corporate.  
Lambasting technocracy in his 1970 bestseller Future Shock, one of the popularizers of 
the movement, Alvin Toffler, accepted the pitfalls of governing based on industrial values such 
as efficiency or productivity. However, he had harsher words for the “irrational,” “anti-
scientific” values of the counterculture. Instead, Toffler proposed a new politics he called 
anticipatory democracy, which constituted a new, more humane, more far-sighted, and more 
democratic form of planning.62 
Alvin Toffler‟s social commentary from Future Shock was that bureaucracies were a 
feature of the past, and caused friction in the post-industrial world. He complained that a sane 
social system was not possible until “technology was tamed, the educational system totally 
revolutionized, and future-consciousness injected into our political lives.”   
Some even attempted to reform political science by integrating classical schools of 
thought with futuristic methodologies. University of Oregon political scientists Harlan J. Strauss 
and L. Harmon Zeigler argued that futures studies were an indispensible part of policy-making, if 
done responsibly and “holistically” – by incorporating “past influences, events, [and] theories” 
and not simply using the present as the basis for projecting the future.63 With their holistic 
approach, which Strauss and Zeigler described as Singerian, they wanted to give future 
policymakers the broadest possible modeling mindset for the resolution of anticipated societal 
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problems.64 According to the Singerian inquiring system, named for the American philosopher 
Edgar Arthur Singer Jr., management needed to be holistic, with open, respectful communication 
between all involved parties, and also needed to include systematic measurements. The inclusion 
of quantitative research was paramount, and one of the reasons why the Delphi Method 
proliferated was because it provided quantitative results – though based on opinions and not 
measurements.65  
Along with the extensive institutionalization and bureaucratization of government in the 
1970s, the number of politicians‟ staff also increased dramatically. 66 During the post-WWII era, 
opinion technologies impacted the U.S. government at an increased rate. Many futurists were 
involved in politics and vice versa, and the futures studies movement coincided with this growth.  
Iowa politician John Culver promoted futures studies methodologies and thinking 
through the futures studies movement, when he served in the U.S. House of Representatives, and 
beyond as a U.S. Senator from 1975-1981. As a house representative he supported House Rule 
988 that required legislative committees to engage in “systematic long-range” forecasts, and 
integrated studies of “principal future national problems.” Commending Culver‟s provision as an 
important step in the right direction, Alvin Toffler urged the development of future-
consciousness in elected representative bodies at all levels – local, provincial, regional, as well as 
national. 67  
Every politician worth their salt had to at least appear conscious of the future.  Culver‟s 
connection to futurist mentality, however, was deeper than using political clichés such as “to 
                                                                 
64
 For a discussion on philosophical influences of Delphi studies see: Eds. H.A. Linstone & M. Turoff, The Delphi 
method: Techniques and applications  (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975) 
65
 Eds. H.A. Linstone & M. Turoff, The Delphi method: Techniques and applications  (Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley, 1975) 
66
 Elizabeth Drew, (1978) Senator – p. 40 Dramatic increase in Iowa senatorial staff. 
67
 Alvin Toffler, “A Future for Parliaments” Futures 7.3 (1975): 182-3 
108 
 
 
leave a better world for our children,” or “to anticipate and rationally deal with problems before 
being overwhelmed by them,” general principles, which by the way he advocated as much as the 
next senator. One of Culver‟s inspirations for more detailed prescription was the 1954 book “The 
Challenge of Man‟s Future,” by Harrison Brown, a California Institute of Technology 
geochemistry professor.  
Culver heeded Brown‟s warnings about the future implications of diminishing resources, 
but especially humanity‟s ability to manage itself at a global scale. Brown‟s possible futures 
influenced Culver‟s political views and led him to focus on the need for more long-term 
outlooks.68 His concern then made him work to remedy the problems of these futures. 
Culver‟s work on the Endangered Species Amendment bill of 1978 exemplified the 
application of futurist ideas in domestic policymaking. Business interests impacted by the 1973 
Endangered Species Act strongly lobbied against renewing this legislation after the completion 
of its experimental five-year period. Worried about Congressional attempts to weaken the 1973 
Endangered Species Act, Culver sought to quell the momentum by finding a middle ground. The 
best-known case study that highlighted the significance of these debates was the Tellico dam 
construction project in Tennessee. Although environmentalist groups had opposed this 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) dam‟s construction for years, they had been unsuccessful in 
halting the project‟s momentum until the discovery of a small fish species called the snail-darter. 
Authorities warned that construction of the Tellico dam would create a high probability of the 
extinction of this endangered species, and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court opposed the 
construction of the dam in 1978. Although TVA ended up continuing the dam‟s construction, 
thanks to an unrelated amendment exempting their project, this popular example showed the 
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tensions between economic and environmental considerations. Another such example was the 
case of the Furbish lousewort, a rare wild flower that impeded another hydroelectric project 
proposed in Maine.69 
While Culver‟s political savvy and attention to the details of senate mechanics helped his 
bill pass amidst the crossfire of environmentalist and developer interests, his long-term futurist 
view aroused the senate to accept Culver‟s compromises. Culver argued for the protection of 
species, though not as fervently as some of the more environmentalist senators such as Gaylord 
Nelson, and portrayed the policy issue as reflecting the value of passing anticipatory measures to 
resolve issues before they became problems. 
During the 1970s, Minnesota politician Hubert H. Humphrey advocated for national 
economic planning. Having served as the Vice President of the United States under Lyndon 
Johnson, Humphrey returned to the U.S. Senate in the 1970s, during which time he spear-headed 
a number of employment and growth planning bills that eventually resulted in the 1978 Full 
Employment and Balanced Growth Act. Humphrey originally submitted the 1974 Full 
Employment Act as a response to the 1973 economic recession and oil crisis, and as a revision to 
the Employment Act of 1946. He partnered with a number of policymakers such as 
Representative Augustus F. Hawkins – thus the label “Humphrey-Hawkins Bill” – as well as 
Republican Senator Jacob Javits, who actively worked for much labor-related legislation 
including the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.70  Despite the harsh 
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economic conditions in the mid-1970s, U.S. legislators did not immediately consent to 
broadening federal planning and influence over the economy.  
 Senator Humphrey, who by 1978 served as the majority leader during Jimmy Carter‟s 
administration, succeeded in passing the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act – after 
Congress defeated the 1974 and 1976 versions, and after several amendments to the 1978 
adaptation. According to this act, the president was to incorporate programs and policies 
necessary to achieve a reduced rate of inflation and unemployment “not more than 3 per centum 
within a period not extending beyond the fifth calendar year.” The authors of this policy had 
optimistic long-term goals, characteristic of many futures studies of their time: “Upon 
achievement of the 3 per centum goal” the succeeding economic reports were to aim for a rate of 
inflation of zero percent by 1988.71 
In a joint minority views statement, Republican Senators Jake Lane, John Tower, and 
Richard S. Lugar opposed the bill on the count that unemployment was not a consequence of a 
lack of economic planning, while commending the goal of combating unemployment.72 
Comparing the ambitions of the bill to President Johnson‟s “Great Society,” these Republican 
senators summarized the unprecedented planning and coordination efforts as “little more than a 
cruel hoax” on the poor and minorities. Accordingly, the three senators argued, that the 
ambitious posturing and promising – or at least prioritizing – of a set decrease in national 
unemployment statistics risked repetition of the 1960s civil unrest and especially urban riots 
among “the average ghetto dwellers.” 73  
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In 1977, the president of the Institute for the Future, Roy Amara, predicted that 
legislators would not seriously consider the Humphrey-Hawkins bill. Amara justified this 
assessment by citing the existence of “a highly pluralistic society that had great difficulty in 
defining national goals, setting priorities, or deciding how to implement them.”74 He argued that 
without severe crises involving massive unemployment and lengthy economic depression, 
national planning simply would not work. Congress enacted the 1978 Humphrey-Hawkins 
initiative to coordinate federal intervention in economic policy with future goals in mind. Yet, 
the post-1978 federal U.S. government certainly did not coordinate, plan, or intervene in the 
fashion of a national planning board that replaced market-mechanisms. A Soviet-style 
centralized economy did not emerge during the Carter administration, or later in the twentieth 
Century United States. Amara misjudged the passing of the Balanced Growth Act, which 
illustrated the continued strong drive to quantify economic goals and to intervene.75  
Policymakers designed a variant of the Delphi method to better suit their needs. The 
“policy-Delphi” incorporated many of the features of the forecasting method with the goal of 
defining goals or priorities for policymaking purposes.76 The main difference of this variant was 
its incorporation of face-to-face interaction of the respondents in between anonymous 
questionnaire sessions.  
The U.S. Government promoted the assessment of technologies and passed legislations 
directed at understanding the social impacts of technologies.77 While some government offices 
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produced new technologies, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 
which pioneered many advances in information technology, others sought to estimate the social 
impact of technologies, such as the Office of Technology Assessment, mentioned later in this 
chapter.78   
Futurists of the 1960s and 1970s were very ambitious and aspired to revolutionize 
policymaking at all levels. They advocated for national economic planning boards as much as 
“future-consciousness” at the local levels of government. Futurists prized the quantification of 
past and present social values. From these numbers, they aspired to clarify the future; how to 
predict and understand it, and ultimately how to change it for the better.  
Congressmen and senators alike utilized futuristic methods and lines of thinking. Senator 
Humphrey and others worked towards national economic planning with specific long-term 
objectives. For example, futures studies deeply influenced Representative (and later Senator) 
John Culver, who advocated for the analysis of long-term projections by all members of the 
House. 
The impact of futurism on policymaking went further than the governmental realm of 
predicting. Futurists relied on opinion technologies with wide-ranging interdisciplinary 
applications that overlapped with other fields such as game theory, political science, or 
economics. Different kinds of policymakers modified forecasting techniques such as the Delphi 
method to suit their needs, by devising the policy-Delphi, or others such as the “business” 
Delphi.  
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g. Futures Studies in Industry 
 
Similar to governmental policy-making, futurism had a tremendous influence on 
corporate planning and policy-making. Similar to the U.S. Air Force actively seeking out 
forecasts of “what might be important,” many corporations set aside a budget for a futures 
studies department.79 These entities used futures methodologies to rationalize future possibilities. 
80 Another parallel was the pronounced characteristic of secrecy, for both the content and results 
of their studies as they often prognosticated about intellectual properties important to the 
companies.  
One property of futures studies in corporate policy-making, as in other areas, was the 
aura of “correctness” their research embodied. Futurists of corporate policy regarded managers 
as experts, based on the fact that they contemplated respective forecasting problems and made 
decisions affecting their industries on a day-to-day basis. Corporate cultures and their futures 
studies varied strongly, prohibiting generalizations. According to some futurists this bias – that 
managers assumed the correctness of their objectives and value judgments which framed 
corporate problems – had a paradoxical nature.81 They debated why corporate policy-makers 
should forecast and make value judgments if they did not begin with “correct” frameworks – 
thus were not experts – while acknowledging the difficulty of scientific predictions of future 
value judgments. This difficulty ultimately plagued the futurists – the possibility that their 
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methods could not be a rigorous scientific field – and focused their efforts on understanding the 
validity of futures studies.82 
Working at RAND headquarters as a senior scientist, Norman Dalkey conducted a series 
of experiments to determine the validity of one of the most prominent tools of futures studies – 
the Delphi method. Olaf Helmer and Norman Dalkey and other RAND mathematicians 
developed this method in 1951 amidst military cold war pressures to scientifically speculate. 
Delphi furnished military authorities with a controlled framework to examine complex nuclear-
era problems. Some futurists including Dalkey regarded the Delphi method, which forced a 
group of experts to yield a consensus through an iteration of numerical questionnaires, as a part 
of opinion technologies. This co-inventor of Delphi differentiated between factual and value 
judgments as two separate kinds of input that went into any policy formulation. So even though 
according to these logical-empiricists, data gathered from experts was as valid for scientific 
analysis as any data gathered from observation of nature, it was not equally valid for decision-
making. 
At the corporate level of policy making, Dalkey further claimed that futurists needed to 
presume the value judgments of company leaders as „correct.‟ Although he did not accept this a 
priori, he argued that the Delphi method was reliable and cautiously desirable, if experts 
numerically weighted value judgments. More specifically, Dalkey reasoned that this opinion 
technology resulted in three reliable consequences, despite the “usual feeling that value 
judgments were nebulous and „unmanageable‟.” First, individual responses had a reasonable 
stability, given the parameters of the forecasting problem. They could not just be any value. 
Second, given iterations of a questionnaire, he argued that the group responses should converge. 
Finally Dalkey hypothesized that similar groups should “arrive at similar judgments, and on 
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iteration should move in the same direction.”83 Because of such findings about Delphi 
experiments, Dalkey suggested that the use of Delphi in weighting objectives of an organization 
or company was feasible.  
Business forecasting needs were different from those of military or government 
forecasting. Experts in early Delphi studies mailed their responses to the questionnaires, and the 
completion of such exercises lasted up to several months. In a corporate environment, planners 
gradually sped up the process using the business-Delphi. With continued research on this tool, 
the next generation of RAND scientists retained many of the key tenets of the original method 
and made “opinioncasting” more efficient.84 
Managers, planners and other operations personnel composed the machinery of corporate 
policy-making. Futurists concentrated their efforts mostly on how planners reached their 
recommendations. For example, they studied the evaluation and management of emerging 
technologies, also known as “technology assessment” (TA). Futurists involved in TA did not 
concern themselves with the development of existing technologies or the invention of new ones, 
rather they analyzed the intended and unintended impact of existing technologies on society, and 
how policymakers should manage these technologies. By utilizing TA reports, planners provided 
arguments for company policies – especially since they brought together the social and economic 
aspects of technologies.85 
At times futurists shifted their attention to the interactions between the different cogs of 
this machinery. Senior RAND researcher Andrew J. Lipinski argued that planners often did not 
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effectively communicate their recommendations to managers.86 For the planner to get the 
message across, Lipinski argued, they needed to teach the management to be receptive, and 
“sensitize” the executives to longer-term issues. On the flip-side of this struggle for reliable 
forecasting lay the fact that planners did not always have the data to make valid predictions, as 
they worked in a shielded environment from the larger context of company operations and 
consumers. Other futurists analyzed how corporate barriers between planners and management 
caused problems. 
 
 
h. U.S. Science Policy and the Emergence of Social Indicators 
 
“prediction is one of the chief functions of hypothesis” Bertrand Russell 87 
 
Science and technology were indispensible for the U.S. government and the American 
people in the twentieth century. After the Second World War, the United States saw an extensive 
institutionalization of science and technology, which resulted in the redefinition of a wide range 
of industrial and environmental standards and regulations. Universities were a central part of 
scientific and technological research, and contributed to a diversity of advances in both military 
as well as civilian spheres. The formation of the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950 put 
a face on U.S. science policy. Although NSF did not at first prioritize social sciences, some 
academic institutions and think tanks received funding for social science projects.88   
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President Johnson‟s “War on Poverty” in the 1960s boosted the funding for social science 
research dramatically.89 NSF became an avid supporter of researching “social indicators,” as 
scientific approaches to social problems.90 Professional planners compiled “relevant data” using 
social indicators that policymakers utilized. Social indicators, whether for gathering data on the 
performance of school children, or statistics on average incomes of different ethnicities, provided 
politicians with both ammunition for and defense against change.91 Critics of social indicators 
argued the quantification of society was too reductive. They questioned the role of statistics as 
well as expertise that analyzed the “relevant data” compiled by planners. What qualified such 
experts, other than their designation as being experts?  
The quantitative analysis of futurists‟ Delphi method also made it into the field of 
anthropology. An enthusiast of the method and the anticipatory thinking of futures studies, 
Robert B Textor, influenced the field of American anthropology enough to establish a prize for 
“Excellence in Anticipatory Anthropology.” This American Anthropology Association prize 
sought studies that improved a society‟s chances for “realizing preferred futures and avoiding 
unwanted ones,” while enabling citizens and leaders make “informed policy decisions.”92 
In his book Looking Forward: A Guide to Futures Research, Helmer devoted a chapter to 
international relations, where he discussed the place of political indicators in forecasting political 
issues. Helmer saw political forecasting as one of the growth areas for futures studies. He was a 
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strong advocate for the use of social indicators in forecasting, claiming some indicators reliably 
approximated complex social constructs.93  
Futurists extensively utilized both expertise – often with the help of the Delphi method – 
and quantification, and they did so for hard-to-quantify social issues in uncertain, long-range 
futures! They often relied on social indicators as stepping stones for inferences of future 
problems. In a response to Dennis Gabor‟s review of Olaf Helmer‟s 1972 report On the Future 
State of the Union, Helmer defended the quantification of “impossible” social problems. For 
example, Gabor criticized one of the report‟s predictions that racial tensions would decrease by 
half by 2001, as being meaningless – not simply because the future was uncertain, but also 
because the quantification of the concept “racial tensions,” let alone the rationale for predicting a 
50% decrease – was meaningless. Helmer defended the study, by arguing the concept was highly 
correlated with social indicators such as the number of race-related homicides or riots.94 
The use of social indicators, similar to futures studies, gaming etc., was a part of 
twentieth century trends of the rationalization, quantification, and modeling of social constructs. 
These trends peaked in the United States during the 1960s and early 1970s. Earlier efforts of 
solving or understanding social theories relied predominantly on qualitative analysis. While 
qualitative analysis did not lose its place as the principal means of addressing social issues, 
quantitative analysis became increasingly important. In part, this was due to a post-WWII belief 
in the power of scientific methodologies to achieve answers.95 
The other part of the equation was that policy-makers sought more quantification of 
social and political changes. Economic statistics were limited in how well they accounted for the 
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recent changes to American life, so social scientists and politicians advocated for the 
development of systems of social indicators in the 1960s. In 1966 members of a project 
sponsored by NASA authored Social Indicators.96 The principal authors of this report, Raymond 
Bauer, Albert Biderman, and Bertram Gross, argued for an increased collection of social 
indicators in order to help policy decisions.  
The U.S. Department of Health and Welfare published a report with a similar message in 
1969.97 The authors of Toward a Social Report, believed in the importance of quantifying social 
issues. Not only would such statistical trends shed light on areas that required action, but perhaps 
more importantly these numbers would justify the continuation or termination of programs aimed 
at social issues. These pioneers of social quantification believed in the appropriateness of using 
social indicators to evaluate which social issues deserved funding, and how effectively funds 
were being used. In order to assess such trends, Toward a Social Report advocated for an annual 
social report. 
Around this time, U. S. legislators tried to establish a Council of Social Advisers, similar 
to the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA). The CEA was established shortly after the Second 
World War in 1946, and published annual reports that gave credence to economics and economic 
statistics. 98 The idea of a sister council that reported on social issues did not, however, gain the 
same traction. 
Social indicators emerged during an era of change in U.S. culture, and they served as one 
of the ways in which policy-makers sought to trace these changes. A parallel story, which aimed 
at forecasting the social impacts of emerging technologies, was “technology assessment.” (TA) 
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The Congress needed expert opinion for information on the pervasiveness and impacts of 
technologies, and discussed how to get this information in the 1960s.99 The outcome was, on 
October, 13 1972, the U.S. Congress passed the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) Act. 
This office essentially amounted to one big opinion technology, and was an extension of the 
historical thread going back to the 1930s when President Herbert Hoover appointed sociologist 
William F. Ogburn to the President‟s Research Committee on Social Trends. Considered the 
father of TA, Ogburn‟s committee explicitly and comprehensively assessed the social impacts 
and costs of technology. The OTA of the 1970s systematically prepared assessments of 
numerous technologies, as well as annual reports during its existence until 1995.100 
Appropriate Technology (AT) also received federal funding in the 1970s, when President 
Jimmy Carter reacted to the energy crises of 1973 by initiating energy conservation programs. 
AT was centralized in 1976 with the establishment of the National Center for Appropriate 
Technology.101 
 
 
i. Connection Between the Futurists and the Movement – Chapter Conclusion  
 
Futurism, with its emphasis on scientific and technological expertise, thrived at a time of 
growth and tremendous societal change. Just as the 1968 student protests permeated throughout 
the U.S. and many countries, the field of futures studies at the time had far-reaching contribution 
and audiences. Much of the content was global, while at the same time many of the forecasting 
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studies demonstrated a focus on local topics.  The 1970s brought about a shift in emphasizing the 
embeddedness of local and national affairs in the world.102 Futures studies also emphasized the 
interconnectedness of different contexts with its inclusiveness and its diversity of opinions, and 
futurists advocated for the importance of analyzing possible long-term futures. This group of 
scientists, academics, politicians, and citizens were a diverse group that spanned across a 
multitude of disciplines and industries. While hard to classify, they captured the attention of 
business, military, and government officials alike. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, futurists voiced a diversity of opinions, measurements, 
estimations, and prognostications. They formed an inclusive forum for expressing fears and 
discussing the future with all its possibilities and threats. Some used the forum as a stepping 
stone to make social commentary of their time, while others were driven to the study of the 
future by a genuine desire to find the best way to study the future.  
Eco-futurists, future-minded politicians, Cold War strategists, or the philosopher-
mathematicians from the RAND were some of the actors of the scientific/intellectual movement 
that was the futures studies movement. The inclusive nature of the field seemed at times to be too 
vague and nondescript to hold these strands together under one roof. Nevertheless, as the 
accounts of some of their efforts in the next chapter detail, futurists formed numerous 
organizations, held conferences, and published in many kinds of media, and with these efforts 
further developed their field. 
                                                                 
102
 Howard Brick, Neo-Evolutionist Anthropology, the Cold War, and the Beginnings of the World Turn in U.S. 
Scholarship in Eds. Mark Solovey and Hamilton Cravens “The Construction of Social Science in Cold War 
America” (in progress) 
122 
 
 
Chapter 4. Futures Studies Organizations – Formalization and Maturation of the Field 
 
Futurists organized during the late 1960s and early 1970s, during what they recognized to 
be rapidly-changing times in order to make sense of the changes. U.S. President Jimmy Carter 
frequently reflected on a saying he had learned from his school teacher, Julia Coleman, who 
often said: “We must adjust to changing times and still hold to unchanging principles.” This 
notion that the future necessitated some judicious change summarized the mission of the 
maturing field of futures studies in the late 1970s.1 During the futures studies movement, the 
number of futurist organizations jumped from a few to dozens in just a few years. Of the many 
different voices of the movement, the most influential, for the futurists and their field, were three 
organizations that wanted to adjust to the ongoing changes, one issue at a time. 
In the mid-1960s, futurists organized a variety of meetings, institutions and societies with 
goals of raising awareness of different possible futures, and the importance of actions guiding 
people towards desired futures. The World Future Society (WFS), the first of three organizations 
I examine in this chapter, led the way for the organization of futurists with its creation in 1965, 
and provided an outlet for raising Cold War concerns about civilian and military issues. Futurists 
of the World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF) organized conferences in the 1960s and 1970s 
before establishing the Federation as an international organization in Paris in 1974. Influential 
futurists including Olaf Helmer started the Institute for the Future (IFTF) in 1968.  
These three organizations provide a good cross-section of the pioneers of the futures 
studies movement. Each started with small groups of people who were motivated to make a 
difference. Even though their content focused on peace, the motivations for their efforts were 
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strongly influenced by the Cold War, either by a fear of nuclear threats, or by a disgust of the 
existence of the Cold War. 
While these organizations led the popularization of futurism with their publications and 
conferences, dozens of other smaller think tanks and futures organizations, often having a more 
specific geographic and content focus, also emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s.2 One 
commonality of these individual entities was their use of the same forecasting methodologies 
regardless of their distinct interests. The uniting mission, both in the organizational mission 
statements and objectives, and the theses of various books, was to raise awareness of the future. 
In the words of Alvin Toffler, being future-minded led to being better suited for present-time 
decision-making, which seemed was ever more important, given the rapid technological change 
of the times.  
WFS and WFSF, both organizations with the word “world” in their titles, became leaders 
with distinct priorities. While very much an open forum for the discussion of futures, the WFS 
primarily sought to be relevant in the U.S. political context, and most of the contributors and 
members were in the United States. WFSF started with a predominantly European membership 
that focused its efforts to broaden its mandate to all nations. These differences between the 
missions of the Society and the Federation at times led to friction as well.  
The futures studies movement also inaugurated several publications that focused on 
futurism explicitly. Most of these emerged in the form of newsletters, or magazines, with the 
IFTF-affiliated journal Futures emerging in 1968 as the flagship publication of the movement. 
Futures soon expanded a wide selection of international content, authorship, and peer review to 
offer a growing audience. 
a. Futures Societies, Organizations, Think Tanks, and Conferences 
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One of the pioneering publicists of the futures studies movement was a journalist named 
Edward Cornish. Cornish instigated, co-founded, and presided over the World Future Society 
(WFS) for many decades. Fearful of thermonuclear war and Cold War tensions, this journalist 
sought to bring together influential and concerned people.3 Despite not being able to locate 
funding at the start, Cornish nonetheless committed himself to becoming a futurist. He first 
started publishing a brief newsletter in 1965, which flourished into the publication The Futurist, 
named after the 1966 Time magazine essay about futurists. Indeed, his efforts were so well 
received that this led to the formation of WFS in 1966. Various professionals, from staff 
associates in the National Science Foundation (NSF) to systems analysts or engineers from the 
industry, expressed an interest to become involved with WFS. With the fundraising efforts of a 
futurist who worked at the NSF staff, NSF even provided some startup funding to get the society 
on its way.4 
While raising awareness of rational studies of alternative futures, WFS also brought 
together many people working on futures studies. Futurists were a vocal group that often 
collaborated. This society provided an important avenue to exchange ideas about futures studies, 
through The Futurist, a growing book service that sold futures-related manuscripts and the 
organization of various chapters and conferences. The diversity of the futures studies movement 
correlated to the WFS audiences, which included RAND scientists such as Olaf Helmer and 
Herman Kahn and well-known European futurists such as Bertrand de Jouvenel and Robert 
Jungk, as well as more popular personalities such as Senator Al Gore, Vice President Gerald 
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Ford, and the “Big Three” of science fiction, Robert A. Heinlein, Isaac Asimov, and Arthur C. 
Clarke found future-minded audiences and interactions through WFS.  
The content of WFS conferences was not primarily of a military or diplomatic nature. 
The predominant concern was the future of humanity globally, akin to the thesis of The Limits to 
Growth report by the Club of Rome in 1972. According to Cornish, “mostly intelligent, and well-
meaning” politicians could not be expected to solve the momentous problems humanity faced.5 
Indeed, he argued that humanity‟s survival required global forecasting, and a revamping of the 
political institutions. Alvin Toffler, arguably the biggest popularizer of futures studies, published 
Future Shock in 1970 with the same argument. According to Toffler, the “future shock” faced by 
society necessitated a new future-minded approach at all levels of policy-making for society to 
deal with the rapid technological changes.  
By 1970, the WFS was a 4000-member organization on the rise.  Minneapolis-St. Paul 
and Los Angeles had led the way in forming WFS chapters, but the number of American-based 
chapters and local committees quickly grew to dozens by 1975, while the first international WFS 
chapter formed in Stockholm in 1970.6 WFS events included concerned citizens as much as high 
profile officials and some celebrities. Their first conference/general assembly in 1971 hosted 59 
sessions, whose participants included psychologist B.F. Skinner of Walden Two, and chemist 
Glenn Seaborg, and drew over a thousand registrants. In 1973, the society responded to the oil 
crisis by holding a public forum that featured a brief talk by then-Vice President Gerald R. Ford. 
After less than one decade of activity, the WFS had grown to a membership of over 15,000 
futurists by 1974, with a peak conference attendance of about 2000 in 1975.7 
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Separately, a small group of less than a dozen futurists established the Institute for the 
Future (IFTF) in 1968 and helped start publishing Futures, a quarterly serial that quickly became 
the flagship journal of the field. One of the founding members was the co-inventor of the Delphi 
method Olaf Helmer. Describing the motivation for starting IFTF, Helmer referred to the 
unwillingness of the RAND management of the mid-1960s to study civilian and humanitarian 
concerns. 8 A related reason was the groupism that Helmer saw emerging among the RAND 
researchers in specific disciplines, with a consequent diminishing of interdisciplinary 
collaboration, much “like in the universities.”9 Helmer, Gordon, and others (including one of the 
inventors of internet packet switching, Paul Baran) felt that they needed to establish an 
organization outside RAND Corporation, in order to pursue techniques developed at RAND “in 
areas applicable to social problems.”10  
Indeed, the institute was in part a product of RAND thinking and RAND people. A 
couple years before its formation, historian, RAND consultant, and later editor of IFTF, Henry 
David helped write a prospectus called Prospectus for an Institute for the Future. This document 
set out the plans for a formalized futurist study center, arguing that such an institute should 
systematically explore possible futures, ascertain the desirable ones, and seek out how to 
enhance desirable outcomes. 11  
Both WFS and IFTF soon grew into well-organized non-profit entities that marketed their 
expertise of futures studies. Donations totaling more than one million dollars, including a 
$250,000 grant from the Ford Foundation, helped start IFTF. The Institute continued to raise 
funds by making services available to businesses with projects over $50,000. Their goal was to 
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study the future of communities and businesses. These Cold War philosopher-mathematicians 
were inspired by Cold War methodologies, and were inspired by a concern for the survival of 
humanity. In 1971, Theodore Gordon, along with a couple other members, left the Institute to 
form a for-profit futures group, called The Futures Group. Within just three years, this policy-
oriented think tank employed about 40 researchers.  
 
The World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF) emerged from a series of international 
conferences in the 1960s and early 1970s. Prior to its founding in Paris in 1974, WFSF had held 
an international conference in Oslo in 1967, organized with the cooperation of the International 
Peace Research Institute, the Institut für Zukunftsfragen and Mankind 2000, and then, 
conferences in Kyoto in 1970, in Bucharest in 1972, and in Rome in 1973.12 The sizes of these 
conferences were considerably smaller than those organized by the Society, gathering around 
two to three hundred futurists.13 In 1975, WFSF began publishing their newsletter Futures 
Bulletin.14 
Renowned Austrian futurist Robert Jungk was involved in the Mankind 2000 efforts, 
which began in 1964 at the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace with the goal 
of supporting all aspects of human development for each human.15 Mankind 2000 subsequently 
evolved into a formal organization in the early 1970s. That new group started publishing the 
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Yearbook of World Problems and Human Potential, which attempted to list and cross-reference 
thousands of world problems in a uniquely interdisciplinary way. 
One of the American leaders of this international body, University of Hawaii political 
scientist Jim Dator, later reflected that the founders of the Federation had been “horrified by the 
immediate past, frustrated by the present, and fearful for the future.” 16 Dator summarized the 
horrifying events of the twentieth century leading up to the Second World War and the Cold War, 
and wondered if that was the best that Western Civilization had to offer. The WFSF united 
Europeans, but also futurists from the United States and other countries, in the belief that an 
organization was needed to incubate “local and global visions for a peaceful, equitable, and 
cooperative world.”17 
Another motivation for founding the Federation was to nurture a non-colonizing 
paradigm of futures studies. According to a WFSF futurist, the founders of the Federation wanted 
to form an alternative and more inclusive forum than WFS, which they believed sought to 
impose a particular future on the world – the American one.18 Instead of seeing the future as a 
system of possibilities to be colonized with a particular perspective, the Federation aspired to 
ground the futures field more cross-culturally, by keeping the choices of the many–including the 
non-aligned, underrepresented, or “less-developed-countries (L.D.C.s) – voices involved in an 
open forum on studying and building futures. According to another futurist, there was a “strong 
Third World feeling that „cultural imperialism‟ [was] a particularly N. American and Western 
concomitant of free enterprise capitalism.”19 WFSF aspired to be a truly global organization by 
                                                                 
16
 Jim Dator, The WFSF and I, Futures 37 (2005) 372-3 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Fabienne Goux-Baudiment, Oral History Interview with Fabienne Goux-Baudiment by Kaya Tolon (Paris, 
France. August 13, 2009)(Appendix 2) 
19
 David J. Berry, „The Future of Politics: A Personal Review and Comment on the 7 th World Futures Research 
Conference in Stockholm, (World Futures Studies Federation, June 6-8
th
 1982) 15 
129 
 
 
variegating its content, leadership, and location of its world conferences, and focused on all 
peoples: the first, second, and third “worlds.”20  
Responding to criticism by WFS futurist Michael Marien, David J. Berry, a futurist who 
worked with both WFS and WFSF felt the need to elaborate on the differences between the two 
organizations. Marien had disparaged the WFSF-style world conferences, saying they “… only 
attract a well-heeled elite and hold little of particular interest for the host country.”21  Berry 
answered with a 36-page report defending the seventh WFSF Conference in Stockholm, which 
drew on his insights based on his exposure to both organizations and experience with futures 
studies. Berry highlighted the respective strengths and weaknesses in the separate organizations. 
He noted an important contrast in their stated missions; the Society (WFS) had a stronger 
emphasis on methodologies that futurists used, while the Federation put more emphasis on 
international conferences and international participation. Berry asserted that the Federation 
conferences attracted more than just elite attendees, highlighting how WFSF leaders raised 
money to underwrite attendance by futurists from less developed countries. 
Berry, a lecturer at London University, Imperial College of Science and Technology, 
expanded those arguments while reporting on the 1982 WFSF World Conference in Stockholm. 
His reflections delineated some of the main differences between WSF and WFSF, and 
specifically suggested that both of these organizations ought to work together more often, 
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because of their distinct perspectives. 22 Berry urged the two organizations to increase 
cooperation, since they were both involved in addressing “democracy‟s greatest challenge … 
public ignorance of increasingly complex problems.”23 He believed that each group‟s approach 
could contribute to clarifying such problems and shedding light on present-time decision-
making.24 
Berry commented that historically, the different funding structures of the two 
organizations had influenced their frameworks of studying future(s). Both groups were initially 
created, and continued to exist, with the efforts of motivated volunteers. But WFS had evolved 
into a financially independent entity, which Berry wrote, led to a supply and demand force 
pushing an American-centered agenda: “… since the W.F.S. relies almost totally on voluntary 
contributions for both its publications and Assemblies, the result is bound to be a kind of vicious 
circle of supply and demand which militates against the inclusion of „non-American 
perspectives.” [emphasis original]25 Meanwhile, the WFSF relied on outside funding to meet and 
organize and follow its mission, including national institutes, but also international bodies such 
as the United Nations, UNESCO, etc.  
Throughout the twentieth century, the World Futures Studies Federation continued to 
carry the futures studies movement banner of peace, focusing on the third world, disarmament, 
and humanitarian issues. One of the ways in which WFSF did this was to hold twice-yearly, 
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four-week postgraduate course in futures studies in Dubrovnik, and also occasional international 
courses.26 The WFSF continued those educational programs into the 1980s.27  
 
The WFS, WFSF, and IFTF provide a snapshot of the momentum of futurists in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Those three non-profit organizations led the drive to study the future 
systematically, at a time when the social sciences and popularizers alike were still enmeshed in 
and shaped by Cold War concerns. Futures related organizations continued to emerge after the 
futures studies movement as well, however without the intensities of Cold War worries and 
visions of a better society of the 1960s movement. For instance, consulting futurists formed the 
Association for Professional Futurists (APF) in 2002. 
Beyond those three leading groups, the field of futures studies included many other think 
tanks, societies, and research labs. Certainly there was continued influence from the RAND 
Corporation, Stanford Research Institute, and Herman Kahn‟s Hudson Institute. A variety of 
other think tanks and local organizations, not to mention government offices, studied possible 
futures as part of their regular operations during the late 1960s and early 1970s; those 
organizations also studied how to study possible futures. According to Edward Cornish, a 
conservative estimate of futurist organizations in existence by 1977 added up to 300.28 In 
describing the explosion of futurist-oriented organizations and periodicals, Cornish listed over a 
dozen research centers, such as Kahn‟s Hudson Institute, and many other associations and clubs 
such as the Italian IRADES (Istituto Ricerche Applicata Documentazione e Studi) and Club of 
Rome, to name a few. Cornish argued that this rapid expansion of related organizations put 
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futurists “increasingly in a position to have a major influence on government, business, 
education, and other areas of human life.”29 
One defining characteristic of futures studies was the fundamental tenet that multiple 
possible futures existed, making the choice of pathway crucial. Even for WFS, which chose the 
singular “future” as its name, the belief in different possible outcomes remained a significant 
theme.30 Depending on the specific forecasting problem, the futurist‟s job was to envision the 
larger context, as a historian would for the past, extending discussion beyond any specific 
parameters of the social or technological issue at hand. Navigating the multiple possible futures, 
the futurist considered factors that could be controlled (where some type of decision was 
possible), and others that could not. The serials published by futurist organizations shine a broad 
yet unique light onto the futures studies movement, and their quest to raise awareness of futures 
studies-related questions, among both leaders and the general public. The content of the futures 
studies movement was heavily dominated by discussion of contemporary social concerns, 
including environmental problems and changing gender roles, with regard to the future 
implications for humanity. 
 
 
b. Journals, Newsletters, and Other Publications 
 
The organizations and conferences mentioned so far played an important role in the 
dissemination of futures ideas. The numerous newsletters and publications produced by the 
futures studies movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s provide insights into the futurists‟ 
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efforts to seek to understand the nature of national and international political, social, and 
environmental change, and how humanity could confront the array of available decisions. Some 
publications were academic, others were popularly-oriented, but all reflected the hopes and fears 
of practitioners of futures studies. Some of these newsletters, such as the Futures Bulletin of the 
WFSF had small circulations, yet still gave voice to the producer‟s contemporary motivations 
and struggles. The peer-reviewed journal, Futures, exemplified the movement‟s philosophical, 
methodological, and thematic trends and changes.   
Of the three main organizations described above, WFS was the first to produce a 
publication. The Futurist emerged in 1965 as a low-circulation newsletter edited by Edward 
Cornish, who turned the publication into a business-oriented magazine in 1969.31 Its subtitle 
read: “A journal of forecasts, trends and ideas about the future.” Geared toward the average 
businessman of the 1960s, this publication covered a lot of content cursorily.  
As a more academic, in-depth serial, the only one to be peer-reviewed during the golden 
era of futures studies, Futures quickly established itself as the flagship journal of the movement. 
Despite their different tones and styles, however, the scope of Futures and The Futurist were 
very similar. Both considered similar problems and technological developments across the globe 
and their impacts on society. At times, both printed material promoting bizarre ideas about the 
future of nuclear power or colonization of space, reminiscent of science fiction (Futures less 
frequently than The Futurist). Despite such oddities, however, both publications ultimately 
aspired to present a scientific and rational image in their forecasts of the future. 
In their first editorial, titled “Confidence from Chaos,” the Futures editor(s) 
acknowledged that futures studies still remained in its formative stage. They positioned their 
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publication as offering an outlet to publish papers on specific case studies, going beyond vague 
talk about the significance of futures, or methodological issues.32 Although these early futurists 
saw their times as complex and difficult to forecast – more so than ever before – they were also 
determined: “forecasting is essential if we are to seize the opportunities and reduce the 
insecurities that result from rapid change.”33 The editorial board placed primary importance on 
presenting case studies and specific speculations. They hoped that such focused coverage could 
“reduce the margin of error in estimating likely developments and to introduce a measure of 
stability into decision-making by reducing the uncertainty that attends the contemplation of 
major projects in a time of rapid change.”34  
Over the first decade of publication, from 1968 to 1978, the content of Futures varied 
along several futures-related and contemporary themes. Several issues were dedicated to a single 
problem, for example on the developments of world models – mathematical representations of 
the world‟s resources, and their interrelations and trends of their use. Other themes, such as the 
search for new energy sources, or problems of habitat, were inspired directly by contemporary 
questions. Following the 1973 “Battle of the Sexes” coverage and responding to the 
“International Women‟s Year Conference” held in Mexico in 1975, Futures dedicated its 
October 1975 issue to the place of women in the future.35 In its editorial, Guy Streatfeild 
advocated that “those who are concerned about the future need to listen to all voices, and not just 
to those who shout loudest.” Streatfeild characterized the experts' opinions not so much as a 
battle between the sexes, but an expectation for “a qualitatively superior society where men and 
women, although different, participate to an equivalent extent.”  He introduced the special issue 
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stating, “here we have articles that can fairly be described as dispassionate and constructive.”36 
Scientific analysis played a paramount role in questioning the future of gender roles as much as 
any other futures question.  
Again responding to very visible questions in the news, articles in other issues of Futures 
addressed the implications of the 1973 and 1979 OPEC oil embargos, as well as the 1976 United 
Nations Habitat Conference in Vancouver. Many futurists were deeply concerned with 
environmental issues, during these years when the modern environmental movement was gaining 
momentum and rousing public awareness. Some writings from the futures movement highlighted 
humans‟ limitations, warning of diminishing natural resources, while others projected an almost 
utopian future, when technological progress would answer all of society‟s needs. Reflecting that 
second, more optimistic viewpoint, a 1969 news piece in Futures suggested that “the mature 
nuclear industry could provide a pathway to the long desired ideal of unlimited supplies of 
energy at a fraction of today‟s cost.” The forecast predicted that not only would nuclear power 
generate cheap electricity, but „food factories‟ using desalinated sea water would produce food, 
“costing only a few pence per day.”37 Some of these technologically deterministic, wishful 
forecasts prompted criticisms, both within and outside the ranks of futurists.  
While editors of Futures wanted to publish articles that offered substantive forecasting on 
specific questions such as the prospects for nuclear power, the journal also continued to address 
internal intellectual questions, such as the proper methodology for futures studies. At least 14% 
of the articles published during the first decade of Futures discussed an aspect of the Delphi 
method, or a Delphi study.38 Other authors addressed the techniques, advantages, and 
disadvantages of alternative methodological approaches that also formed part of the futurist 
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toolkit, such as cross-impact matrices, scenarios, or others. Futurists believed using a variety of 
different tools improved their chances at resolving conflict, predicting unknowns, and deducing 
probable futures. They still prized the Delphi method, now declassified from early Cold War 
studies, as a systematized opinion technology, which they believed could offer a more scientific 
forecast than subjective expressions of opinions. But by the 1970s, the evolution of futures 
studies had brought new criticism of specific tools such as the Delphi method, and also criticism 
of the field as a whole.   
Futures started off as a quarterly journal in 1968, with a $30 annual subscription, and 
gradually grew to publish ten issues a year by 1989. The articles included purely methodological 
discussions, some specific forecasting studies, and also discussions of the future of humanity 
with a global focus. Of the near-400 articles appearing in the first ten years of publication of 
Futures, the majority did not focus on specific geographic locations. But a substantial minority 
of pieces did offer forecasts pertaining to specific nations, and others on worldwide forecasts.  
Futures scholars, editors, and readers lived in many countries, something that factored 
into the publication‟s perspective on who counted as a futurist. According to a 1970 editorial 
commentary, the journal‟s readership consisted of 27% from the U.S., 27% in the U.K. (the 
journal was housed in London), and 46% scattered across the rest of the world.  While some 
subscriptions went to individuals, 39% of the journal copies were sent to companies, 25% to 
universities, and 15% to governmental departments.39 Characterized by diversity, the 
contributors, audience, and the editors of this journal were from different backgrounds. Olaf 
Helmer served on the editorial board of Futures until 1995, reflecting his background as a well-
known, senior RAND researcher and mathematician, who had been actively involved in the 
development of IFTF. Helmer‟s fellows on the editorial board included other well known 
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academicians, editors and think tank directors, including the infamous Herman Kahn. The size of 
this editorial board fluctuated between ten and thirteen members, usually two of whom were 
from Switzerland, one each from Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom, and five from the 
U.S.A- (although some American delegates, including Helmer and a couple of the others, were 
born and raised outside of the United States).  Then in 1974, Futures expanded its editorial board 
to seventeen members, with the addition of four more members (three from the United 
Kingdom). Helmer also served on the board of trustees of the Institute for the Future, which 
included various prominent chairpersons from the government, business, academia or think 
tanks. This group was led by Frank P. Davidson, the first president of IFTF, who was influential 
with the development of the Peace Corps and starting the plans for the English Channel tunnel.40 
While this diversity of authorities did not make Futures the authority on the future of everything, 
it certainly gave this publication credibility and an international appeal. 
Just as academic scholars contributed to Futures and other journals, “mainstream” 
futurists participated in more traditional academic fields. Futurists of sundry backgrounds also 
contributed futures scholarship to a variety of other publications, such as The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution (1957-), and Technological Forecasting and Social Change (1969-). During the 
height of futurology government offices also began to compile reports on technology assessment 
and social indicators that stressed decision-making based on the quantification of trends and 
possibilities. 
At the height of the futures studies movement, promoters created a number of other, 
smaller publications, to continue the exploratory and conscientious futurist mentality. Prominent 
academic journals that appeared during the later years of the movement included the Futures 
Research Quarterly (1985), published by the World Future Society, and the Journal of Futures 
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Studies (1996-) produced by the Tamkang University in Taipei, Taiwan. Futurist groups also 
continued to create new, less formal publications to create a common record and dialogue for 
their membership. For example, in 1975, the WFSF began publishing its Futures Bulletin. Unlike 
the ambitious journal Futures, this WFSF newsletter contained a spattering of editorials, 
information for members, book reviews, and short essays. The content included light-hearted 
commentary ranging from transcripts of commencement speeches to poems. It also included 
serious discussions and opinions that continued the founding ideals of forming an international 
organization dedicated to changing the world paradigm that had led to the Cold War and the 
preceding World Wars. 
The 9th world conference of the federation focused on the future of health, welfare, and 
other topics, under the theme of a caring society, a theme Dator later reflected was a “quaint” 
idea.41 Dator‟s “quaint” conference theme of a caring society for the Federation met in Hawaii in 
1986. In an editorial leading up to this conference, Dator expressed his hopes for good global 
representation and discussions. The themes of caring were overshadowed, according to this 
WFSF secretary-general, by the bombings of Libyan civilians “under the pretense of something 
labeled „terrorism.‟”42 
Not surprisingly, most of the Bulletin was about the Federation members. Many of its 
pages were dedicated to updating futurists on their peers‟ accomplishments. It enabled 
Federation futurists to express their opinions, share their poems, or publications about their 
hopes and fears. While substantial portions of the content were devoted to Federation business, 
such as election procedures, conference updates and so forth, it also tried to stay up-to-date with 
world politics.  
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More importantly, the WFSF Newsletter portrayed the continuing peace emphasis of the 
Federation. William Boyer, chair of the 1988 Oregon Democratic Party‟s Foreign Policy 
Platform, utilized the newsletter as a forum to share his party‟s policies. Their positions included 
continued nuclear disarmament, the elimination of covert branches of the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the National Security Council, reduction of military expenditures outside of the 
United States, and an overall emphasis on demilitarization and increasing diplomatic meetings.43 
Another example was when the newsletter printed the declaration of principles of the World 
Council of Indigenous Peoples, which defended the human rights of minority groups across the 
world.44  
Another magazine that emerged in later years was The Manoa Journal of Fried and Half-
Fried Ideas (about the future...), published by the Hawai'i Research Center for Futures Studies. 45 
This publication was started in 1993 by political scientist Jim Dator, after he completed his 
service as the WFSF secretary general in the 1980s and as the WFSF president in the early 
1990s.  As the phrase “Fried and Half-fried Ideas (about the future…)” suggested, Dator edited 
this half-serious newsletter to bring out its self-deprecating humorous side, while also aiming for 
it to be a place that was open to expression of nascent ideas. Its covers were printed on different 
colored papers for each issue, while its table of contents page was formatted as a restaurant 
menu. Philosophically, the starting point of Dator and this journal was the humble conviction in 
the unknowability of the future, for which Dator was known amongst futurists.46 
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c. Decline in Popularity of the Delphi Method 
 
Although the Delphi method had served as one of the originating points during the early 
Cold War for the principles that grew into the futures studies movement, scholars and other 
observers in later years continued to evaluate and discuss the trustworthiness of the Delphi 
procedure. Early advocates remained loyal, convinced that the Delphi method of multi-round 
evaluation offered scientifically valid results.  In the early 1970s, Norman Dalkey conducted 
several experiments aimed at thoroughly evaluating the success of controlled feedback in 
improving group estimates. Dalkey concluded that the repeated iterations of the Delphi 
procedure helped facilitate participants‟ convergence toward a sound conclusion “more often 
than not.”47 For this reason, he considered Delphi to still represent a distinct improvement over 
any alternative methods of quantifying opinions. However, Dalkey did not question what 
happened if the panel began its deliberations with an inaccurate mean.48 These experiments led 
other researchers to conduct more critically-minded investigations of the Delphi method: Some 
criticized the convergence caused by iteration, while others argued that alternatives without 
anonymity had even higher degrees of conformity.49 
Not everybody held the Delphi consensus-building tool in high regard. Several authors 
conducted studies that incorporated deceptive statistical feedback in between rounds, to show 
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that Delphi respondents could be manipulated. This debate over convergence led to numerous 
studies involving deception within Delphi studies.50 Almost all these studies showed that it was 
possible to mold opinion by using deceptive statistical group feedback in a Delphi study. Such 
research raised concern about the validity of the Delphi method, since experts had been unable to 
tell the difference between deceptive and actual group feedback.  
By the mid 1970s, many critics had targeted the Delphi method, attacking overly 
optimistic forecasts and uncritical use of the technique.  They extended their criticism to 
condemn futurism in general.51 Many commentators suggested that until much more research 
had been conducted, forecasters should avoid using the technique.52 Ironically, one of the most 
influential critics was RAND‟s own Harold Sackman. His very thorough 1975 book, Delphi 
Critique, epitomized the objections against what he called the “Conventional Delphi.” Sackman 
strongly opposed the use of the Delphi method by the scientific community until it met relevant 
American Psychological Association (APA) standards for surveys.53 
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 In turn, defenders of the Delphi method described Sackman‟s comparison with the APA 
standards as “mundane, boring and prosaic” and accused him of failing to “point out the 
importance of practical and procedural advantage” the technique provided.54 Over the following 
years, other investigators continued to debate the reliability or validity of the Delphi technique. 
By and large, their studies cautioned Delphi facilitators against generalizing beyond what was 
statistically sound.55 
The method‟s popularity lost momentum amidst these criticisms. One of the main sources 
of resentment of the method was that the end product of a Delphi study reflected a forced 
average of all participants‟ opinions, and thus rarely equaled that of any of the individual 
experts‟ responses. Another complaint was that Delphi studies were time-consuming and 
expensive. About a decade after the method‟s declassification in 1963, the thoroughness and 
intensity of Sackman‟s criticism was a testament to the widespread use (and misuse) of the 
Delphi Method.  
Despite the criticisms, this forecasting tool continued to be used; Delphi secured a place 
in the futurist toolbox by its unique and pioneering design. This opinion technology was not 
spreading as widely as before the criticisms against it, but in exploratory studies it was one of the 
few approaches available to forecasters that had desirable tenets such as minimizing biases of 
outspoken panelists, or incorporating a crowd‟s opinion to improve the estimate. But Delphi was 
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not the panacea to all ills, as some futurists believed it to be in the 1960s. Even though the 
method lost its popularity, this opinion technology still had influence, in part because the very 
act of quantifying complex unknowns continued to have value. Perhaps more to the point, 
quantified speculations obtained from a Delphi study still appeared scientific and stripped of 
personal biases. In a 1977 survey of 800 individuals with experience in using the Delphi method, 
70% said the quantification of the expert opinions had considerably enhanced the acceptability of 
the findings by the organization for which the study had been conducted. The remaining 30% felt 
the Delphi technique slightly enhanced the acceptability of the findings.56  
 
Unlike the more popular futurists, who appealed to the public with attention-getting 
books, Helmer continued his focus on methodology, as he strove to build a “hard science” 
foundation for futures research. In the foreword to the 1975 tome, The Delphi Method, Helmer 
admitted that, “… Delphi still lacks a completely sound theoretical basis.” He went on to argue 
that this fact made further investigation desirable, because of the “far-reaching applications [to 
which] the method … lent itself.”57 Rather than dropping Delphi due to its theoretical vagueness, 
Helmer wanted more scholars to still embrace and extend the technique. In an introspective 1984 
Futures editorial reflecting on the first fifteen years of the journal, Helmer stressed the social 
responsibility of futurists, and urged experimenting further with forecasting methodologies. He 
regarded the Delphi method as a „cybernetic arbitration‟ technique, and Helmer urged that 
decision-makers should conduct more experiments with Delphi in problem-solving contexts.58 
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The Delphi method itself did not remain stagnant over these years. During the 1960s, 
decision-makers with different needs modified the technique to suit various purposes:  to reach 
business decisions, rank values for educational studies, or define goals or priorities for 
policymaking purposes.59 These new “Delphi variants” had a number of methodological 
differences from the original Delphi method, adapted to fit specific tasks. For example, the 
“policy-Delphi” version of the method incorporated face-to-face discussions in between 
iterations of anonymous questionnaires. Such variations depended on the nature of the problem, 
and thus the Delphi technique was never universalized to fit all cases. Murray Turoff, one of the 
prominent Delphi experts who worked as a research analyst at the White House in the 1960s, 
wrote about combining the Delphi method with computers into a “Delphi Conference.”60 Turoff 
argued: “The incorporation of Delphi techniques into computer systems appears to be a first step 
in making the computer a true extension of man‟s intellectual capability.” 61 These modifications 
caused some headaches for the inventors of the Delphi Method, who had a very specific 
definition of what this opinion technology should include. The pioneering methodologists 
cautioned that studies using Delphi variants often resulted in misuse.62 
A 1975 article in the New York Daily News by the science editor Edward Edelson 
summarized the method as having achieved “stardom in the technology forecasting efforts of the 
1960s.”63 Edelson continued by suggesting that this “major tool of the futures business” was not 
equipped for the complex problems futurists dealt with in 1975. This technology forecasting tool 
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was great for straight-forward prediction questions like “when will an artificial heart be made?” 
but solving the more complex social and economic problems of 1975‟s tomorrows seemed to 
require more subtle methods such as scenario-forecasting.   
As Edelson‟s comments suggested, the widespread appeal that Delphi enjoyed during the 
1970s had indeed diminished by the end of the decade. Nevertheless, the consensus-building tool 
survived well into the twenty-first century. The original patron, the RAND Corporation, 
continued to utilize variants of the method with expert pools ranging from very small to very 
large in recent years.64 Others in the methodologist camp of futurism, including Ted Gordon of 
the Futures Group, and later of United Nation‟s Millennium Project, also continued to conduct 
Delphi studies. 
 
 
d. Maturation of Futures Studies – The Post-Movement Era 
 
Many of the first generation of futurists were part of a drive in the 1950s and 1960s to 
rationalize, quantify and model. The Second World War and the Cold War brought this field into 
a sharp focus that led to the establishment and professionalization of a new Cold War social 
science. Subsequent years of addressing global military, political and social issues gave futurists 
a real momentum, with the emergence of various institutions and conferences. The height of the 
field of futures studies lasted for about a decade in the United States, between the 1960s and 
1970s, at which point the field had substantially matured. During this decade, futurists fervently 
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modeled and quantified social issues, which eventually led to criticisms of them for being 
reductionist and deterministic.65  
Amidst criticism of quantification and reduction of social issues to mathematical models 
in the 1970s and 1980s, futurology quickly lost the momentum with which it started in the 1960s. 
Of course statistical and expert-based forecasting methods still existed before and after this 
golden era of futurology. Futurists retained their dream of gaining certainty on uncertain 
questions by using scientific methods, and thereby helping leaders choose the best course of 
action. 
One of the problematic aspects of futures studies, whether military or civilian, was that 
the content was often secret. Robert Jungk called on futurists in 1970, to discuss the shadow 
thrown on their work by secret or semi-secret futures research.66 According to Jungk, futures 
studies had not yet become people-oriented, in a fashion that many natural sciences had; rather, 
futurists were more power-oriented. Within his criticism of secrecy, however, Jungk also 
acknowledged that some futures research was “unsuitable for public debate.”67 Tom Mandel of 
the Stanford Research Institute, whose job focused on thinking about the futures of consumers, 
noted one important trend. Writing in 1987, Mandel saw a shift in funding of futures research 
from “considerable government and foundation support” in the 1960s and 1970s to private sector 
funding later in the 1970s.68 In this 1987 commentary, Mandel agreed with another author who 
considered work going on in the public domain as flimsy and/or ideologically driven. 
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By the 1980s, many critics had come to disapprove of futurism, futuristic methods, and 
the kinds of futures that they imagined, as deterministic, wishful, or simplistic. The field‟s 
momentum slowed down, but futurism did not cease to exist or become replaced by something 
else. Futures organizations, ideas, and methodologies, did not lose their momentum completely, 
as witnessed by the continued emergence of new organizations and publications post-1975. 
Many futurists reflected upon whether the period from the 1960s to 1970s constituted a 
movement, and whether their maturing field was worthy of the term “field.”69 In their self-
evaluations of futures studies, these assessments asked questions about what the definition of 
their field ought to be. They also raised the matter of gaining intellectual respect, reflecting their 
aspirations to help futures studies enter “the holiest of the holy: the university” as a distinct 
discipline.  
 
 
e. The Identity Issue – Futuristics, Futurology, Futury, or any of Dozens of 
Alternatives 
 
Critics and participants alike worried that the uniting theme of being future-minded at a 
time of rapid technological change was too broad to define as a field. Futurists came from 
diverse academic backgrounds with different outlooks on how they approached their work, even 
disagreeing about whether it was an art or a science. One of the reasons for the declining 
momentum of futurism was that futurists could not agree on what their field ought to be called. 
This uncertainty reflected a more fundamental problem than simply choosing the best name of a 
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journal or organization that best encompassed their mission – it was a substantive problem about 
the nature of futures studies. Aside from studying multiple futures, what was it?  
Futurists who argued that their methodology represented a real science preferred to call 
their work “futurology,” using the ending “ology” to lend linguistic credibility to their 
approach.70 Not all futurists promoted their field as a science, however, including one of the 
pioneering futurists, Bertrand de Jouvenel. In his pioneering 1967 book, The Art of Conjecture, 
de Jouvenel argued that futurism was more of an art.71 WFS president Edward Cornish argued 
for “futuristics,” which he considered to mean “applied history.”72 When discussing what to call 
their society, some WFS members argued for “futury” or “futory,” terms that positioned their 
work as a temporal companion field of history. 
Despite futurists‟ organizations, meetings, compilations of directories etc., by virtue of 
their constituency‟s diversity, the identity issue became a recurring problem. As much as Edward 
Cornish supported the ideas in Toffler‟s Future Shock, Cornish suggested it was mislabeled. The 
future was not what shocked people, it was the change – so Toffler would have been better off 
naming it “Change Shock.”73 And change, Cornish argued, was not a concept that people could 
rally against; change did not galvanize futurists enough to define their field more specifically. 
Futurists struggled with their identity on a continual basis, asking in their publications 
and conferences what their mission was, or contemplating at a WFS Toronto meeting where “the 
future of futures studies” would be.74 This continuing identity crisis posed a problem for futurists 
as they tried to grow in numbers, enter academia, and improve their efforts of investigating the 
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future. Although many futurists taught university courses focusing on futures studies, and formed 
programs and even some departments teaching futurists-in-training, they failed to establish a 
graduate program explicitly in futures studies. According to Jim Dator, one of the reasons why 
academia did not accept futures studies as a field was the scattered nature of futurist publications 
within a library.75 Too diverse a membership, coupled with too diverse a mission, threatened the 
coherence of futures studies. 
 
 
f. The University Issue – Subordinate to Political Science, Sociology, Economics 
 
Academics from many disciplines such as sociology, political science, and economics 
conducted futures studies and published their results in various journals during the futures 
studies movement. Universities, by employing many futurists, no doubt played an indirect role in 
this movement. The more interesting issue, however, was the bigger ambitions futurists had 
about the role they wanted to play within academia, which was to establish futurology as a 
separate discipline. The dream of creating new university courses and degrees in futures studies 
represented something of a philosopher‟s stone for futurists – a goal they constantly strived for 
but never systematically realized at a global level.76  
By the 1970s, many futurists had begun to teach university courses focusing on futures 
studies.  They formed programs and even some departments most prominently in the University 
of Hawaii and the University of Houston in the United States, and various international programs 
to teach futurists-in-training. During the futures studies movement, some futurists hailed such 
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trends as signs of progress; several articles, news snippets, and books referred to hundreds of 
university courses that taught futures studies in the United States and claimed this trend would 
increase momentum towards establishing an academic discipline of futures studies.77  
But beyond such isolated infiltration of academia, scholar-advocates failed to establish 
any graduate program explicitly in futures studies. A professor of genetics started an 
experimental program under the title “Man-made future” in the University of Edinburgh in the 
early 1970s.78 The program sponsored a futures-specific course, employed a couple of assistants 
and a secretary/librarian, and was led by Professor C.H. Waddington – the Buchanan Professor 
of Genetics. However, this “school of the man-made future” at the University of Edinburgh did 
not last long.  
This may very well have been an instance of futurist methodologies becoming 
assimilated within other academic fields. A German futurist at the University of Cologne wrote 
that futures studies “cannot be categorized in any of the existing sciences but has many of the 
existing sciences as its subject.”79 Instead, the field brought together the findings of different 
fields sort of like a “science of science,” (which interestingly was what Soviet prognosticators 
called their efforts in the 1960s). He suggested that in order to bring together different fields and 
develop long-range prognoses that were “thought over carefully in all directions,” futurists 
needed to develop new methods “based on scientific knowledge … gained through 
interdisciplinary cooperation.”80  
Whether interdisciplinary or focused on a single discipline, futurists‟ efforts to enter 
academia yielded mixed success. On-line sources on this topic are plentiful, but unreliable. A list 
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on the Australian non-profit Acceleration Studies Foundation web site looks impressive, 
however this source must be taken with a grain of salt as many of the links are broken and 
misclassified.81 In addition, many academic programs within political science, economics, or 
various technology programs (statistics, engineering etc.) taught futures studies topics without 
giving it that name.  
Despite such issues, a few programs emerged as leaders in futures studies after the 
movement. One of these was the University of Hawaii, which started offering courses on futures 
studies in 1969 and later started offering MA degrees in 1978. The University of Houston started 
a Futures Studies in Commerce program, led by sociologist Peter C. Bishop, which started 
offering an MS degree in 1975. Another program specific to the African context – the Institute 
for Futures Research – was established in 1974 at the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa. 
The Graduate Institute of Futures Studies established late in the twentieth century at Tamkang 
University in Taipei, Taiwan, and also started the publication Journal of Futures Studies. 
Universities in France, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Hungary and other countries started or continued 
to offer courses beyond the 1970s, and some even offered degrees related to futures studies, but 
almost always as a specialization in an existing discipline.   
For historians, one possible interpretation of these fragmented, yet persistent, academic 
endeavors is that there was a second futures studies movement during the 1980s and afterward, 
akin to the way that new futurist organizations and publications continued emerging, well into 
the twenty-first century. This second-wave of futures studies could be considered a less popular 
or intense continuation of the efforts between the 1960s and 1970s, which still carried enough 
momentum to assemble and research futurism in a more long-term and continuous effort. Later 
                                                                 
81
 Acceleration Studies Foundation. Foresight Graduate Programs – Global List, Accessed on March 30, 2011 
from: http://www.accelerating.org/gradprograms.html  
152 
 
 
futurists continued to be convinced of the importance of understanding possible futures as well 
as how to understand them, but had a harder time captivating popular or institutional interest. 
Both in the United States and internationally, futurists who taught at the university level 
were always housed in a separate, already established, discipline. Dator‟s students at the 
University of Hawaii received their Ph.D.s in political science with a focus on futures studies, 
Bishop‟s Houston students majored in commerce with a focus in futures studies. The 
international cases, treated in the next chapter, also paralleled the same problem futurists faced. 
For example in Italy, Eleonora Masini‟s Ph.D. students received their degrees in sociology, in 
France, Fabienne Goux-Baudiment‟s students in sociology, and in Hungary, Erzsébet Nováky‟s 
Ph.D. students in economics, all with a focus in futures studies.  
According to Fabienne Goux-Baudiment, futurists‟ inability to introduce futures studies 
as an academic discipline had nothing to do with whether or not their methods were scientific. 
After all she pointed out other human sciences such as psychology similarly did not have 
replicable methodologies. Perhaps, she argued, the reason was that “when we think of the future 
we are afraid, we are afraid of death, social death, even familiar death.”82 The future was not 
something, this futurist argued, that many could stomach studying in a too formal way.83  
The actors of the futures studies movement in the U.S., whether they subscribed to 
futures publications, contributed to them, professionally worked as futurists, or participated in 
the various events and conferences, were diverse not only in their ideologies, but also in their 
nationalities. The futures studies movement grew into a forum in the United States, but it was 
greater than the American paradigm and influenced international inceptions of futurism. The 
field of futures studies grew internationally, as the actors, actions, and places of action of the 
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futures studies movement demonstrated, which is the topic the next chapter examines in more 
detail. 
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Chapter 5. Global Inceptions of Futures Studies – Cases from Outside the United States  
 
During the post-WWII decades international futurists developed a myriad of national 
interpretations/schools of studying the future under varying names including, foresight studies, 
futurology, and prospective, among others. Some paralleled the years of the futures studies 
movement in the United States, while others had very different reasons, motivations, and 
timelines for coming into existence. Yet, the fact that a specific intellectual interest in the futures 
of so many people, and different approaches for studying those futures, came into focus after the 
Second World War was an indication of the exceptional pressures of the post-industrial, post-
nuclear times. Both the international order and the living conditions for ordinary citizens in the 
post-WWII world had changed dramatically, and according to the many emerging futurists, it 
required a new paradigm through which to study it. 
As scholars and other observers began reassessing world conditions during the return to 
peacetime, many still lamented the fact that humanity had been engulfed in world wars twice in 
less than forty years.  That harsh reality, combined with the Stalinist transformations of the 
Soviet peoples during the years in between, seemed to call for a focus on a scientific means of 
anticipating the future. Within each national context, government and citizens alike faced 
specific concerns that drove worries about the future. In particular, World War II had devastated 
the Soviet Union‟s population, physical infrastructure, and economic conditions; left in one of 
the worst situations of all the war-torn countries, Soviet leaders and advisers needed to plan for 
recovery. During the Second World War, the Nazi sneak invasion in 1941 had caught Soviet 
forces off-guard and unprepared, defenseless and resourceless to fight back. Memories of that 
desperate situation meant that in the aftermath of WWII, the Soviet futurists were strongly 
155 
 
 
motivated to concentrate on preparing for future wars, by developing seemingly-scientific ways 
to anticipate different possible events. 
In the United States, the most critical turning points for the field of futures studies were 
the early Cold War strategic impetus for forecasting in the 1950s, the spread and democratization 
of futurist ideas in the 1960s, the futures studies movement between 1965 and 1975, and the 
continued efforts of a maturing field afterward. The early efforts of the 1950s and 1960s were 
characteristically optimistic and technologically deterministic. The later efforts during the futures 
studies movement strengthened the methodological and epistemological foundations of the field. 
A movement exactly like the U.S. developments did not happen in other nations, yet 
there were some similarities, aside from a renewed vigor in thinking about how to study the 
future. Interestingly, in the Soviet Union, futurists tried to transform the governing system from a 
planning to a forecasting paradigm during the 1960s. Those Soviet developments followed a 
timeline roughly parallel to that in the U.S., with an initial surge in the early 1960s of optimistic 
and deterministic forecasts that later yielded to mature efforts. Similarities and differences across 
interpretations of futures studies in different countries show how the field managed sometimes to 
transcend the geopolitical divisions. While futurists and their field became pawns in the 
East/West division as much as the next political forum, there were also many combined efforts 
that made futurism a global endeavor.  
 Futurists of different motivations found a forum for discussion or work related to their 
varying national contexts and to landmark global events. One of the two broad turning points for 
futures studies internationally was the oil crisis of the early 1970s. A second critical turning 
point, especially for European futurists, was the fall of the Berlin wall. As the Cold War neared 
an end, on June 12, 1987, President Ronald Reagan called out to the Soviet leader from the 
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Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” The Berlin wall signified the 
disconnect between the communist superpower and the people within the Soviet Union, but also 
in other countries throughout the world. With the end of the Cold War an important motivation 
that led to futures studies became less intense. Moreover, the fact that established futures studies 
experts had apparently failed to predict the fall of the Berlin wall also was a sobering reminder 
that futurists were not in the business of predicting the future; rather, they were in the business of 
guiding the present through systematically-designed analysis and choice.1 
One of the significant themes that unified the perspectives of many international futurists 
was a desire to study the future without colonizing it. Just as historian of technology David 
Noble stressed the importance of questioning the assumption that technology always brings 
progress to society by asking “progress for whom?‟ and „progress for what?‟, so too futurists 
advocated for an analysis asking „futures for what?‟ and „futures for whom?‟2 Similar to the U.S. 
futurists, international futurists followed different motivations for entering the field; some 
wanted to make a quick profit, others were concerned for national security, yet others wanted to 
improve methodologies; the actors, and motivations varied in each context. 
The next section summarizes the international developments in the futures studies field. 
The subsequent two sections provide summaries of futures studies developments in the Soviet 
Union, and in Hungary. While these histories provide by no means a comprehensive coverage of 
futurists‟ efforts, these cases provide comparison with futures studies in communist and socialist 
contexts. 
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a. Internationalization of Futures Studies 
 
As the global focus of the WFSF and the international authorship of academic and 
scholarly contributions highlight, the futures studies movement had long drawn lively 
participation from outside of the United States. Indeed, some centers of activity had relatively 
little to do with the U.S. movement; most notably, the French and Italian futurists emerged from 
their own national motivations and evolved distinctly different paradigms for viewing the future. 
Other national schools were strongly influenced by American futurists, including forecasters in 
the Soviet Union and other socialist states – if sometimes only by using arguments developed in 
the United States as fodder to debunk capitalism. 
Many international futurists worked to transcend the East vs. West Cold War divisions. 
WFSF futurists chose Oslo as the location for their first 1967 conference, because they thought 
its proximity to the Soviet Union symbolized their goal to build a bridge between the east and the 
west. In later years, the Federation chose locations for other conferences that continued to 
showcase the assembly‟s specific agendas and visions. Another display of futurists‟ efforts 
transcending the Cold War divisions was the collaboration of U.S., Soviet, and other 
international scholars at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) that 
began in 1972. This policy-oriented research organization, located in a lavish Austrian castle 
emerged out of a desire to transcend the dichromatic Cold War paradigm.3 U.S. President 
Lyndon B. Johnson, and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin worked for a number of years to form 
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IIASA, and this group of about a couple hundred researchers was headed by both American and 
Soviet scientists. 4 
The development of French futures studies was a good example of how the post-WWII 
reconstruction needs motivated futurists to define a field of futures studies. The field‟s inception 
in France was government-based, with the creation of the Commissariat Général au Plan 
(National Agency for Planning) in 1947. This entity‟s primary goal was to aid decision-makers 
with France‟s reconstruction. Given their leaders‟ apparent lack of anticipation and preparedness 
during WWII, French planners wanted to adapt to the post-WWII reality by rethinking the 
policy-making process. Given the country‟s central settlement, with Paris as the political hub, 
this new field of futures studies influenced policies ranging from housing to energy 
independence, where experts focused on the new possibilities of developing nuclear power.5  
These initial efforts by the French government to organize and promote futurism differed 
substantially from American efforts going on at the same time. While the U.S. futurists rode the 
waves of the continued post-war defense funding that became the military- industrial complex, in 
France it wasn‟t until 1963 that their defense ministry devoted funding for futures studies. Their 
visions of France‟s future were timid, due in part to the widespread existentialist philosophy, and 
also in part because of their inability to have predicted the threats of the Second World War. 
More than this, French futurists fundamentally distanced themselves from forecasting in any 
way, by focusing on how they could assist with immediate policy-making decisions. Instead of 
strategic forecasting, the early period of French futurism focused on rebuilding the nation via 
new guidelines for policymaking, and by starting futures studies departments in businesses. 
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Kodak, LaFarge, and all the big corporations that took part in the reconstruction of France 
created their own departments of prospective, where futurists promoted the goal of 
systematically analyzing trends in social and economic conditions for business growth.6 
However, this did not grow into a movement, and not many people worked on popularizing 
futures studies in France. 
Two of the most well-known personalities of the post-WWII French futurism field were 
Gaston Berger and Bertrand de Jouvenel. Gaston Berger was an influential French businessman, 
educator, and philosopher. He worked his way to the top of an oil making plant, and later taught 
at and directed universities and started an engineering school in Lyons. As a person who entered 
leadership from outside the mold of the typical Paris-centered French elite, this hard-working 
philosopher promoted futures studies and started the journal Prospective in 1957. Berger instilled 
in French public servants the mentality that they should perform at their best standards to 
accommodate their own immediate needs, but, more importantly, to also set up future 
generations for better opportunities.7 Bertrand de Jouvenel, the other influential promoter of 
futurism in France, started an international organization called Futuribles International in 1960, 
and wrote one of the first books focusing on futurism, The Art of Conjecture, in 1967. 
Although American futurism enjoyed widespread growth and popularity during the late 
1960s and early 1970s, French futurism did not thrive during that period. According to French 
futurist and sociologist Fabienne Goux-Baudiment, the 1968 student protests came along “too 
late to change the fate of the culture.” Existentialism as the mainstream movement yielded to the 
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“no future” generation. She described the 1968 revolutions as the remission of a dying patient, 
not just for French culture, but Europe in general. 8 
According to Goux-Baudiment, there were three distinct generations of futurists in 
France. The first generation was defined by their humanistic goals, the second with their 
emphasis on mathematization – the methodologists – and the third was a pragmatic mixture of 
the first two that emphasized desired futures and a normative approach.9  French futures studies 
had two critical turning points after its inception in the late 1940s. The early 1970s oil crises and 
the beginning of devolutions in the 1980s seemed to divide the aforementioned futurist 
generations. During 1972, 1973, and 1974, the majority of companies that had established 
departments of prospective closed them, reportedly due to budget cuts. Then with the focus on 
devolution of the French government, a rejuvenated focus in futurism emerged, starting in 1982. 
In later years with the fall of the Berlin wall, and a continued national focus on French 
decentralization, participatory futures studies boomed. Public funds offered support for many 
initiatives in local futures studies. During this time, French futurists also devised new 
methodologies which incorporated the participation of everyday citizens.10 
 
Beyond this history of futures studies in France, Japan offers yet another useful case-
study of the field‟s international evolution.  Starting in the 1960s, new groups of Japanese 
futurists brought together government officials and business leaders, efforts that produced sort of 
a game plan for the next decade, which they called visioning. Japanese futurists provided a 
unique merger of state and business decision-makers, as these experts successfully collaborated 
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and produced strategies for what sectors and technologies they believed should be pursued. They 
continued this work through similar visioning exercises in the 1970s and again 1980s. They 
stopped this effort after their 1990 meeting, when business and government leaders failed to 
reach a consensus about the direction Japan should take for the next decade.11  
Japanese institutes during the Cold War years conducted perhaps the most extensive and 
influential Delphi surveys, which produced regular national outlooks of future technological 
trends.12 But according to Edward Cornish, by 1977 the Japanese futurists did not appear to have 
played a role impacting international futurism because of the limited readership of the Japanese 
language. It was only later in the twentieth century that Japanese forecasting efforts influenced 
the creation of a separate thread of futures studies called foresight studies, as Fabienne Goux-
Baudiment noted. The scope of this dissertation does not address the history of foresight studies 
as it emerged in the 1990s and in the twenty first century, but a brief statement here to 
distinguish between the different schools of thought in the field of futures studies should help 
clarify the actors. In short, Japanese futurists used and disseminated ideas of technological 
forecasting that had originated in the U.S.; their efforts were later picked up by a German 
delegation visiting and witnessing the Japanese forecasting efforts, and this re-interpretation then 
caught the attention of English and other European futurists.13 The idea of foresight studies 
subsequently gained global interest and spread, especially after Australian futurist Richard 
Slaughter popularized the idea in his 1995 book The Foresight Principle. 
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In her 1993 primer of futures studies Why Futures Studies?, Eleonora Barbieri Masini 
wrote an introductory survey aimed at the uninitiated university student.14 This sociology 
professor and futurist directed her work to the young people who would be living and working in 
the future, particularly those who were future-minded and understood that the future did not 
“simply happen, …[was] built by each and every one of us, from wherever we may come.”15 
Influenced by the Club of Rome, this Italian futurist traced the history of the emergence of her 
field back to the 1960s and 1970s, claiming that the waning interest in futures studies by the end 
of the 1970s reemerged with a “renewed impetus and interest,” which continued into the 1990s.16 
Masini jumped into the ongoing debate about how to define the name and purpose of her 
field, after surveying definitions of the field by Daniel Bell, Olaf Helmer, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 
Ziauddin Sardar (author of Future of Muslim Civilization), Rajni Kothari (author of Footsteps 
into the Future), and other leading futurists. According to Masini, the best way to understand the 
term futures studies was as referring to the study of multiple possible futures. Masini delineated 
futures studies as distinct from the act of forecasting. Futures studies encompassed a broader 
spectrum of analysis beyond simply making predictions; as John McHale argued, the field 
“include[d] all forms of looking into the future from trend extrapolation to utopia.”17 
Masini further laid out for readers three “generally accepted” principles of futures 
studies. Her first principle was that humans faced a constant dilemma, between knowledge on the 
one side and desire and fear on the other. One way futurists tried to cope with this dilemma was 
by seeking to differentiate between the possible futures and the desirable futures. The second 
“generally accepted” principle of futures studies stated that “the only space on which humans can 
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have an impact is the future.” This did not necessarily mean that futurists ought to impose their 
ideologies and social values to colonize and focus only on desirable futures.  Rather, Masini 
interpreted this idea to suggest that humans could analyze the past and the present but not change 
it; more could be done about the future, which remained open to invention, creativity, and will. 
According to Masini, the third principle of futures studies was that there were many possible 
futures, and not a predestined single future.18  
In more specific terms, futurists distinguished between possible, plausible, probable, and 
preferable futures. Masini believed that futurists could discern “possible futures” on the basis of 
knowledge, data, and information. Among these possibilities, there were some branches of 
possible futures that experts could judge to be more probable, and among the probable ones were 
the subset of plausible futures, ones that were the most likely to occur. The last term, “preferable 
futures” differed in that it described futures that were more related to personal and social values. 
Masini‟s perspective on futures studies was strongly influenced by the Club of Rome, in 
that she similarly believed that the present era faced a “crisis” that mandated a need for studying 
multiple possible futures. Earlier in the futures studies movement, Daniel Bell, Alvin Toffler, 
and many others had raised this same idea, that the sheer rapidity of modern social change and 
the pressure of technological developments were pushing society toward a breaking point. 
According to Masini, developed societies were first to face this crisis, awareness of which had 
stimulated the earlier, inherently Western inception of futures studies.  But Masini concluded 
that an increased awareness of the rapidity of change had spread globally by the 1990s and 
asserted that she saw an interest in futurism already increasing in developing nations toward the 
end of the twentieth century.19   
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b. Ideology & Futurology – Soviet Futurists 
 
Soviet scientists and social scientists also studied the future with an increased enthusiasm 
during the 1960s and 1970s; however, the context and motivations for their work were very 
different from those in the West and in Japan. Because of the significantly distinct context, the 
beginning and end of Soviet forecasting also differed.  The Soviet futurists and the American 
futurists of the 1960s and 1970s had similarities in their methodologies, scales, and even 
reception, but also dissimilarities in their concepts of futurology and its place in policy-making. 
During this period, Russian futurists assimilated some of the specific methods and principles that 
the futures studies movement was quickly spreading around the world. However, Soviet thinkers 
were also engaged in developing their own unique methodologies. 
Arguably the whole history of the communist superpower throughout the entire Soviet 
period, starting with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and running to the end of the Cold War in 
1989, constituted a grand exercise in futurology. Although the term “futurology” was not coined 
until later by Ossip Flechtheim, the Soviet central planning mechanisms which set out the Five-
Year-Plans, evaluated their successes, and continued this cycle every few years, were involved in 
studying the future of their country. As any investigation of Soviet forecasting must note, the 
1917 Revolution, followed by nearly four years of civil war, was a tumultuous time for the 
Russian people. Because of the brutal hardships of the Russian Civil War, the early 1920s 
constituted a transitional period. Aside from mortality due to the civil unrest, many Russian 
professionals and elite fled to rural areas or other countries, which led to an unstable society. 
165 
 
 
During the New Economic Policy era, from 1921 through 1927, the early Soviet era command 
economy was permissive of limited commerce. Compared to the totalitarian yet stable regime 
that Stalin brought about, these years continued the social tensions that had led to the Russian 
Revolution in 1917, while offering limited economic freedom.20  
Amidst these larger events, Soviet decision-makers and scientists raised their notion of 
science to the highest pedestal. In his 1979 doctoral dissertation Soviet historian (and futurist of 
the Institute for the Future) Robert Randolph interpreted the historical trends of the acceptability 
of forecasting in the Soviet Union. 21 As part of Randolph‟s view Soviet forecasting emerged, 
however briefly, during the 1917 Russian revolution and then resurfaced during the Cold War 
especially in the 1960s as a broad-ranging meta-science, or naukovedenie (translated as “science 
of science,” or “science policy studies”).22 Between the 1930s and 1960s Soviet forecasting 
efforts deteriorated and such interests attracted little support or tolerance, as the historiography 
on these years of Soviet forecasting efforts documents. The “catch up and overtake” policy of the 
Stalinist years voided the motivation for examining the future, as the trends of the more 
developed nations, which were to be caught and overtaken, played a dominant role.23 Randolph 
interpreted that science and technology forecasting efforts in the early 1920s included some 
serious pioneering studies, which were shunned and rejected throughout the Stalinist Era, but 
that the period nevertheless saw the inception of Soviet forecasting. According to another 
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historian of Soviet forecasting efforts, a major reason why forecasting efforts died in the 1930s 
was that most of the scientists and social scientists had died or fled before then. 24 
According to Randolph‟s history, the revival of Soviet forecasting began with the death 
of Stalin. Starting in 1954, he argued that the development of futures-thinking, or at least the 
returned acceptance of forecasting in the mid-to-late 1960s, was enabled by various small steps. 
Significantly, he assessed the planning mechanism of the Soviet system to have incorporated 
“increased freedom of expression and personal involvement of scientists.”25 Once again, 
forecasting became an acceptable avenue of communication, expression, and policy-debate. 
Despite the dramatically different contexts, a strikingly comparable feature of Soviet and 
U.S. forecasters during the 1950s and 1960s was their optimism. Many Soviet projections were 
optimistic about the world‟s unlimited resources and expressed confidence when discussing the 
scientific and technological outlook, including prospects for human advancement through 
automation, energy generation, resource extraction, and computation. The majority of the 
forecasts, and commentary on futures and planning, were ideologically constrained and 
technologically deterministic.  
In the post-Stalin years, Soviet scientists paid increasing attention to forecasting and 
publicly discussed its value. After 1965, with the urging of Premier Alexei Kosygin, an explicit 
interest in forecasting became significantly more influential in Soviet policy-making. The Soviet 
5-year plans played a critical role for the growth of Soviet planning and futurism, two concepts 
that overlapped significantly.  According to one contemporary commentator, forecasting became 
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so significant that it overshadowed planning.26 Soviet planners, scientists, and social scientists 
also had a renewed and keen interest in the study of the future. Although the multiplicity of 
potential futures was not an openly expressed feature of these efforts, much of the Soviet 
forecasts implied alternative futures and provoked non-conformist thoughts.27  
During the late 1960s, Soviet scholars also started many organizations, wrote copious 
amounts of literature, and gathered in large numbers in dozens of conferences. For instance, 
1,400 scientists were involved in providing a basis for the five-year plan that was implemented 
during the early 1970s. These scientists used many of the same techniques, including the Delphi 
method, that other futurists around the globe also used.  
As the Soviet policies shifted from “catch up and overtake,” to “overtake without 
catching up,” or “overtake without being left behind” so too shifted the demands on Soviet 
planners and forecasters. This effort to devise the best science and technology meta-policy to 
retain or gain leadership in a particular field was similar in some ways to the emergence of 
futures studies in the United States.28  
Soviet futurism, or “science of science,” aimed to become a scientific field with a 
growing knowledge base. Aside from gaining knowledge for its own sake, however, it primarily 
evolved as a policy-making guide.29 During the 1960s, many members of this community began 
discussing the relevance of forecasting to planning and more specifically to socialism. Thus, as 
Randolph pointed out in depth, Soviet forecasters were debating the nature of their work and its 
proper role in their country, during the very same years that the U.S. futures studies movement 
was also engaged in a debate as to the place of futurism. Proponents argued that a greater use of 
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forecasting offered clear advantages to the future well-being of Communist countries, especially 
when forecasting was employed in central politics where major changes could be achieved.  
Some policy-makers debated the acceptability of forecasting in the Soviet paradigm, 
while other authors considered it as a marginal field that had severe limitations. These critics 
pointed out, for example, that specific scientific breakthroughs and technological developments 
were hard to predict, and thus, the “science of science” could only be applied to broad aspects of 
science policy.30 Soviet opponents of futurism provided several reasons for their distrust of 
forecasting. One of the most prevalent arguments against futurology was that futurology was a 
bourgeois endeavor, “a „delayed echo from the U.S.A.,‟ appropriate only in an uncontrolled 
capitalist economy and society.”31 Other commentary dismissed forecasting as unnecessary, 
backward, or impossible.   
One of the Western examples of “bourgeois futurologists,” at least according to the 
Soviet anti-Western-forecasting camp, was Zbiegniew Brzezinski. His 1970 book, Between Two 
Ages, in which he had forecast the preeminence of the U.S. in science, technology and education 
through the 20th century, drew the ire of Soviet commentators. One of the responses to 
Brzezinski‟s argument came from Georgi Shakhnazarov in his book Futurology Fiasco. 
Shakhnazarov described the futures studies movement as an artificial Westernized response to 
communism that had the goal of predicting non-communist futures, and thus was not a truly 
objective scientific approach, but a biased one.32  
Ironically, Brzezinski‟s vision of the future attracted critics from the West as well as from 
the Soviet Union. His arguments about how international banks and corporations were replacing 
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nation-states in terms of political power, and how every person and state served, or would serve 
such a unified global system, exemplified the “colonizing the future” school of thought against 
which the WFSF futurists often protested. 
There was an interesting paradox between the anti-Western-futurology critics in the 
Soviet Union and their use of Western methods. According to a contemporary commentator, 
these Soviet observers accepted the Western methods, while rejecting Western motivations, 
which they scorned as “a hopeless attempt to save a dying system” of capitalism.33 To reinforce 
such ideological divisions, critics sometimes went to such extremes as to using obsolete data to 
misrepresent the U.S. realities and make America look especially bad in contrast to the 
communist ideal. To create an impression that U.S. industrial output had sunk into decline, V. V. 
Kosolapov used data on depleted resources, manufactures of obsolete technologies, and other 
misleading data.34  However, Randolph distinguished between Soviet forecasters who operated 
within a black or white Cold War context, and those who studied futures for the sake of 
knowledge. Accordingly some were critical of Western efforts and asked “to whose advantage 
does Western forecasting contribute,” while others simply went about their ways in working on 
forecasts like policy scientists. These Soviet futurists felt perfectly comfortable referring to 
Western authorities such as Olaf Helmer when discussing expert methods, or citing the work of 
Forrester and Meadows when working on global modeling.  
Some commentators in the West also viewed the Soviet futurism efforts through a black 
or white framework. While highlighting that there was no futures studies in the Soviet Union, 
and that any kind of speculation was shunned, John Erickson argued in 1977 that Soviet analysts 
had a “genuine commitment to dialectical materialism as an instrument for both explanation, and 
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prediction.”35 The Soviet interpretations of Marxism, dialectical-materialism, and the rhetorical 
respect for science all served as strong motivations for the support of forecasting, and the 
epistemology of forecasting in the Soviet Union. One of the consequences of an ideologically-
based forecasting effort was that all processes were seen as a means towards a communist end. 
Being directed to understanding the causes of the dynamics of communism, though not desirable, 
Randolph argued, was better than measuring or forecasting without understanding the inner 
workings of the processes themselves.36 It provided a more structured approach to studying the 
future. 
A Soviet cartoon republished in The Futurist nicely illustrated the dichromatic context of 
some futurists during the futures studies movement. In the first of two panels, a bourgeois 
futurologist consulted his computer printout and foresaw automated workers obediently turning 
the keys to their hearts and minds over to the capitalist. In the second panel, the worker seized 
the computer tape and instead presented his vision of ousting both the capitalist and the 
bourgeois futurologist. 37 This cartoon demonstrated the black or white context in which many 
commentators of the time viewed futures studies. 
Randolph described the post-1965 Soviet forecasting efforts as having “grown 
explosively.”38 Aside from the many organizations, conferences, and scholarship created in the 
years following Premier Kosygin‟s pro-forecasting speech, Soviet futurists tried to raise the 
public‟s awareness of problems in the future. The future, and future-mindedness, became a 
theme in the Soviet Union as much as the futures studies movement of the U.S. The forecasting 
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“explosion” in the Soviet Union had deeper effects than the establishment of organizations. It 
also influenced the formation of small research groups in many government offices akin to the 
small futures studies departments of large corporations, or to think tanks in the United States.39  
In his compilation of Soviet forecasting studies from 1966 to 1977, Randolph traced the 
shifting emphases of the forecasters. Methodologically, according to Randolph‟s tabulations the 
use of expert methods, and thereby the influence of experts, grew significantly, from four percent 
during the first three years from 1966 to 1969, to thirty one percent during the last three years 
from 1974 to 1977. Although this did not match the U.S. trends of the time, other data was 
similar. For example, methodological discussions decreased over time in both American and 
Soviet futurism, and increasingly complex procedures and world models gained prominence.  
The Soviet contributions to forecasting methodologies included the invention and 
improvement of specific methods, but also work on the epistemology and philosophy of 
forecasting studies, as Randolph detailed.40 Forecasting in a planned society assumed that social 
processes were planned, and that a skeptical analysis of these plans, scientists could quantify, 
automate or alter social changes. Soviet prognosticators worked with well over a hundred 
methods, with some publications listing as many as 300 distinct forecasting methods. 41 Among 
these was the Delphi method, which continued to be used and valued in Soviet forecasting circles 
even after American Harold Sackman‟s 1975 critique of the method became known. Soviet 
analysts did not regard any of the multiple methods in the arsenal of the Soviet forecaster as a fix 
for all problems, but believed that most of them remained valuable scientific tools.42 
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Topically, energy- and resource-related forecasts increased in number, while automation-
related forecasts decreased. Another trend that Randolph spotted of the 1960s and 1970s Soviet 
efforts was the increasing focus on technology assessment. Similar to the strands of eco-futurists 
in the United States, many Soviet prognosticators contemplated the undesirable side effects of a 
rapidly-changing high-tech industrial and extraction economy. Similar to the strands of 
conversation among Western methodologists during this period, some Soviet forecasters 
discussed the epistemological foundations of forecasting in great depth.43 Soviet forecasting 
efforts also paralleled Western futurists in their dream of establishing a respected, secure place in 
the academic world, and as in the West, the Soviet efforts did not fully succeed. 
Within the socialist paradigm, one of the unique aspects of futures methodologies was 
that, starting in 1970, the government provided national guidelines on science and technology 
forecasting methodologies. This centralized standardization of procedures came in part as a 
response from the many conferences in which forecasters spoke in favor of establishing uniform 
guidelines. Another unique Soviet aspect of forecasting studies came in the form of 
collaborations between the central organizations and other socialist countries. But these efforts 
always remained within the Soviet context. Although forecasting grew within the Soviet 
government, and was publicized via magazines and so on, it remained a top-down approach 
rather than an open forum for all topics and all forecasters.    
In his article „A Second Party in Our Midst‟  Gordon L. Rocca traced the history of the 
Soviet Scientific Forecasting Association and its rapid demise after 1969. Not only were this 
organization‟s efforts criticized, but its actors also suffered political repercussions. As opposed to 
the science and technology forecasting efforts made by Gennadiy Dobrov, which the Randolph 
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dissertation examined, this association with futurists A. M. Rumyantsev, L.V. Bestuzhev-Lada, 
B.N. Tardov and others had a broader futurist mission not as dependant on the Soviet regime. Of 
these actors, L. V.  Bestuzhev-Lada became an internationally renowned futurist, who also 
became an influential member of the World Futures Studies Federation. In his analysis of 
numerous futures researchers, Randolph concurred that Igor Bestuzhev-Lada represented one of 
the leading figure in Soviet futurology.44 
Rocca‟s argument about the declining trend of Soviet futurism conflicted with 
Randolph‟s historical analysis, which specifically contended that the 1970s continued to see a 
rise in the use and spread of futurism in the Soviet Union. This difference in perspective may be 
due in large part to Rocca‟s distinction between forecasting and futurology. In contrast, 
Randolph provided a broader picture of the different schools of futurism operating in the Soviet 
Union during the 1960s and 1970s.45 However, even Randolph admitted that 1969 appeared to 
have been a peak in Soviet forecasting.   
The growth of forecasting in the Soviet Union paralleled the U.S. futures studies 
movement in surprising ways. Both national efforts boomed in the later 1960s after some 
notoriously optimistic visions of the future, which was followed by a maturing of the field and its 
methodologies on the one side, and a criticism of these efforts on the other. Additionally 
methodological and philosophical parallels were striking.  
The primary difference was the broader political milieu of the emerging fields. The 
American futurists succeeded in creating the kind of open forum which allowed participation of 
anyone interested in or concerned about the future. Even though it never grew into a popular 
movement, and whatever other limitations it had, the U.S. conception of futures studies allowed 
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for a bottom-up involvement in future-thinking, whereas the Soviet efforts necessitated a top-
down inside-the-(central Soviet)-box thinking. 
 
Socialist prognosis was accepted by the decision-makers in the Soviet Union, and 
accordingly also by leaders in communist satellite states during the Cold War period.  According 
to Masini, pre-1989 eastern European futures studies efforts provided a forum that supported 
alternative thinking and opening to the world.46 However, despite the strong influence of Soviet 
forecasting efforts in these places, each satellite state‟s politics and futures studies efforts were 
significantly different. 
The Soviet satellites had dissimilar cultures and political circumstances. Similar to the 
Russian efforts, many socialist futurists in the satellite states sought to verify and justify 
historical trends leading to a communist order. Yet, some eastern European futurists enjoyed 
more freedom than others, a freedom to communicate and collaborate internationally and express 
ideas about alternative futures. According to one source, Polish futurists were explicitly 
forbidden from certain types of futures studies.47 Although other types must have been accepted, 
as a 1967 group worked on a project called Poland 2000, which studied the cultural values of 
Polish futures. Futurists did not emerge with the same momentum to form departments, 
committees, and organizations in all Soviet satellite states.48 However, according to one 
secondary source Robert Jungk wrote about a tradition of futurist efforts in the eastern European 
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countries and how these activities survived during the Soviet period.49 In other places such as 
Czech, Romanian and Hungarian states the field was more active than in Poland. Motivated by 
top-down desires to improve the existing planning mechanisms, futures studies efforts in these 
states flourished before 1989, with direct encouragement from state leaders interested in 
analyzing major trends in their populations. 
 
 
c. An “Iron Curtain” study – Hungarian Futures Studies 
 
The history of Hungarian futures studies efforts, which started around the late 1960s, 
provides an interesting case-study. Most notably, it was in Hungary during this time that one of 
the most long-lasting of all academic departments of futures studies appeared and remains today. 
This department was not organized as a distinct field, but was created under the economics 
school within the Karl Marx University (now Corvinus University) in Budapest.  Its faculty 
members and staff designed and taught many courses, completed policy projects for various 
levels of government, and became an active group in the international scene of futures studies. 50 
After the 1956 revolution in Hungary, and the overwhelming response to it by the Soviet 
Army, the 1960s were comparatively quiet in this Soviet satellite state. In 1966 the introduction 
of the New Economic Plan brought new opportunities and at least some openness for citizens. 
One of the significant changes was the easing of the economic system that permitted exporting 
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goods to other non-socialist countries. The revolutions in Hungary allowed for economic and 
political leniency, especially when compared to other socialist satellites. Not a lot, certainly not 
enough to be free from Soviet influence, nonetheless it permitted the inauguration of futures 
studies seminars in 1968 at the Karl Marx University of Economics.51 The Futures Studies 
Department was formed in the same year under the vision of Géza Kovács, the head of the 
National Economic Planning department. 
Kovács saw a niche in 1968 because of the political loosening, which seemed to offer an 
important opening to reform the national economic planning board. In order to make it more 
intellectually diverse and encompassing, he started the futures studies department at the 
university in Budapest. Kovács believed that planning and predicting a single path was not 
enough to think about the future and shape the future, instead he believed, government analysts 
needed to systematically explore and weigh multiple possibilities.52 
Erzsébet Nováky finished her studies in economics with an emphasis in mathematics in 
the late 1960s and became one of the first hires of the department. Her background in trend 
analysis and strictly mathematical forecasting methods distinguished her as a candidate to help 
start the futures studies department. Nováky described her attitude toward futures studies as 
having changed from strictly mathematical assessments in the late 1960s to a combination of 
modeling, expert methods and mathematical/statistical methods. She and other Hungarian 
futurists used the Delphi method, among other American futures techniques. The zero-sum and 
cross-impact analyses were also adapted in 1977 for the Hungarian context. So, although the 
context was different, Hungarian futures studies efforts also had similarities to work performed 
in the West. 
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Kovács argued that Hungarian futures studies emerged as part of an international trend 
during the 1960s.53 According to Kovács the field of futures studies became an independent 
discipline, chiefly in light of the increased publications on futures, and their improved quality 
during the 1960s. The 1968 reform of the Hungarian economic mechanism led to an increased 
need for futures research to support long-range planning. Hungarian futurists organized to 
develop a complex future image of their country, described by Kovács as being close to a 
“futurological approach presupposing a high level of fantasy,” [emphasis original] and also to 
prepare prognoses that were more practical and data-based. The inherent broadness of the field 
of futures studies, and the diverse range of methodologies at the disposal of this pioneering 
Hungarian futurist, enabled him to combine the Soviet rhetoric of forecasting as an aid to central 
planning, and the defining tenet of the field that there were multiple possible futures – even if 
some constituted non-communist futures. 
Similar to the “science of science” thinking of Soviet forecasters, Kovács, viewed futures 
studies as a natural expansion of science. Consequently, he drew attention to the utilitarian aspect 
of futures research in Hungary. Those fields most helpful to the socialist planning mechanisms 
received the most funding. Kovács saw this unbalanced distribution of science funding as a 
problem to be remedied. Furthermore, he argued against the ideological divisions of Eastern vs. 
Western, or rather Marxist vs. Bourgeois futurologies, and that the field of futures studies that 
projected distant futures ought to be able to oppose both ideologies.54 
These early Hungarian futures studies efforts had various motivations and funding 
sources. Kovács and other practitioners defined their goal in studying futures as providing better 
options and information to decision-makers, but to do so with a mathematical basis, as 
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scientifically as possible. The futurists embraced varied approaches and put together teams of 
different sizes for each specific project, depending on whether the futures studied pertained to 
the textiles industry, a particular factory, or a quality of life analysis. 
In one early major project, Budapest‟s small academic research department sought to 
construct economic forecasts for Hungary into the year 2000. That exercise embraced a “top-
down concept and approach” to think of ways of making the economy more efficient and guide 
leaders to develop the right assets. Kovács‟ team, which also included a statistician, produced a 
complex future image combining mathematical and creative futurist approaches. The forecasters 
sought to project and map how Hungary‟s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) could change over the 
coming decades, and how they could structure the economy to meet a goal of overtaking the US 
GDP of 1968 by the year 2000. According to Nováky, the Hungarian GDP in 1968 was 600 U.S. 
dollars per capita, compared to the US GDP of 3600 dollars. The early Hungarian futurists aimed 
to raise the Hungarian GDP to 4000 dollars per capita by the year 2000.55 To reach that level, 
futurists recommended national changes that would restructure the country‟s employment system 
and lower the ratio of jobs in the agricultural sector, and increase the commitment to education 
and science fields, creating what Daniel Bell would later call a knowledge-based society. This 
group published a report of their work by 1970, a document that was disseminated to policy-
makers to follow as a guide. 
Such studies were good examples of what Masini and others called preferable futures, as 
opposed to any one of probable futures, since the study outlined a specific desired goal, a 
preferred future state. Similar to some of the Soviet studies, this was an effort to colonize the 
future with desired outcomes, one with an economy that was “much more developed than 
capitalist or socialist countries.” Hungarians tried to distinguish themselves from both the U.S. 
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and Soviet futurist efforts, yet their ideological desire to surpass the West was similar to the 
Soviet “catch-up and overtake” policies.56 
Futurology flourished as a parallel alternative to socialist prognosis. The pioneering 
futurologist Ossip Flechtheim‟s works influenced these early Hungarian futurists, who were able 
to secure significant funding from both national and local government. The Karl Marx University 
futures studies department received funding for about half a dozen graduate students, support 
contributed by the city planning institution for Budapest. The need for long-term funding further 
extended the department‟s power to hire up to a dozen external professionals. Kovács had strong 
political connections, because he was the head of the department of national economic planning, 
and a strong believer in shifting from a planning mentality to a futures studies one. Because of 
his personal connection to the committee, the futures studies department had a successful track 
record for securing government funds for projects that employed dozens of people at a time.  
Although the futures studies department was growing within a socialist paradigm, these 
intellectuals were ultimately marginalized and had their share of difficulties. The Hungarian 
futurists started organizing for their first conference in 1972, only to see it driven underground 
because of political pressures.57 This may have been due to a concern of the Soviet government 
cracking down on futurist organizations, similar to the demise of the Soviet Scientific 
Forecasting Association that took place during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Nevertheless, 
Kovács wrote that these conferences were successful forums of debate, which may have been an 
exaggeration. Kovács promoted the internationalization of Hungarian futurism, and their 
collaboration with peers in WFSF. However, he focused primarily on strengthening the academic 
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division, which he judged would be “the most effective institutional development.”58 The size of 
the department varied from three to five full-time members and its course-load similarly changed 
over the years. In 1976, the futures studies committee under the Hungarian Academy of sciences 
was set up and led by Kovács, which provided Hungarian futurists with communication to other 
countries as well.  
During the first three years of the department‟s existence, Géza Kovács studied along 
with the graduate students. He came from a lesser background, was very knowledgeable about 
agricultural processes and was well-liked. With his continued education he was able to bring 
together philosophical and political aspects of futures studies, while his prominent public 
position provided opportunities for the field to grow. 
Starting in 1971, all Karl Marx University students in economy, and those training to 
become teachers, were required to take a futures studies course. With the growing numbers of 
courses and students, the department focused on teaching while also working on sponsored 
projects. The futures studies department produced the first Hungarian futures studies textbook in 
1976, which resulted from an interdisciplinary collaboration.  In 1976, Kovács set up and led a 
new futures studies committee as part of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, which provided 
Hungarian futurists with important avenues of funding and communication.59  
The department at the Karl Marx University was the hub of Hungarian futures studies,    
but their field soon expanded beyond the city of Budapest. Aside from the newly created 
committee within the Academy of Science, other universities started offering futures courses, or 
courses that had a partial focus on futures studies. For example, one medical university added a 
                                                                 
58
 Géza Kovács , “On the History of Hungarian Futures Research (1965-1980), in Eds. Ervin Bona, Eve Gabor, Pal 
Sarkany, and David Biro, Future Research in Hungary, Akademiai Kiado, Budapest 1983) pp. 13-19 
59
 Personal Communication with Erzsébet Nováky, Budapest, Hungary. July 23, 2009 
181 
 
 
course on the future of medicine, while the University of Miskolc taught a course in corporate 
futures studies and so on.60  
According to Nováky, the 1990s were a growth decade for the Hungarian futures studies 
department and a turning point that brought about new methodologies, and approaches. With the 
cooperation of professors in philosophy and sociology, futures courses gained increasing 
prominence – for instance, a globalization course had a split focus and partially covered futures 
studies. That intellectual interdisciplinarity brought a more human element to a math-intensive 
field.61 
When I interviewed Nováky in 2010, her school then offered over a dozen courses in 
futures studies, in which over 500 students enrolled. One of the two required courses was based 
on modeling, while the second was an introduction to futures subjects. In addition, the number of 
electives grew to about ten different courses, each with 30 to 50 students. Some of these courses 
included international futures studies, social economic forecasting, environmental modeling, 
surveying methods, and later in the 1990s, future orientation, chaos theory application, evolution 
theory application.  But even though futures-thinking had thrived in the Hungarian university-
system, the field remained on the fringes, and the department bounced around, based on the 
shifting university policies. Unlike marketing, corporate economy, or other economics fields, 
futures studies was not in the main-stream of the university, which translated into non-renewals 
of professor lines, decreases of staff, and budget reductions for committees and books. The 
courses‟ subject matter shifted somewhat, to reflect changes in the university leadership‟s 
mission. As corporate business gained weight in the 1990s, the futures courses focusing on 
national economics were revised to focus more on business futures. 
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The 1968 revolutions in Hungary had allowed for some political leniency, which 
permitted the inauguration of futures seminars at the Karl Marx University of Economics.62 This 
provided opportunities for studying the future and impacting policy-making over the remaining 
decades of the 20th century. In a fortieth anniversary summary report, Nováky commented on the 
various celebrations of the year, including Professor Kovács‟ eightieth birthday, and looked 
ahead to the next forty years hoping that futures studies “could be part of everyone.” She 
believed that futures studies still had a vital theoretical and practical value in Hungary, as long as 
her department remained committed to raising the “future orientation of the students and future 
decision makers.”63 
 
This chapter detailed some of the international inceptions of futures studies and U.S. 
futurists‟ influences on international expressions of the field. Chapters three and four portrayed 
several international aspects of the futurist efforts in the United States. The scholarship, 
conference participation, not to mention philosophical influences by French thinkers like Gaston 
Berger and Bertrand de Jouvenel had played important roles during the inception of American 
futures studies. Instead of a single global movement with a united message, futures studies was 
rather a global idea with diverse national or local political expressions. 
Gloomy Cold War scenarios in which the two superpowers exchanged nuclear attacks 
influenced the field of futures studies. Accordingly, there were futurists of communist and 
capitalist backgrounds who caricaturized the politics on the other side of the “iron curtain” and 
focused on international tensions and differences. But the futures studies movement did not only 
grow out of an “us vs. them” mentality.  For many futurists, a defining principle of their 
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international movement was the ideal that present-time decisions should be made with future 
options in mind, for all people. Many futurists succeeded in transcending the dichromatic 
political divisions of the Cold War context. 
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Conclusions 
 
Forecasting efforts of the United States Air Force to study the future constituted a very 
influential historical thread in the formation of the multi-stranded field of futures studies. The 
early RAND Corporation philosopher-mathematicians worked in a uniquely collaborative and 
independent environment. These futures methodologists developed many key concepts for the 
evolving field of futures studies as they tried to answer Cold War unknowns by using opinion 
technologies. For example, the controlled and structured procedures of the Delphi method, they 
argued, produced the most objective compilation of their experts possible at the time. 
Although the roots of futurists traced back to the early Cold War pressures and the 
patronage of the U.S. Air Force, the content of futures studies changed dramatically and quickly. 
The beginning of détente coincided with the outlook of many futurists that were increasingly 
preoccupied with peace studies, and social and humanitarian crises rather than military ones. The 
diverse group of futurists that included methodologists, science fiction writers, eco-futurists, 
corporate planners, and politicians emerged in the 1960s, and by the mid-1970s established many 
organizations, gathered in conferences and started futurist publications.  
The Cold War reality prompted scientists and social scientists alike to question and 
redefine their accepted paradigms. Many, including RAND mathematician-philosophers, 
academics, business analysts, and politicians found the answer in the newly emerging field of 
futures studies. Motivated by a changing world, many of these futurists were defined by a desire 
for something new. Their strength came from their nonconformity to existing methods and 
frameworks of social and technological analysis.  
185 
 
 
One of their unifying messages was the ubiquitous claim that everyone needed to be 
future-minded in order to deal with rapid technological changes. This was a testament to the 
enhanced self-consciousness of humanity‟s impact on the world. Many futurists, such as Paul 
Ehrlich and Herman Kahn, delineated the worst cases in their discussion of futures. 
Interestingly, when traditional definitions of science would not permit a science of long-
range forecasting, Helmer and others redefined science, rather than how studying the future 
should be conceptualized. When academia did not grant futurists a seat at the high table, rather 
than adjusting their concept of the field of futures studies, some futurists advocated for an 
overhaul of the education system. They cared about studying the future intently, even at times 
when others criticized or marginalized them as unscientific soothsayers. 
As the first editorial of the Futures journal stated in 1968, the object of the journal was to 
help “efforts of long-range forecasters working as a team according to disciplined methods” in 
order to restore confidence in the future.1 This quest for certainty amidst uncertainty in the 
seemingly- increasingly-uncertain twentieth century defined the futurists during the futures 
studies movement. To this end the field of futures studies embraced the transfer of ideas and 
opinion technologies from the military paradigm, and applied the seemingly-scientific 
approaches to broader human issues. 
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Appendix 1: Oral History Interview with Olaf Helmer 
(Also deposited at the University of Southern California Archives) 
 
KT_ My name is Kaya Tolon and I am a Ph.D. Candidate in the History of Technology and Science 
Program at Iowa State University. In support of my dissertation research, I am conducting an oral history 
interview with Dr. Helmer about his life and his involvement in opinion technologies and futures studies. 
We’re meeting at the Helmer residence in Montecito, CA on Wednesday, June 3rd, 2009. Dr. Helmer, do 
I have your permission to record this interview? 
OH_ Yes, Indeed. 
KT_ Thank you. And could you please state your full name for the record? 
OH_ Olaf Helmer. 
KT_ Alright. Well, you were born in Berlin in 1910 and you stayed there until 1934.  
OH_ That is correct, yes. 
KT_ Could you tell me a little bit about that period of your life in Berlin, which Gymnasium you went to... 
OH_ I stayed in Berlin, until I was able to get my doctor's degree there, which was in 1934, but I left in 
fact the day after I received my document for my oral examination. I went to London, I couldn't get out 
of there soon enough - for obvious reasons. 
KT_ Sure, of course. 
OH_ I don't know if you want to know anything about my earlier time in Berlin. There wasn't anything 
special to report there. As a student, I met some very interesting people. I already mentioned to you 
that one of my professors was Hans Reichenbach. I also met Rudolf Carnap and he came through on a 
lecture tour. He was later very helpful in getting me to the United States. Another one of my  teachers 
who acquired a great deal of fame was John Von Neumann. I imagine you are familiar with the name. He 
was really an outstanding person in his field. And later on, to jump ahead a little bit, when I was working 
at RAND Corporation, he was a consultant at RAND, so on quite a number of occasions I met him again 
in Los Angeles, or Santa Monica rather. He and Morgenstein developed what's become known as the 
theory of games. And I was very much intrigued by that as well as all of my colleagues at RAND and we 
worked to develop the theory further much to Von Neumann’s surprise and delight. When he found out 
what we were doing. We were very much influenced you know in some of our work in mathematics at 
the RAND Corporation through the influence of Von Neumann. 
KT_ We may return to Von Neumann and some of the other people you mentioned, but let us go back to 
before you came to the United States, you also went to London for a couple of years.  
OH_ Yes, I went to London and got myself another doctor's degree in the University of London and, of all 
places at Bedford College, which is officially the women's college of the university. Since I already had a 
doctor's degree, they made an exception for me and permitted me to be a graduate student at Bedford 
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College. And I got a degree there under Susan Stebbing – you might be interested too that one of my 
examiners was Bertrand Russell. 
KT_ Oh really? 
OH_ One of the examiners should not be college staff. I went back and forth. Why not try Bertrand 
Russell. She said it's a wonderful idea, so she got in touch with him. He agreed. The oral examination 
took place in her office for an hour, smoking cigarettes talking about logic.  
KT_ Did he have any tough questions for you? 
OH_ Not that I recall. It all went very smoothly; it was just like an informal discussion of some logical 
problems. Went nicely to everybody’s satisfaction, I think. So that’s how I ... I met him later in Chicago, 
but my main contact was through that doctor examination. That’s kind of a nice memory. I don’t  know if 
there’s anything from the earlier time in Berlin that’s worth reporting. I don’t know if you want to know 
about the general cultural, environmental anything like that. It’s probably it is not specially in your area 
of interest. 
KT_ More generally it is. It is not my focus, but if there is anything you would like to say... Were you 
consider leaving before ’34, were you considering leaving sooner?  
OH_ 20s in Berlin really was a cultural highlight. Theatres were doing extremely well; there were some 
wonderful actors there. Altogether Max Weiner and so on. It was a great time. I was exposed to some 
wonderful performances there as a youngster - I was delighted with that. Let me say in parenthesis my 
father was an actor himself. Because of the general economic disaster caused by WWI, he had a very 
tough time afterwards. He was not really able to get back into his profession – prior to that he had been 
engaged as was customary at the time for 6 months as a time at various provincial theaters – great 
many of them in Germany. He acted all sorts of things, particularly Shakespeare, - played the part of 
King Leo once, Mark Anthony – played some great parts. Also, as a youngster his original name had been 
Fritz Hirschberg – his agent at the time advised him that he ought to change his name and adopt a stage 
name – this is related to me – he said ”Well, I am doing that part – why don’t we do it Helmer”. He was 
doing Helmer in Ibsen’s A Doll’s House. That’s how my name came about – he was known as Fritz 
Hirschberg, and I was Olaf Helmer. That’s sort of an aside – kind of amusing, but probably not 
particularly interesting to you. 
 KT_ No, that is very interesting. How about your mother? Is there anything you would like to share 
about your mother during that period? 
OH_ She was really a very intelligent person, very well-read. She was the youngster of a bureaucrat in 
the small state of Lippe-Detmold – one of those tiny little fiefdoms in Germany, that’s where she was 
brought up. My father met her there during a performance. They became acquainted and decided to get 
married. That’s how that came about. 
KT_ I see that you worked in the University of Illinois from 38-41. When did you come to the U.S.? 
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OH_ In 1937. I first came in a visitor’s visa in ’36 after I finished my  degree in London. This was very 
much under the auspices of Rudolph Carnap whom I mentioned before. I travelled around and received 
a grant that made this possible for me. From an organization that was supporting some of the scientific 
émigrés from Germany. So I was quite lucky to get a small stipend that allowed me to come to the 
United States. Travelled there for a while, lived in Chicago, and before I left Chicago I was offered to 
work as Carnap’s assistant for the enormous salary of $1000 a year. I got married there to my first wife. 
One little note, which is sort of amusing too. Since I still had German nationality as a so called non -
Aryan, I was half Jewish, my father’s family was Jewish, my mother’s was not. Under the German laws a 
special permit was required for a non-Aryan to marry an Aryan. So, when I had emigrated to London, I 
had to go to the German Embassy in London, applied for a special permit to marry an English woman! (in 
1936) So, utterly absurd.  
Together we went to Chicago. We spent a year there. My research assistantship to Carnap was sort of a 
nominal appointment. I didn’t have much to do there. It was really a kindness of Professor Carnap to get 
this job for me. And before the year was out, I managed to secure an appointment at the Unive rsity of 
Illinois in Urbana as a math teacher. I was then in Urbana for three years. From Urbana I went to New 
York, taught at what was then called New York City College, it since became New York City University I 
think. I taught mathematics there for a couple of years. Let me see. Subsequent to that I had this split 
appointment, I was teaching part time at the new school for social research in New York, and part time 
as the personal assistant to Felix Oppenheim in Princeton. So we travelled back and forth all the time for 
about a year. That was 1944-45 if I remember correctly.  
KT_ and that’s also where you met Einstein? 
When Einstein was admitted as a member of the Institute for Advanced Study there for a year that 
carried with it certain privileges of attending lectures and that sort of thing, but no particular duties. 
Then toward the end of the War in 1945 I was asked to join a small research group in mathematics in 
support of the war effort. It was called the Princeton Research Group or something, but it  was located 
near Columbia, New York. There we worked for solutions to math problems. There I met John Williams, 
who was the head of that group, and who later invited me to join RAND when he himself went there. 
That’s how that came about. 
KT_ Before we start talking about the RAND Corporation and your work there, let me ask you during all 
these universities and institutions that you worked at, did you do anything related forecasting or futures 
studies, or is that really something that came about later? 
OH_ It came about later. Because of the interest at RAND, RAND was really created for the purpose for 
foreseeing any of the problems particularly the Air Force might be confronted with in years to come. So 
that sort of brought in the futures element and interest in that. 
KT_ How would you characterize your math work from this earlier period? 
OH_ I was always fascinated with mathematics. Strangely enough, an interest which I inherited from my 
father. Although, he was an actor, he was always very interested in mathematics, and somehow I also 
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acquired that interest myself – I found it a fascinating area. I don’t think that I myself produced any 
world-shaking discoveries in the field of mathematics. I did reasonably well, but nothing outstanding. 
But I kept my fascination was never diminished. Later on because of the work that I was involved in 
became much more interested in abstract mathematics, rather than applications to the real world. That 
brings us to RAND activity. 
KT_ Let’s talk about the RAND Corporation a little more. You mentioned John Williams was the head of 
the Math Division at RAND? 
OH_ He was a very important influence. He was not by any means the president, but he was in the top 
council that advised the president of RAND. I think he was responsible for some of the general directions 
the RAND Corporation went in the early days. It was really a great institution. A great deal of freedom of 
research. There were no specific problems that the government particularly the Air Force imposed on 
RAND. It was simply told “think about what might be important” but leave it to the staff to decide what 
they should be working on. For instance we had the intellectual freedom to pursue something like Von 
Neumann’s game theory. It is one sign of the intellectual freedom  of action we had in those days. A 
number of things of that sort happened at the time. One thing in particular Williams emphasized was 
interdisciplinary cooperation, which was much more real there than is at most universities. It was sort of 
a very open policy. You could walk around the corridor there, most of the doors were open, you 
probably would stop and talk to some colleague who might have been in entirely different fields. “Hey 
I’ve been working on this, can you give me some advice?” Or maybe even be come a member of a 
particular small research group to work on that. It was sort of very free environment which contributed 
to the early reputation of RAND – as being the first so called Think Tank. That general feature was 
somewhat lost in years to come on a new management there. But from my impression is that in the last 
ten years or so that has been somewhat revived so that RAND now has regained some of the great 
reputation it has had in the early years. RAND people are very often cited in the news as contributing 
some ideas to what’s going on in international relations or weapons technology or whatever it might be.  
KT_ How big was the math division in the 40s and 50s when it first started? 
OH_ Researchers, no more than a dozen. Plus of course support personnel, secretaries and so on. 
KT_ How many of those less than a dozen researchers had been involved with in Von Neumann’s game 
theory? Was it just a handful of researchers? How much were you involved in that? 
OH_ One who was best known was Lloyd Shapley, continued the theoretic development of game theory, 
then there was Nash, about whom, as you may know a movie was made. I met Nash only relatively 
briefly when he was consulting for RAND at the time. He worked closely with Shapley, looking back now 
my feeling has been that Shapley really deserves more of the reputation of advancing that field than 
Nash ever did, but that’s my personal opinion. 
KT_ I read similar commentaries. What were Shapley’s major contributions?  
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OH_ I would have trouble to remember now. He tied in some of the basic ideas of game theory with 
some of the more theoretical parts of mathematics and vector theory, etc. I would have a hard time 
remembering. It was generally recognized that he was making substantial advances in the field and just  
theoretical basis of the logic of game theory. 
KT_ Okay, I think we have arrived at Project DELPHI. In your book you mention that the method itself 
was invented in 1953. I have seen some memorandums that write it was conducted in 1951. Could you 
tell me… 
OH_ I’m not sure ‘53 sounds about the right year, but I’m not certain.  
KT_ There is one RAND memorandum that suggests it was conducted in 1951.  
OH_ I just don’t remember. I might search some of the…  If it’s important, I’ll do a little research?  
KT_ Perhaps… we can talk about that after the interview. How long did the project last? Do you 
remember, can you give me a broad overview? 
OH_ It is hard to put dates on that because it was a gradual development that was pursued over a 
number of years with gradual improvements. I don’t know if you know about the origin of this. Do you 
know the story? 
KT_ Not specifically. 
OH_ As you know, as I mentioned before, RAND to some extent was interested in future problems which 
the Air Force might be confronted. So, we asked ourselves “how can I make some reasonable forecast 
about what’s likely to happen?” And one of us – I cannot remember it was me or one of my colleagues, I 
don’t want to claim it for myself, I really can’t remember it as it was such a collaborative effort  – came 
to the idea that we are to look at the forecast that are traditionally made about the outcome of horse 
races. So called horse race handicappers put out forecasts of who’s likely to win. So, we persuaded the 
fellow in charge of procurement in RAND – who were used to quaint requests – to subscribe to these 
horseracing journals. So we collected this information, and what we found, which wasn’t very surprising. 
Took any particular forecaster and followed his forecasts systematically, he lost a lot of money. Because 
he was more often wrong than right. So then we had the idea, of not using one, but combining a 
number of these forecasters and somehow seeing if we could improve these forecasts by using the 
recommendations of several forecasters. What we found was, if we did that, the result was that we 
would have lost much less money, but we still would’ve lost money. At least you didn’t lose as much 
money, so the purses would improve by combining the forecasts. So that was the intellectual basis for 
Delphi. So then we tried to figure out how can we systematize this process. We asked ourselves, if we 
have a group of people who are asked to make a forecasted about a particular development, whatever it 
might be. How can you make the best use of this group of forecasters in order to get the most reliable 
forecast? That’s how the whole idea came out of it. First asking each one of them make a forecast, 
feeding the information back, saying this is what the others said, this is the median of forecast of all 
these, give us your comments – if your forecast was lower or higher tell us why. Then we summarized 
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these reasons and fed it back in another round of interrogations to get comments to make people think 
about these possible reasons why their forecast should be higher or lower. And a lot of people as a 
result of that – although everything was anonymous – as a result of this a lot of people changed their 
forecasts. Oh this is something I hadn’t thought of before – so they made correction of their original 
forecast. This would be carried out through one more round, and usually we wound up with four 
rounds. Then, the fourth round we simply took the median of the final answers that was then the 
outcome of that particular of that Delphi effort. And it turned out that several improvements were 
made later. This turned out to be reasonably successful. Nobody was expecting perfection there 
naturally, but at least the forecast was somewhat more reliable than reliable in a particular person no 
matter how high his reputation. So it was for that reason that it was adopted for many people. I don’t 
know what the recent history has been, but at one time I remember, must have been in the 70s, 
someone made a survey of how often Delphi had been applied under the auspices of the military – and 
it turned out it was well over a thousand. It was strange to me at the time, because we hadn’t heard 
about these individual efforts. But apparently it had caught on, and a lot of people, they probably 
misused the word Delphi, and used a process which we would not have approved of, so a lot of things 
were done under that name. So it wasn’t as clean as it should have been. We made some improvements 
ourselves at RAND, really over a number of years. We made some improvement, for instance we asked 
in one case, each respondent to give us some weighting of the degree of expertise in that area. If you 
build that into the process, and give a little more weight to those who themselves felt they were a little 
more competent, the results reflected that and you got somewhat more reliable answers. 
KT_ I am familiar with that paper, in the 60s I think you wrote that.  
OH_ You may have seen some of those papers, there are probably a lot of things available at RAND, I 
don’t know if they are available to an outsider. But much of it is declassified and can be seen, if they still 
have it. 
KT_ A lot of it is published and available on their web site. 
OH_ So that’s a rough outline of what went on then.  
KT_ You said you had a lot of freedom, in which direction to research. For Project DELPHI, the one where 
you forecast Soviet attack on the United States… Did you come up with the idea, or did the US Air force 
officials come up with that idea of forecasting that particular study? 
OH_ No, we came up with it ourselves. 
KT_ And all the specific constraints for the scenario, you came up with those and then asked experts to 
try to forecast? 
OH_ Yeah, of course. I forget now, but we probably had to be cautious and not reveal any classified 
data, but I don’t think that was necessary at the time. No, we had no intervention at all from the Air 
Force at the time. As you may have found out, you probably know more about it, the method was 
adopted in so many cases. One of the most prominent uses of Delphi was in Japan. Japanese heard 
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about this and conducted a survey of prominent Japanese economists about the future of the Japanese 
economy in the years to come. As far as I know, this effort was repeated annually in Japan for quite a 
few years. I don’t know if it’s still going on, it would surprise me if it is, but at least at the time they 
displayed a great deal of interest in that and were quite pleased with it.  
KT_ Do you remember when this was. 
OH_ No. 
KT_ A lot of articles suggest that yourself along with Norman Dalkey were part of this original study 
where the method was started. Could you tell me a little bit about Mr. Dalkey and others who were 
involved in this project? 
OH_ There isn’t very much I can say about Dalkey. Dalkey took a very active interest. Another person, a 
woman by the name of Bernice Brown participated in a number of internal RAND research studies on 
the subject in an effort to improve the method. Dalkey pretty much devoted himself to pursuing 
research on Delphi for a number of years. So I think that became his main interest . I don’t know if he 
contributed anything – I don’t mean to talk down – but I think in a way because of his interest, he 
contributed just through that. Pursuing and maintaining an interest. I don’t think he contributed very 
many original ideas to this, but on the other hand he was very conscientious from a scientific point of 
view. And so was quite careful in applying some ideas and improve the methods. And of course, the one 
other person I should mention is Ted Gordon, and you probably know about the study . In fact that 
above anything else, really became, contributed to making the whole idea of Delphi pretty well known 
all over the place. That’s where the Japanese for instance picked it up too. Because he conducted this 
big study about future developments in all sorts of fields – in the course of which, he first of all travelled 
around to solicit the participation as respondents of a number of people all over the place. For instance 
Dennis Gabor was one of the contributors, so was Bertrand de Jouvenel of France, and a few others, two 
of the more prominent ones. So we had quite a large number of pretty good people to participate in 
that. And that resulted eventually in the publication with Ted Gordon, forecast study that really became 
pretty well known.  
KT_ When was this study conducted? 
OH_ Not sure, early 60s. 1964, it was published by Basic Books. So it was conducted in the early 60s, 
probably 62 and 63. 
KT_ Very good. Was Ted Gordon also involved with the original Delphi study – Project DELPHI? 
OH_ No, he was not. I was trying to remember the connection was, how I first got together with him. 
No, he was not involved. 
KT_ How about Bernice Brown? Was she involved with Project DELPHI? 
OH_ Yes, I think so, she was a permanent member of the staff. Gordon was just a consultant. 
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KT_ I’ve come across the name of Nicholas Rescher. Was he involved in the original study as well?  
OH_ Not directly, but indirectly yes. Because, the work that we did together was probably… it was called 
the epistemology of inexact sciences, published in management science in 1959, so it preceded that but 
it gave some of the basic ideas there of justifying consulting experts in order to get scientific results. 
Experts themselves could be treated in the same way that you treated phenomena that you might 
observe in nature. There are variations there and you can get average values and so on. I don’t know if 
you’ve seen that paper. 
KT_ I have, yes. 
OH_ It established something of a theoretical basis, theoretical justification of the work that we did on 
Delphi. But he was not, so far as I remember not directly involved in conducting any of these studies. I 
believe by that time he left RAND – he’d been there a number of years – and he became a professor, I 
think in Pittsburg, and he’s been teaching there for many years. I think he’s still around; I haven’t been 
in touch with him in recent years though. 
KT_ Can you think of anybody else who was involved in the original study, in Project DELPHI?  
OH_ Not really involved, but of course, there was a lot of indirect involvement in the sense that this 
study--- supported people like Williams, but as far as direct participation, developing this concern it was 
essentially Brown, Dalkey, and (eventually) Gordon. I think that’s the limit of it as far as I remember – 
there may have been others, I’m not sure. 
KT_  I assume the few of you who coordinated the original study, contacted the experts, and fed them 
the group feedbacks and statistics about that. So, how did you, once you had defined the parameters of 
the study, the requirements necessary or however many atomic bombs necessary to reduce the U.S. 
munitions output by a prescribed amount, how did you determine who the experts were? From the 
study I remember there were seven experts… 
OH_ In that case that was essentially an internal RAND Study. From personal knowledge we knew who 
are the experts on the effectiveness of particular munitions, we also had an expert who was an architect 
who knew how vulnerable the buildings were to pressures produced by explosions. So we knew who the 
experts were personally. Otherwise you would have to go out and essentially what amounts to general 
reputation of such people. Gordon pretty well knew at least knew some of the people from various 
countries that ought to be included because of their particular interests or expertise in the future.  
KT_ The Gordon study was in the early 60s, and the early Project DELPHI was in the early 50s: ’51, ’53 or 
so.  
OH_ Correct.  
KT_ Okay, maybe we can wrap up the discussion of the RAND Corporation and your involvement there 
and move on in a little while to the Institute for the future (IFTF). But, did you stop working at RAND, 
when you started IFTF, or did you keep working at RAND as well.  
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OH_ No, I didn’t work there anymore. You see, RAND’s interests had been broadening for some time. 
Originally it was set up as an adjunct to the Air Force. Then RAND because of the reputation I think was 
invited and supported by a number of other government agencies. And later on as I think RAND received 
a number of contracts with private industries. Right now, my guess would be 50/50 government and 
private. So that the character in general has changed somewhat. And together with the inclusion of 
particular private industry, some of the original degree of freedom of research was lost. Because in 
industrial contracts, they usually insisted on concentration on giving you answers to specific problems. 
But still, from what I hear, there is a good deal of freedom left.  
KT_ Could you see that trend (freedom of research diminishing) while you were still there? I mean did 
that trend begin in the 1960s? 
OH_ It was beginning yes. At the time, you see, in fact, my feeling was – this was supported by Williams 
as well – that RAND ought to make an effort to expand some of its research methods to fields other than 
the military – for instance to social problems. That was the reason why, since we couldn’t persuade the 
RAND management at the time, I decided together with some of my colleagues that maybe we should 
set up our own organization and pursue that idea to pursue some of the rand techniques in areas 
applicable to social problems. 
(Brief break of interview) – Doorbell rings, flowers from the residence association celebrating his 99th 
birthday…  
KT_ You were talking about the RAND Corp., the climate, and how that was beginning to change. You 
wanted to have more of a social research focus, and that’s why you started the institute. Is that correct?  
OH_ Yes. I think what gradually took place, if I think back, is some of the people wanted to have less 
intervention from people in different fields. For instance the political scientists had a distrust of 
mathematicians – “what do they know about politics?” – that sort of feeling you know. So this gradually 
developed into a separation of individual disciplines, which was very much contrary to the original spirit 
of the RAND Corporation, and made it more like the university. That’s what I always found about 
universities – that you have very little contact of an interdisciplinary nature, so people stuck to 
themselves to their immediate colleagues, rather than talk to people with very different interests. A 
little bit of that feeling, I don’t want to exaggerate, a little bit of that feeling developed at the RAND 
Corp. In recent years, I haven’t been there for a couple of years or so, on a few occasions when I visited 
there, I had the feeling that some of the old spirit of cooperation between different disciplines had been 
revived. 
KT_ Do you think that had something to do with the fact that RAND Corp. was growing in size, it started 
probably as a smaller number of employees. 
OH_ To some extent yes. Most of the growth occurred in the early stages. In fact I may claim that I was 
in some extent responsible, because it was at my urging talking to John Williams to bring in other 
disciplines. So John Williams at that time, must have been in 1950 or even earlier, he had a meeting in 
New York of all sorts of people from different disciplines, from various social sciences particularly. Look 
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at their opinions to see what kind of cooperation one could arrange there. And as a result of which some 
relatively prominent people were hired by RAND. Especially Hitch, and Speier. Hitch (Charles J. Hitch) 
was an economist who later became the associate secretary of defense I think. And Speier (Hans Speier) 
was heading the political science department at RAND when he was hired. So, I don’t want to claim 
anything there, because in retrospect I am not so sure it was a good idea.  
KT_ Really? 
OH_ Well, I take that back. In principle it was a good idea. Because we needed that input from other 
areas. But, in the long run, if you look back, ten years later, began to develop this kind of split into 
separate groups. We didn’t talk to each other as much as we should have. I got that feeling.  
So at that time, this caused some concern with the RAND staff, because the economists and political 
scientists and others to originally we only had essentially people specializing in aircraft, in missiles, and 
as sort of a support group the mathematics department. It was pretty limited in that sense, two 
engineering departments and a theoretical support division. But, that changed when all these other 
people that were brought in. I think on the whole it was a change for the good.  
KT_ So in the 1950s you collaborated with some these other people? 
OH_ Oh yes. 
KT_ and were they involved in Delphi studies as well? 
OH_ To some extent yes, but. You see there again was an example where some of the social scientists 
felt “this is bunch of mathematicians work trying to develop social forecasts” was something foreign to 
them. Which is part of this division, looking back now I think. 
So there was quite a period when, after I left people kind of looked down on formalized efforts to doing 
futures research and Delphi and so on. That has been I think also revived now. I hear that now when 
people talk, the RAND people themselves talk about the history of it, they don’t hesitate to mention 
Delphi and efforts of that kind, development of game theory and so as positive features of that time.  
KT_ Right, so, when was that (well, I think I might be getting ahead of myself here) but when Delphi was 
introduced in the 1960s to a more popular audience Delphi became popular, but in the mid 1970s there 
was a decline in maybe people’s perception of what Delphi was and what it was good for. And you are 
saying that has been revived in the last decade or so. 
OH_ Yes, what you are saying is correct. Also one of the main criticisms was really based on a 
misunderstanding of the intention that is right to mention that, and I think that is important. What 
people said in their criticism was that if you get some results using a particular panel of experts, then if 
you repeated with another set of experts you might get a different set of answers. But, of course you 
would. But, they misunderstood was, that this was not a statistical survey, of this kind at all, it was 
mainly a question of, given a set of respondents what is the best way of using them. Rather than how do 
you get a representative sample, so that this represents a much larger population from which this 
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sample was drawn. It was just a question of effective use of a given set of experts. So that caused some 
misunderstanding, I think that turned a lot of people against Delphi. Because it didn’t have that kind of a 
feature of being replicable as statistical studies usually are where the participants are chosen at random 
to be representative of a larger population. 
KT_ Okay, let’s move to the Institute (Institute for the Future) if  you don’t mind – you worked at the 
institute after you helped found it in 1968 – 1973, is that correct? 
OH_ … yes, that’s correct. 
KT_ How many people founded the institute – how big was this? 
OH_ It was never large. The actual number of researches, I wou ld say ten people. It’s quite small. With 
the secretarial staff it never exceeded I’d say something like twenty. In general the size of the institute – 
it still exists as you know - has not increased very much. A little perhaps, it might have fifty percent more 
people but quite a small outfit. 
KT_ You already mentioned one of the major reasons for starting the institute, which was to have more 
of a social emphasis to your research. What were some of the other themes that the other eight or ten 
members that started this institute had? 
 OH_ One of the other members was Ted Gordon. Another who in fact acquired a great deal of 
prominence on his own was Paul Baran who has done some of the basic work for setting up the internet. 
He’s quite well known for that, he’s won international prizes and is quite well known. Paul Baran lives 
not far from the present location of the institute. 
KT_ So he also was a founding member of the institute? 
OH_ Oh yes. He is not a member now, but he still keeps an eye on things and is interested in what goes 
on there. Fellow by the name of Enzer, who later joined the staff of the faculty at the USC. I don’t 
remember some of the names of the other people. It was as I say a small organization. When we first 
signed up, we looked around for a suitable location. It became finally a choice between two very 
different places. One was in Austin, Texas, and one was where we finally ended up, near Wesleyan 
University in Middletown. I guess, it depended in part on where the potential participants wanted to 
live, and partly what kind of support we would get from the adjacent academic facilities and so on. So 
we finally settled on Middletown. 
KT_ You were a member until 1973, but after that, for some time you were still on the editorial board of 
the journal is that correct?  
OH_ Yes. 
KT_ I wrote down that you were on the Futures editorial board until 1995. Does that sound right? 
OH_ I really don’t know. No, I can’t say. It sounds a little too long a period. I don’t think so. Anyway.  
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KT_ After you left the institute, from 73 to 76 you worked at the center for futures research at USC? 
OH_ Yes, that’s right.  
KT_ Could you tell me a little bit about those three years there? How did it come about that you would 
work in the Business College there? And, what did you work on primarily? 
OH_ I can’t tell you much about this. But as far as I recall, someone from the California Edison company 
set up a professorship there. It I think, it was at one point was offered to Edelson (sp?) who was not 
interested in joining the start there, but suggested strongly that they approach me. And they asked how 
the professorship should be named. So it was the first professorship of futures research at the time. So, I 
was there for three and a half years. It was on the whole a very pleasant experience. I was not loaded 
down with enormous courses, I just had small seminars, usually no more than about eight or ten people. 
Who, many of them usually were not young students, but mid-career people who wanted to refresh 
their connection with academia and learn something about the idea of forecasting future events and so 
on. So I lectured to them, and I think quite successfully. These students were always quite interested, I 
had a very pleasant time with them, for the number of years I was there. I left there, as you probably 
known by going to Austria to IIASA (International Institute for [Applied] Systems Analysis). 
KT_ And you left in (1976) for IIASA?  
OH_ I think that is correct. I was there for almost two years. I was joined there by a f ormer colleague at 
RAND, Ed Quinn (sp?). We set up some seminar courses. Do you know anything about this place – it was 
very interesting – an organization which was set up in one of the Austrian castles, about ten miles out of 
Vienna in Luxemburg. Very elegant place, silk paper in the offices and so on, it was beautiful model 
fireplaces and so on. Anyhow… The director of the institute was an American, the Chairman of the board 
a Russian. This was at a time when the relationship between the two countries were still tense, but 
beginning to loosen up a little bit. It was a very unusual set up. That an organization was handled both 
by an American and a Russian. And we, as I said, Quinn and I started some seminar classes there to 
teach students about essentially elements of futures research. What was interesting was that these 
students came from all over the world. We had a seminar with – there may have been some from Japan, 
some from Finland, one or two Russians, some Germans, a Frenchman, it was a complete mixture of 
international students. It was quite interesting to talk to them. And both Quinn and I enjoyed teaching 
there very much. It was a beautiful place, attached to this castle was a big park. You could walk around 
there, and often we did our thinking and our researches walking around the park and talk to each other 
you know. The Russians in particular had to be very careful always in what they were saying publicly, 
because they were always clearly being observed by their superiors. So they very often used the 
opportunity to walk into the park where they would not be heard, to have their private little 
conversations. But, on the other hand, they cooperated pretty well. I had some studies there, some 
effective cooperation from one of the Russian students too. It was quite interesting. 
KT_ How big were the seminars? Were they larger, or small size, but multinational? 
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OH_ The whole, was pretty sizable. Something in the order of 200 people I would think. Not counting 
the students who were sent there for special courses. Just the research personnel. It was something of 
that order of maybe two hundred. 
KT_ So that’s the institute - How about the students? How many students were there? 
OH_ Just a few dozen carefully selected. They had to be very specially gifted in some area or other to 
have this privilege of being sent there by their government institutions. So they were all bright people.  
KT_ What was the nature of the research – the studies that you conducted there?  
OH_ In general you mean? 
KT_ Yeah. Social, military… 
OH_ Some yes. A lot of it was technical – for example studies about energy production – that sort of 
thing. Though I do not remember anything specific right now. Occasionally I still get some publications 
from them. It is still a very active outfit. But, despite that I think they never acquired the reputation that 
the RAND Cor. acquired. Which always surprised me, because with that sort of international cooperation 
you would expect you get some very significant results. I think they did some basic, so lid research but 
nothing spectacular.  
I’ve been through one study there myself when I was there I developed an economic game. I do not 
think led anywhere, but it was just a means of getting a number of people to cooperate on some ideas.  
KT_ And, when did you leave Austria? You said you were there a couple of years… 
OH_ Not quite. I lived for a few months in Bavaria – I have a cousin there who invited my wife and me to 
live with her house for a while. I did some research, continuation of some of the work I did IIASA 
Institute, and I went back there a couple of times to report on my own results and so on. But, I was 
serving some where a member of the staff there on leave, but altogether it covers a period of almost 
two years. 
KT_ Okay. And then where did you come back to? 
OH_ Essentially I retired to a little place in Carmel. I did a little bit of a vocational research at the Naval 
research institute near Carmel. But that didn’t amount to very much. It was essentially discussion groups 
in where I tried to contribute something. So I did some writing when I came back, but essentially I 
retired. My interests have since changed. I am now my interest is mostly abstract painting.  
KT_ Very nice. 
OH_ I try to use copper and so on. My main interests have changed. 
KT_ I can see that. But, still there is a mathematics connection I would guess. 
OH_ Well, I don’t know maybe a little of the background, but not much.  
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KT_ Alright. Well, I would like to revisit a few things, going back in time again. I’ve read in one of Norman 
Dalkey’s articles about the validity of Delphi methods, that some people referred to methods like Delphi 
as “opinion technologies,” what do you think?  
OH_ Depends on how you interpret that term. One could certainly call it that. Yes. Unless, there is some  
formal definition of this term, I am not sure. It certainly covers it yes.  
KT_ Okay, it covers it. And other similar forecasting technologies could also be included under an 
umbrella term “opinion technologies” that try to use expertise, or opinions to specific purpose – to try 
to forecast or make a decision etc.? 
OH_ Yes. 
KT_ And had you heard that term before – opinion technology? 
OH_ No, I don’t recall, I don’t think so, but it makes sense.  
KT_ So it wasn’t popular.  
KT_ I would assume that you have interacted with Herman Kahn since he was involved with the institute 
[Institute of the Future] as well. Could you tell me a little bit about your correspondence with him, your 
experiences with him? 
OH_ Herman Kahn, nominally was a member of the mathematics department. I don’t know why, but he 
had to be fitted somewhere. I was very fond of him, I must say. I loved our contact with him. Of course, 
he impressed an awful lot of people, either positively or negatively. Most people had strong opinions 
about him, one way or the other. A lot of people have misunderstood him, because I think he was 
among the first to clearly point out the changes in military strategy, that were of necessity applied by 
the development of nuclear weapons. I don’t know why some people interpreted his activities as being 
in support of nuclear weapons. I have never seen that, on the contrary, he was very concerned about 
the negative implications of that. But, “there we are, we have them now, one has to be prepared by 
them, one has to ask us about what changes in general strategy are indicated by the possible possession 
of nuclear weapons of an enemy.” So, I still see the implications of that almost every day when I read 
the news. Of course, the moral aspect there has changed a good deal, because we now have the 
potential power on the part of very small groups to exert enormous influence and do enormous damage 
to the rest of the world without even being associated with a particular country. So, when I hear for 
example all of this on-going debate about whether Iran or North Korea should be allowed to develop 
nuclear weapons, it seems to me always that the critical question is not whether they themselves 
develop or own nuclear weapons, but rather the control of their distribution so they don’t ge t into the 
wrong hands. If in exchange for permitting that, let’s say Iran developed their own nuclear weapons, 
one could have a very clear cut agreement of mutual inspections to make that sure these weapons are 
properly safeguarded and cannot get into the wrong hands. This may not be such a bad deal, but the 
public discussion is always on the subject on whether or not they should be allowed to develop these 
weapons, it’s the control of them once you have them which is much more important.  
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To take an example, Israel is naturally very worried about the acquisition of nuclear bombs by countries 
like Iran – which is clearly opposed to them altogether. But if Iran had even had intentions against Israel, 
which probably they do, they would never openly fire a nuclear weapon at Israel. Because it would be 
very clear the weapon came from there, and other countries – particularly the United States – might 
very well respond by completely destroying Iran, wiping them off the map, which is something that they 
could easily do with their hundreds of weapons. But if the Iranians really wanted to do some serious 
damage to Israel, I think their best strategy would be to smuggle weapons secretly into an Israeli harbor 
let us say and detonate it there and no one would know where  it came from. So they wouldn’t risk the 
same kind of danger of their own country being completely destroyed. The same goes for other 
countries that might have such evil intentions. It’s an awful world we live in now, we have to think about 
such things, but sometimes I wonder if the emphasis is really on the real dangers. That’s why I regret 
that Herman Kahn isn’t around anymore. Because he would’ve very clearly pointed out the kind of 
difference in strategy that is called for. Anyway, you asked me about Herman Kahn – I have a great deal 
of respect for him and I think he has been greatly misunderstood. 
KT_ And you credit him for bringing to the forefront the discussion of nuclear strategy, but, would you 
also characterize him as one of the popularizers of futures studies? Because he is perhaps one of the 
most famous futurists. 
OH_ Only by implication. I don’t think he made any serious efforts in that direction – that wasn’t his 
prime emphasis. He was just concerned that the current danger that presented by the existence of 
nuclear weapons in various countries, and if it came to a nuclear conflict how you would you react to 
that. So, it was much more concerned about military strategy rather than with futures research.  
KT_ Later on he went on to write more about the futures – he wrote a number of things about twenty 
years ahead, or the year two thousand… 
OH_ Oh yes, that was partly implied by what other things he said. But I don’t think it wasn’t his main 
interest. 
KT_ Okay. What do you think about other parallel institutions or societies that came about?  In the 
1960s the World Future Society started in the east coast I believe. In the sixties there were also some 
international conferences that resulted in the World Futures Studies Federation. Have you been 
involved with either of these two institutions? 
OH_ Very little. In the early days I attended a couple of these big conferences in Washington by WFS, in 
fact I gave some lectures there. I remember one time, the only time I met Gore. Gore was one of the 
speakers in these meetings. He was very much interested in the future. I haven’t heard him say anything 
particular in that direction since then, but that is the first time I saw him and met him.  
KT_ Did you chat about the future with him? 
OH_ No. Just listened to his lecture. Maybe shook hands with him afterwards but there was no time for 
any kind of discussion. But I was surprised at the success of the WFS, because, I think that the 
A1 page 15 
205 
 
 
foundation of several magazines concerned with the future – may sound very immodest, but I think was 
very largely caused by the work we did at RAND, particularly the study that was published with Gordon. 
It became so well known, awful lot of people took an interest in that and I think it was one of the 
reasons why this society was formed in the first place. When I went to one of their first meetings, I was 
astonished at the number of people there – there were thousands. Unbelievable. I could hardly believe 
that there would be that many people who’d take an active interest in this. That kind of excitement 
about the future has died down a great deal now, maybe it is just taken for granted.  
KT_ Maybe. Perhaps one of the reasons for that is that the field itself is so overarching and so 
interdisciplinary, there is a little bit in every field itself.  
OH_ I think you’re quite right, that is very likely the case, yes.  
KT_ You talked about the WFS, how about the more international one, WFSF? 
OH_ I know very little about that.  
KT_ I understand that was a smaller organization. 
OH_ Yes, I think that’s a smaller, probably very serious… but I can’t comment on that, I don’t know 
enough about it. 
KT_ Is there anything else that you would like to share, with respect to the mathematicians you worked 
with, or some of the studies that you’ve been involved  with throughout these years, not just particularly 
with RAND, but maybe the Institute for Future Studies or other places? 
OH_ I can’t think of anything outstanding that occurs to me now. If you have any specific questions, I’ll 
try to answer them, to the extent that I remember. For quite a while it seemed there was a good deal of 
interest among relatively prominent people in this whole development – at least indirectly we received 
a great deal of support from the international scientific community I think.  But I have heard very little 
more about this now, as you say it has more or less vanished as being part of the general 
interdisciplinary progress that is made.  
KT_ You don’t’ see a comeback of futures studies to the forefront, in the late twentieth centu ry or 
perhaps in the future? 
OH_ I don’t know, it could be. I think it is necessary. I would very much welcome it, it’s not just only 
because of my personal interest but I think that an awful lot could be done with our obviously of our 
planning. Sometimes very important matters depend on the degree to which we can more or less 
accurately foresee what is going on in the future. To have methods that are more reliable than the 
original Delphi efforts that were made to provide a basis for this kind of planning.  I would very much 
welcome it, and I hope that places like the Institute for the Future and other similar ones would actively 
take that up and move in that direction. So far then it’s just a certain amount of reliance on past repute 
based on earlier effects of the results of futures studies. But, I haven’t seen much that’s new in that 
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direction that even looks like serious efforts that would really improve the methodology. I wish very 
much that could be done. If I were a very younger person I would do it myself.  
KT_ If it’s alright I’d like to characterize a couple of trends and then ask if you agree with them. Perhaps 
starting with the publication of your study with Ted Gordon in 1964 all the way up into the mid 1970s, 
maybe 1975 or so, I would characterize this as the height, or the golden age of futures studies. Would 
you agree with that? Maybe with some of its roots in the RAND Corporation, in the 1950s and then 
blossoming in the 60s and 70s and becoming much more popular. And following that, perhaps with 
some misinterpretations and misuses of methods like the Delphi method in the 1970s there is Harold 
Sackman’s Delphi Critique, and some other commentators who wrote about the Delphi method, and 
perhaps with such criticisms, even if Delphi did not fall off  the radar, it did not retain its popularity. 
Would you agree with those two descriptions of the history of Delphi? 
OH_ I think you summed it up very well. I really agree with what you said just now. You characterized it 
very clearly. The only reservation I have myself is that I am just not that familiar with what has 
happened in the last ten years or so. Whether there has been any kind of a revival or not, or whether 
people have continued interest or are cashing in on past successful results, I just don’t  know. But maybe 
you know more about than I do.  
KT_ I do have a quick follow-up question to that, one more characterization of the period that followed 
– it seems to me that maybe there was sort of a second movement, but one that was a little more global 
in its scale with institutions in South Africa, Taiwan, and a few other places that started academic 
programs or maybe centers that focused on futures studies, so maybe late 1980s, ‘90s. I was wondering 
if you would agree or know anything about sort of a resurgence or a second movement of futures 
studies?  
OH_ I don’t know if you could call it a second movement. I think what has happened is that there has 
generally been a greater awareness of the possibilities and even the need of exploring more clearly the  
possible future opportunities and dangers that lie ahead. People are a little more conscious of that than 
they used to be and I think in many cases make therefore a more serious effort to form a clearer image 
of what they expect in the future. I think that has sort of become a feature of our general culture to be a 
little more future oriented than we used to be in the past, but I think it is sort of a vague, part of general 
intellectual development, but nothing very specific that I am aware of.  
KT_ Could we talk a little bit about the Cold War? You helped start the institute for the future in 1968, 
and during that period all these student protests were going on. Did the larger climate play a role in the 
focus of the institute for the future? 
OH_ It is hard for me to answer that. I am sure that since so much of that was dominating the thinking of 
so many people, it must have had an influence. But, anything specifically took place that really affected 
the futures research movement, I cannot say, and I am not aware of it.  
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KT_ I guess I can ask you the same question, although you already answered it, but let me rephrase it 
and you might have something to add to it. When Project DELPHI was going on – how much influence 
did the political climate, the social climate have on the way you defined that problem? 
OH_ You mean the influence on the conduct of the study? 
KT_ Not only the conduct, but also the way you formulated the problem. With Soviet nuclear…  
OH_ Well, I am not aware of anything particular there. Except for some influence – I mean the very first 
small internal RAND study of course was concerned with problems that RAND as such was interested in 
– possible danger to this country, if it ever came to a nuclear conflict between the Soviet Union and the 
United States. So, that was an obvious influence for the choice of the subject matter, but later on there 
was very little except well for instance, people were very concerned with the dangers of possible over-
population of the planet. So we asked about forecasts of  what the population is likely to be. But, I don’t 
think that’s the kind of thing that you were asking of in your question. It’s sure influenced some of the 
topics, but it probably was not systematically put together. Probably depended more on the personal  
interests of the participants running the study. That they wanted to have some answers to these 
questions. To some extent they surely felt that their answers might feed into some other work that they 
were involved in. But, there was no explicit attempt as far as I remember at singling out the most 
important potential developments that ought to be included.  
KT_ One trend that I see, is an early interest in military type forecasting that in the 1960s and 1970s 
gives way into much more civilian concerns – like population, like food consumption or other social 
matters in the future. I am wondering if that is a correct generalization to say that futures studies was 
born out of some cold war pressures, out of military concerns that that was the spark for creating the 
Delphi method… 
OH_ Yes, and no. You see, originally of course because of the interest of the RAND Corporation we 
concentrated on features of particular interest to the military. But then particularly after when people 
from other disciplines were added to the staff – that was a natural thought to ask ourselves to what 
extent can we apply similar methods to non-military affairs. It was I think a reasonable and 
understandable and perhaps quite obvious extension of the original effort. But as I said before once we 
tried to move in that direction, we found a lot of resistance on the part of the social scientists, because 
they distrusted anything that smelled of mathematics. 
KT_ I see, interesting… Were you involved in other military forecasting studies other than Project 
DELPHI? Were there a lot of them in the early 1950s? 
OH_ Oh yes. I went looking back in way of my personal interest aside from future studies, and Delphi in 
particular, when I was at RAND, was the development of gaming techniques. So, when I was there I 
developed a number of games, with particularly in fact while at RAND almost entirely concerned with 
military problems. So this kind of gaming was developed and I think promoted quite a bit, and to some 
extent even imitated by some of the military organizations. So, we did quite a bit of work in that area. 
And I think there is still some gaming of that sort is going on in RAND. 
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KT_ And when were you involved with gaming, in early 1950s? 
OH_ This went on throughout the 50s and 60s. There was a good deal of interest. Quite a few people 
outside of the mathematics department who were interested in developing such games, so I cooperated 
with quite of few of those. I might just mention that I also developed some parlor games, which were on 
the market for a couple of years. One was called summit, less concerned with military political events, 
was called “square mile” about the development of a piece of land. It’s very different than publishing 
books, summit game was eventually taken off the market for the simple reason that it wasn’t selling well 
enough – they had only sold 200,000 copies, that wasn’t good enough. If you write a book, and people 
buy 200,000, you are pretty pleased. That wasn’t enough to keep it on the market.  
KT_ Wow. How about the non-popular games that you designed. Could you talk a little bit about how 
you continued Von Neumann’s and Morgenstern’s work on the basis of game theory.  
OH_ There is a lot of difference between the mathematical theory of games, and gaming as an activity. 
There are no very direct cross-connections that I am aware of. Just the general interest in that sort of 
approach. As far as gaming is concerned, I always felt, and still do that the application of gaming could 
be extended very successfully to other areas. It’s been used for instance  in the business world for many 
years, long before we did anything like that at RAND, for hundreds years now. I would think gaming 
might be an excellent approach to studying world economic situations – for instance the present 
economic crisis we’re in right now – where the game provides an opportunity for experts in the field to 
feed in their own ideas per se – “let’s try this thing, play it out and see through the mechanism of the 
game whether this make any sense, and what kind of difficulties you might run into. And so on. I think 
one could learn an awful lot from that. 
KT_ Would you consider the cross-impact matrix as a form of gaming? 
OH_ Not gaming, but it plays a part in that. Just puts the emphasis on the mutual influence of potential 
developments of one thing happened then something is likely or less likely also to happen, so on. It’s 
something which people take into account implicitly, but very few explicit studies I’m aware of really 
make a systematic effort to look into these cross-connections. I wish there were more of them. 
KT_ Could you perhaps tell me about one of the major gaming studies that you have been involved with 
while at RAND? 
OH_ I’m trying to remember enough of this. I’ve forgotten so much of it. Some games were largely 
concerned with the allocation of resources within the military. So, how much effort should we put into 
one development versus another. And try out in a gaming fashion, how successful one or another would 
be. The results of course were highly classified. That doesn’t mean one couldn’t talk about it now – it 
was a long time ago. But at the moment I would be hard put to recall any of the details.  
KT_ Sure, that is fine. I have one general question, that’d be the last major question I have: Could yo u 
reflect back on your time at RAND, at the Institute for the Future, and after that, and when you look at 
futures studies, when you think of the major accomplishments of the field and your involvement in the 
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field as well, and tell me what is significant in the historical context. In the 1960s and 1970s, and at other 
times as well mathematicians like yourself were involved with the future, others were involved with the 
future, what is the historical significance in the larger picture? 
OH_ That’s a big question. It’s hard for me to comment on that. In a very general sense, I think 
particularly the early success of the RAND Corporation affected research in many areas and there were 
many attempts to imitate it and to introduce more emphasis of interdisciplinary approaches. I think it’s 
become more of a consciousness of people in general working in this field, scientists and engineers and 
others to put emphasis on these interconnections between different areas and research from different 
areas and progress, that I think that RAND and similar efforts have left sort of a mark in a vague but very 
definitely noticeable effect on the people’s attitude. It’s hard for me to point anything very specific, but I 
think it’s because of this particular approach that was emphasized at RAND contributed more than 
anything to provide the kind of reputation the corporation acquired over the decades. Nowadays often 
referred to as the ultimate source for getting some judgment on problems of this kind.  
(Brief break of interview:  
Mrs. Helmer_ Forgive me for interrupting – you are tired, I can hear it in your voice.  It’s a terrible 
thing to do… 
KT_ No, not at all. I’m sorry for exerting your husband. I will wrap up with a couple questions, if that it 
alright with you? 
OH_ My voice isn’t holding up for much longer, but we’re having a good time… Why don’t you join us?  
Mrs. Helmer_ I don’t have anything to add to this conversation. 
KT_I will make it quick.) 
 
KT_ Talking about futures studies generally, there are a number of popularizers that come to mind, like 
Herman Kahn, or Alvin Toffler who wrote Future Shock, but if you look at the science behind it or the 
foundation of it, can you think of any key players? Ted Gordon, yourself, anybody else?  
OH_ One thing, I am not sure if it’s a major contribution, but something which I think I ought to mention, 
some  effort of this kind has been continued for many years, with participation by Ted Gordon – I forget 
his principal core, it’s done under United Nations auspices. They have been publishing studies about 
future forecasts I think on the annual basis. As far as I know that is still going on. So that’s one thing 
that’s going on. To answer your question, about the major contributors, of course we’ve already 
mentioned some of the names. One of them was Bertrand de Jouvenel and his son who has been 
continuing his tradition. To some extent Dennis Gabor, although he merely got involved in this by being 
a participant in our study, but he maintained a great deal of interest in that area. I don’t know if  he 
made any original contributions, I think not. I’m trying to think… 
KT_ And this is the sort of thing we could e-mail back and forth on if you can think of anything... I think 
I’m done asking questions – but let me give you one last chance to add anything else, perhaps an 
anecdote, or anything you would like to share. 
OH_ Nothing off hand. Given time I might think of some things, but nothing now.  
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KT_ That’s perfectly fine. Dr. Helmer, thank you so much for your hospitality here and thank you so 
much for answering my questions. 
OH_ Not at all, it was a pleasure for me. 
KT_ Likewise. Thank you very much sir. 
(End of interview) 
  
A1 page 21 
211 
 
 
Appendix 2: Oral History Interview with Fabienne Goux-Baudiment 
 
KT_ My name is Kaya Tolon and I am a student at Iowa State University in the History of 
Technology and Science Program. In support of my dissertation research, I am meeting with Fabienne 
Goux-Baudiment to talk about the history of futures studies and her involvement in this field. We are 
meeting at the office of proGective in Paris, France on August 13, 2 o’clock in the afternoon. Fabienne 
do I have your permission to record this interview? 
FGB_ Please do. 
KT_ Very good. Thank you. 
FGB_ You’re welcome. 
KT_ So, perhaps a good way of starting this conversation might be i f I could ask you to reflect 
back on the history of futures studies as a field. Do any periods stand out as different from others? If you 
had to categorize the periods over time, when was the beginning? 
FGB_ Well, the main problem for me is that I’m French. Because I’m French, I have two histories 
in mind. I have the world history of futures studies, mainly, I would say, led by America. And we have the 
French futures studies. So, I would rather, if you don’t mind, tell you about this double story.  
KT_ Sure. 
FGB_ I think it was really concomitant, I mean that they appeared in the same time. We used to 
say that futures studies appeared as such in the US Army in ’45. In France, we had the first mention of it 
in ’47 when our government decided on the creation of Commissariat Général au Plan (National Agency 
for Planning), I would say. And this was the beginning of the study of the future in France as well.  But 
the difference is absolutely huge between them. And I would say that we had a real gap between the 
French and the American conception of futures studies.  In the American conception, from my point of 
view which is relative, Americans thought of the future at that time, as a new field to colonize. It was 
something relative to the conception of time. In this one there is determinism, a strong determinism. So 
the future is the succession of events that will appear certainly in the future. It is not a way of thinking 
the future as an alternative path but only in a very probabilistic way. What future will appear for sure? If 
we look at this future, what kind of risk, threats, opportunities, will appear in this future for us? Which 
means that you must first know yourself to know what are your own strengths and weaknesses;  then to 
look at the future (trends, drivers) and only after crossing both results you can say what will be 
interesting for you or not. This kind of vision is related, in my mind, to the fact that at that time America 
was the winner of the last war. And they were very confident, they were, I would say almost “arrogant” 
regarding the future: “We are the masters of the world. We won the war. The World War. And we will 
be the masters of the future as well.” So I think it was this kind of vision that prevailed in America at that 
period. 
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FGB_ Now you have to remember that in America futures studies emerged really in the field of 
military-industrial-complex, and specifically army. The Institute for the Future and the RAND 
Corporation, both were born from this Army-oriented vision of the future.  In France it was quite 
different because futures studies came to the Ministry of Defense only in ’63, so rather late regarding 
that. First the French government used futures studies for civil purposes, in order to reconstruct France. 
And here also you have to remember that whatever the end of the war, we were the loser. We lost the 
War because we were not able to save our country, America did it for us. The consequence is huge in 
terms of futures studies: it means that we have not been able to anticipate the future .  And I think that 
this is the first lesson from the war: we were not able to anticipate it. The second was: now our country 
is destroyed, and we have to rebuild it. But to rebuild it, we need guidelines. And these guidelines 
should not be the same than the past. But should be adapted to the new world – the after world war 
world. Those guidelines must also reflect our own vision of the future – the future we want. And so 
immediately you see the difference between the American vision looking at the future as something 
that will come, whatever you do, in a very deterministic way. And the French view which is: we never 
know what the future will be so all we can do is to shape it as we want it to be. So we have just to act 
now, right now, to shape it. So it was very different approach to the future. We used to say that 
Americans have created exploratory foresight, while French futurists have created normative foresight, 
normative meaning here to create the future.  
FGB_ So, from this, you got in America, for example, fields like technology assessment, which is 
“what will be the consequences of technology development in the future”. In France, we never had this 
kind of issue. Our focus was only “what do we want for the future? What are the problems of today? 
What will be the problems of tomorrow?” The problems we do not know right now. And how will we 
plan our country so that we will succeed to develop it again in such a way that we will never face again 
such a defeat. That’s the reason why it was mainly a civil process, not a military one.  It was really a civil 
process based on the rejection of this society (and its beliefs) that led to the World War II. We had to do 
something new,  to rethink everything, and change everything. Kind of a renaissance.   
FGB_ In America at that time they developed operations research and management – all the 
things about organization. In France, it was not our mindset. Our orientation was rather philosophy. In 
Germany Hans Jonas elaborated the principle of precaution “how can we deal  with research and 
development in public policy to tame the technology development?” So our National Center for 
Scientific Research (CNRS) was something very different from the National Science Foundation of 
America. And I think it has been completely inducted by our vision of the future at that time. Another 
philosophical issue then was “what does it mean to exist?,” which was very purposeful after the 
atrocities of the war. A philosophical movement, that we call existentialism, was born then around Jean-
Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir.. Existentialism was really a bad hit against future thinking. Because 
the idea was “I just have to act to exist, I do not have to plan the future.” I do not have to think the 
future, in a certain way. And so, we were caught between French existentialism and the German 
principle of precaution and all what we really carried on our shoulders at that time from Hiroshima, all 
this culpability, this guilt that Americans never felt indeed. Only Europeans. But it was such a heavy 
weight on us. Thus it was very difficult at that time to move futures studies from the ruling system -
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mainly public policy and army- to society. Bertrand de Jouvenel tried to do it, but it was not a big success 
to be frank: people were more interested by the present than by the future. 
FGB_ But during the same time in America you had this social movement. I mean the whole 
society was optimistic, building for the future, wanting to go ahead. Look at Epcot. You know the project 
from Walt Disney at that time. If you look at the engineering project -not the entertainment (which now 
is not the thing that Disney wanted I think)-what Disney really wanted –it was in ’60 – ’66- for Epcot was 
really a place where technological development and also condition of life of  the future would be 
displayed and showed to the population.  There were a great will and great success of the Americans in 
convincing the population, in making the futures studies really enter the population and influencing so 
many people. And I think that we never succeeded in doing that in France. Also because beyond the 
existentialism principle of precaution, we had then a strong technocracy, that brought the intellectuals 
to discard the future. To even kind of a disprizing look at futures studies. The only ones who really 
bought it at that time were the firms – the big firms like Kodak, Lafarge, etc … who were involved in the 
reconstruction of France; almost all of them had a unit of prospective at that time and invested in 
futures studies. So I would say that this is more or less the beginnings of futures studies in France and 
America from ’45 to ’70.   
FGB_ Simultaneously, you had a movement coming from operations research to mathematize 
methods and thinking and to give them an appearance of credibility, truth, and scientificity. So during 
the ‘70s appeared all the famous world models (Jay Forrester), like the Bariloche in Latin America. But 
this ended rather quickly because the big first stop to the development of Futures studies was in mid-
70’, which is the first oil shock. At that time the economic depression was so high that most of the firms 
decided to close their own foresight unit and even to cut the budget for future -oriented studies. In 
France it was really the end of this movement from those f irms and corporations to develop futures 
studies, strategic futures studies as they called it at that time. I don’t think that the same thing occurred 
in America. But from this time on I’m not able to analyze how America developed itself during the ‘80s 
and ‘90s. My feeling from here is that America became completely static in the development of futures 
studies and they kind of sedimented themselves working always with the same old methods Like the 
Delphi which is no longer accurate as a predictive method due the multiplication of so-called experts, 
but  yet it is the most used, which is a little bit strange for me. 
KT_ Yes and no, there are a lot of differing opinions about the Delphi. 
FGB_ Just to say that in my vision (however shared by some foreign colleagues), American 
futurists really got encrusted, paralyzed in this very same conception of the future which is what is 
about to come and that we have to guess. One of the causes and consequences of this paralysis is the 
fact that French and American futurists have had no dialogue at that time with each other; they did not 
nurture each other. In the 70s, futures studies in France became a field for the engineers of the higher 
administration, with very good mathematic skills. They used it as a tool for planni ng. But a pure 
technocratic way of planning where  only technology can shape the world,  human beings having to  
adapt to technology. I mean it was very very far away from the original way to conceive futures studies 
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as Gaston Berger did; his ‘prospective’  was really the philosophical vision of a continued progress 
centered on human beings.  
FGB_ After that, the second big shock in futures studies was the fall of the Berlin Wall in ’89. At 
that time the feeling was that, it’s funny b/c if you look back now , you see exactly the same things after 
the WWII, we have been unable to predict it. And suddenly in France futures studies -which was not 
dying but was not in a very good health at that time- began  a new life. And this new life came from 
devolution. You know, when the central state gives most of its power to local governments. So our first 
process of devolution was the laws of devolution of ’82 and from ’82 on ‘prospective’ or futures studies 
(which was named ‘prospective’ in France), suddenly sprung again, from this territorial ground. 
KT_ after ‘89 
FGB_ It was exactly ’82. So it happened after ’82. 
KT_ Ok. 
 FGB_ So from that came the territorial foresight. The first exercise was in ’87. So from ’82 to ’87 
you have the first laws, decrees and election of the mayors by people, all this momentum contributing 
to the birth of a strand of futures studies dedicated to the territory. And then the Berlin Wall fell, at this 
precise period. So immediately, the futurists at that time, mostly territorial futurists, understood that 
the last umbilical link between foresight and forecasting was cut, because no one has predicted this fall.  
Now definitely in France we are not about to forecast the future. This is another strand of futures 
studies that we call ‘prevision’ (forecasting) in France. But what we do, as foresight (French 
‘prospective’) is to shape the future. And the lesson from the fall of the wall is that we have not enough 
taken into account citizens’ aspirations, what they want and need, etc. So occurred in the ’90s a huge 
concern and much money put on the table for territorial foresight exercise based on participatory 
processes. Participation was really the key word:  And how can we bring all those ideas together and tie 
them into a systemic vision; then how to offer this to the mayor or president of the local authority in 
order to create a project of territory for the future. It was all about visioning and participation. 
 FGB_ Finally they understood that they were spending a lot of money for a very small re sult. 
We have an expression in France which is “Café de commerce” which means that when  a talk is not 
based on fact, or proof or whatever, it’s the same kind of discussions that you can have when you are 
going for a coffee. I ought to say most of the exercises of territorial foresight were about that. Just 
saying common things and often with not much discernment or capability to distinguish things 
purposefully. 
KT_ Let me briefly interrupt with just a question. Is what you are talking about differentiated as 
foresight studies. Would you consider futures studies to be the same thing as foresight studies?  
FGB_ I’m coming to that. 
KT_ Okay, please continue. 
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FGB_ I am not sure what is the right word for that … You know when you are knitting,  after a 
while, you get a ball of wool made by all the wool threads you had. And very often you can see a cat 
playing with it. So, the evolution of futures studies is like this wool ball, it is formed by lot of several 
threads intertwined and you cannot just take one to understand the whole thing. So, in France after the 
WWII, we had a very big thread ending to territorial foresight, including participatory process. And this 
vision lasted I would say to the beginning to the crisis of 2001. After this crisis most of the local 
governments, public authorities wondered if their money was really well spent. That was the first 
question. The second question was that they were facing an increasingly complex and changing world, 
and discovered they didn’t understand anymore this world. Since 2002, we’ve got increasing demands 
for what I would call global foresight. I mean a future-oriented way to understanding the world, and 
macro history, as a tool for this, is more and more used to understand the transformation process, the 
evolutionary process. So this is another thread of Futures Studies which is about working on the great 
transition – I’m not speaking of Kurzweil or singularity, just transition as intended by Fritjof Capra – he is 
a very famous American physicist, he wrote about the paradigm shift. 
KT_ Not Thomas Kuhn? This was someone else, okay… 
FGB_ Yes he was very famous for his book: The Turning Point (1982). And the other one was Ilya 
Prigogine – Nobel prize of chemistry. At the time we had also, I can send you a full list if you’d want, a lot 
of people speaking of paradigm shift, and showing that we are really undergoing a great transition 
process. But, very strangely, futures studies missed this movement. We had no major futurists, talking 
about that. Of course we had some writing mega trends, but it was light regarding Prigogine or Capra. 
You can think of Alvin Toffler but at that time he did not exactly speak of the transition as such, he was 
speaking of the shock of the future, but not about organizing the transition. So duri ng the 2000s, 
futurists are rather…  
KT_ quiet? 
FGB_ well they demonstrate a rather disappointing  capability to bring something new to the 
debate about transition. And I think it is really a pity. Perhaps this is the time to try to clarify the 
evolution of futures studies from futures studies to foresight. I would say that foresight is… let me take it 
from another angle. Do you know the origin of the term foresight in futures studies?   
KT_ No. 
FGB_ No, okay. So, in Japan, ’61 you had the first futures-oriented exercise called visioning. It 
was initiated by the MITI – this is the name of the industry and technique ministry of Japan. And, there, 
civil servants decided that to build the future, you need more than just try to anticipate it. What they 
wanted to do, was exactly the same than what the French authorities wanted: to shape technological 
development thanks to a 10-year planning. At the beginning of each next ten years, they brought 
together the civil servants of the ministry and the heads of the main leading companies working on 
technological development. They dialogued together for one week, let’s say. And the civil servants 
would learn from these companies what will be their own objectives during the next ten years, in what 
field they wanted to develop or to invest and so on. Building on this they would decide together of a 
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national program of technological development for the next ten years. And this worked really from ’62 
to 70 to 80, then to 90. In the 90s this program stopped, because for the first time civil servants and 
business people were unable to reach an agreement. But this process was beginning to get known 
abroad. People started to talk about it.  
FGB_ A German delegation studying technology forecast visited the MITI people at that time 
and they heard of this. On the way back, they went to Australia and explained what they saw (in Japan) 
with Australian futurists, specifically Richard Slaughter. And Slaughter said, “well, the thing that MITI 
was doing is not forecasting, because forecasting is really based on a mathematical model…, but it is 
rather foresighting.” So, the German team came back to Germany and there they began to speak about 
it as foresight. Later on they visited colleagues in London and talked a lot about that. Thus  British 
authorities decided to start the first technology foresight in Europe. Immediately after that Germany 
also made a technology foresight. And from that time on, they continuously spoke of foresight. That’s 
the reason why, if you look at all the papers produced by the European Commission about foresight, 
first, they never use the term “futures studies,” only “foresight” and second, they only talk about 
“technology foresight,”  because they ignore everything about the field as such. Interesting enough. 
FGB_ So, this is another thread: the replacement of technological forecast by foresight based on 
the Japanese experience. But then, Richard Slaughter thought that “mmm, this experience could be 
interesting” and began to mull over that. He wrote a book called “the foresight principle.” (‘95). 
Australia is a very interesting place where there it is probably more European influence than American. 
And even if the way of life is rather more American, they are used to think like European, and they are 
still very willing to keep their contact with Europe and go back here. This is reason why you can find 
there for example all the papers from Gaston Berger that you cannot find in Europe – not even in 
France, but in Australia you will find them. When you say you found the first futures bulletin of WFSF 
there it just confirmed the same thing. 
KT_ Sure.  
FGB_ So, it is really interesting that Australia became the cradle of the convergence between the 
forecasting approach of the Americans and the ‘prospective’ approach of the Europeans, and that they 
succeeded to put them together, mix them in such a way that what they offered was “foresight.” 
Foresight kind of came back in Europe, and was very easily adopted, first because, “futures studies” is 
very difficult to translate in any European language. “Etude du futur” in French, and “Zukunftvorschung” 
in German is a little bit strange, and also in German you had several other words for that like 
“prognosis,”. So, it was complicated to use it. And suddenly, “foresight” exploded like the magic word. 
For the French people, foresight was the way to make the French prospective recognized as something 
special – not futures studies, not forecasting – but truly something specific because it was normative. 
And foresight was normative as well, this Japanese process was normative. It was kind of winning the 
intellectual war between foresight and forecasting, or exploratory and normative. It was the perfect 
convergence between them. Today, if you look in the world the way foresight is used and how,  you will 
find exactly the same thing than the  French model – which is participation, which is about grouping, 
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collective process, etc. This is a collective process of people trying to act on the world, and not study the 
world. I think the major difference is there. French prospective is really about changing the world.  
KT_ I need one clarification. And that’s specifically between foresight as you just described it 
now, the modern version, and technological forecast that you talked about earlier, when you  talked 
about that, you sounded that it was very narrow, very deterministic – the early versions. So when did 
“foresight” perhaps I’m misinterpreting this, but when did “foresight” replace this “technological 
foresight” – or maybe I didn’t follow you? 
FGB_ Technology foresight is just  another thread of futures studies. We had in France, coming 
from America, the technological forecasting (together with technology assessment ’50 and ‘70s). Then 
technology forecasting was replaced by technology foresight, which is still working. Sometimes 
technology foresight may open on to a large national foresight (which is about everything). For example 
the British government launched the first technology foresight in ‘92. ‘92 or ‘94? Then in ’96 broadened 
it to national foresight – took off technology, it was something global, with a participatory process and 
interest about the society evolution – then it narrowed again to just be only technology foresight.  
KT_ Interesting. 
FGB_  Technology foresight is only a foresight exercise dedicated to anticipate the technologies 
of tomorrow, based on a normative approach. The European Commission clung on this technology 
foresight, spread it, and a lot of books and seminars on it and spent a lot of money to promote it. It is 
not my field of competence, so I can’t say if it is useful or not. Even so, this thread within FS still exists.  
KT_ Would you consider this thread to be a mistake, or do you see a place for it within futures 
studies. 
FGB_ No, I can’t consider anything like that as a mistake. I’m just saying that it was a pity that 
the European Commission was not able to move forward, first to learn the culture of futures studies and 
move this concept forward. I’m saying that perhaps they prevented this field from moving forward by  
narrowing *the field.+ But, in a parallel way, really parallel, the word ‘foresight’ was adopted by the 
French, who never invested much in technology foresight, it was not our area of interest – we are not 
technological oriented people/culture. At that time, the mainstream in futures studies in France was 
territorial ‘prospective’. But when you talk or write  in English, it was very difficult to make understood 
that territorial French prospective is not territorial futures studies, as futures studies is not always about 
participatory process. So, it was really problematic to express that without the word foresight. So once 
this concept of foresight arrived in Europe, - suddenly we understood that the foresight principle from 
Slaughter was exactly what we needed. French ‘prospective’ IS foresight. We took off ‘technology’ 
because it was not about what we were doing, but we kept the word ‘foresight’. And now, all French 
futurists translate ‘prospective’ in English by ‘foresight’, not in reference to the EU technology foresight 
but in reference to the foresight principle. I think it is really reflecting the fact that the French 
prospective is oriented toward action, toward changing the world and not  only studying the world.  
KT_ I really like your earlier comparison to knitting, if not the same there is a lot of overlap. 
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FGB_ Definitely. And influence – we were influenced by Americans, I’m not really sure we 
influenced Americans, but we influenced Africa a lot. Right now territorial foresight is spreading 
everywhere, except in America which is a funny thing. 
KT_ Participatory, anticipatory... ? 
FGB_ But they’re late – they’re really the latest in this field of territorial foresight - Latin 
American Colombia is more advanced. 
KT_ Okay. I have several questions. You have talked about American as distinct than French 
development of futures studies. And perhaps let me briefly describe a few key points, chronologically, 
and then go back to asking a couple of questions going back to the early period. In the French case 1947 
onward 1970 there was an initial interest in Futures studies that was primarily taken up by major firms 
and companies 
FGB_ And government. 
KT_ And when you were talking about that, you said it never became a movement. And that’s an 
interesting comment for me because, I read a lot of opinions about that in the U.S. that it never became 
a movement either.  
FGB_ But, just a comparison about Herman Kahn. When there was a conference by Herman 
Kahn in America, you had 400 people in the room. When he did it in Europe only 80, 100 attended. 
KT_ okay, but even then whether it was much more popular is debatable. But, I guess my 
question there would be, would you consider that a failure to create a movement, if there was influence 
still that impacted the government, that impacted the companies, and they started prospective 
departments as you mentioned. Perhaps as a field it wasn’t in the forefront, but it was in the 
background doing some of these works. So, would you consider that to be a failed movement still in 
France, post-WWII up to the oil crises? 
FGB_ Your question is good even if difficult. I’m fifty years old, and I spent a good 30 years of my 
life doing futures studies and I am still convinced that we are good at it, in France. Yet, the problem is 
our culture, and this has nothing to do with futurists or ‘prospective’ as such. I think that futures studies 
as a movement came too late to France. Because France has had its historical peak a century ago – a rise 
and now is declining. Futures studies arrived too late to save the culture from this decline. The main 
criteria to assess this decline are optimism of the population, and the capability of the population to 
innovate, to patent new innovations, to create new companies and so on. Our population is old, it i s not 
old by the number of age but by the statism of mind – even a teen here is old – not ready to move. I 
mean I spent a lot of time in Turkey for example, and I have been so surprised by the difference 
between the Turkish and French. Because in Turkey, the “youthness” of the population is just amazing, 
you can meet any teen in the street, and he will tell you about his or her project, about creating 
something, or going abroad, moving, changing, evolving, they’re full of life. And here we’re already 
dying, since first step out of the cradle; turned to status quo, not evolving, just earning money, and not 
A2 – page 8 
219 
 
 
questioning anything, not doing the revolution any more, and not progressing as well. Just at an end of 
an era. 
FGB_ And this is the reason why I am saying it is difficult question for me, because I have to talk 
about my own culture. Clearly what I think is that we’ve had a good educational system, capable to 
create good intellectual/scholars who are able to think the future and provide tools for that. But w e, 
futurists, are not in phase with the culture of our own people. I would say transplant our French futurists 
in America, or a new country like Australia, and you would get such big successes.  
KT_ And are you talking about the futurists of the 50s, 60s, and 70s, or current? 
FGB_ I’m speaking of the current time.  
KT_ When I look at the more global picture, and I don’t know much about France. The 1968 
student protests seemed to be, and other movements in the United States, seemed to be maybe like 
that knitting example, part of that same problem. And it also seemed to be a defining year for futures 
studies. Would you consider it differently in France? Because of what you just said? 
FGB_ No. 
KT_ Was that a key turning point for the field? 
FGB_ Not for the field. For the culture. What is very surprising is that before ’68 the mainstream 
movement was existentialism, and after 1968 it was generation “no future.” So even ’68 was too late to 
change the fate of this culture.  
KT_ I see.  
FGB_ There is a time, you know, when you’re about to die, that physicians call “remission”  It 
means that just before dying you suddenly appear to  feel well, all your symptoms are vanished, and it 
seems that you’ve recovered. It can last some hours, even one day or two, but after that, this is the end. 
Movement of ’68 was like a remission for Europe. The last time we tried to make the revolution.  
KT_ Looking at that bigger cultural picture, there is a similar term in German for the “no future 
generation” – the “null bock generation.” When does this period end, or does it not end? 
FGB_ Sociologists in France say it ended in the middle of the ‘90s. Every year I ask my students 
the same question since ’95: what you think of the future? From the answers, I am not sure that this 
really ended. Kairos Future, a Swedish futures company, led a major investigation about that. It was 
called “The Future of Youth.” And the result of their investigation was that, France had still the most 
depressive youth than everywhere else in the world. We have a high, if not the highest, rate of suicides. 
KT_ I’m trying to understand, or to gauge your sense of how specifically French this is, this 
periodization. It is somewhat artificial to say this “no future generation” starts in the 60s and ends in the 
90s. 
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FGB_ Yes. 
KT_ Let’s go along with that periodization and was it a European phenomenon, was it a global 
phenomenon. 
FGB_ I really can’t tell. You have to ask the right people about that. What I can tell you is there is 
a new generation. I work a lot about that new generation which is showing exactly the very same 
symptoms all around the world. That generation is amazing, they will change the world, even 
unconsciously, even if they don’t want to. I think it is not only a cultural thing. In Korea and China as  
well, they are very very different  from us [older generation] and they are alike around the world. All 
what we are talking about today is really history, but the future will be different. That generation is 
making something very very different. 
KT_ Yes, I was just about to say let’s focus on the field, because the big picture can be 
sometimes hard to handle.  
FGB_ yeah, but at the same time, the big picture can explain the evolution of the field. As we are 
speaking of young people and culture,  there is a kind of paradox, just right now. In America, Latin 
America, Australia, Northern Europe and I would say even Africa, now you have units of foresight almost 
everywhere. Quite all of them belong to X generation. Yet, if you look at the students of this generation, 
like Jim Dator, Eleonora Masini or me, none of them will become futurists. I really wonder if futures 
studies will survive this lack of interest for the future. It is something interesting. 
KT_ From my perspective, that struggle to define, not define but establish or keep it in tact and 
question has been there for many years.  
FGB_ Yes. 
KT_ But nonetheless, 
FGB_ The ‘80s. 
KT_ I would even say ‘70s. I am talking about the global context here, not France.  
FGB_ I was speaking of the federation (WFSF). This was the first time, during my mandate, that 
all the courses just stopped. The futures course in Budapest is over, we have no longer courses in Asia or 
wherever we used to have them. 
KT_ But, the federation courses may have stopped, but there were still some academic 
institutions that had their courses. In Hungary they had some futures studies department, and there are 
a few others that I know about. So that makes me wonder if that struggle is something that comes with 
the field. But nonetheless, as much as I see, for example in the mid 1970s there is a lot of criticism of 
futures studies – sort of defining the end of the futures studies movement of the late 1960s. Even after 
that decline, there is always a presence of futures studies, globally and in dif ferent places emerging. 
Perhaps it’s not… how would you describe it? When I write about it I’m wondering if maybe there was a 
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movement and there were ripple effects, or maybe there was a movement, and then a second 
movement later in the twentieth century. How would you describe that? 
FGB_ Again I’d like to get back to the bigger picture by this time in history. Since the very 
beginning of us as human, our relation to the future was part of our development, through methods of 
divination as well as forecasting  But we always had a channel of communication with the future. My 
real issue is why futures studies has not succeeded in  entering the holy of the holiest, which is the 
university? I don’t know any country where the university would recognize futures studies as a 
discipline. It is always a course included in an academic field such economics, political sciences, etc. Even 
in Manoa with Dator, and Dator has real weight, it is a Ph.D. in political science with major in futures 
studies. My own PhD is in sociology with a major in futures studies. I mean it was the same with biology 
in the 19th century, it was the same with management more recently, but you can have a PhD in biology 
now, as well as a MBA. But we didn’t succeed to make FS recognized as an indepe ndent academic field, 
not even in France. Will it be possible in a near future?  As I am fundamentally, methodologically 
optimistic,  I would foresee two possibilities, because I just don’t know the answer. One, we would need 
to crush down the current education system before we get new disciplines like ours recognized. Good 
news. Second assumption is they will be stronger than us, and we will disappear as a mainstream and 
from time to time, someone will speak of something called futures studies, like we’re speaking of 
Neanderthal in anthropology.  
FGB_ Now what we can say for sure, is that we have to dig deep into sociology and psychology 
to understand our real relations to future. We are not as rational as we use to say – as a human species. 
When we think of the future we are afraid, we are afraid of death, social death, even family death, 
whatever, but I think it’s not something we want to look at in too scientific a way. Perhaps this explains 
why university is so tense about futures studies. Very often people think that FS is not taught  in the 
universities because it is not a science, because it can’t reproduce the same results. But look at 
psychology, or all the human and social sciences, even there you cannot reproduce the same thing, 
they’re all sciences of interpretation. I’d say psychology is the least scientific science existing. So, I am 
not convinced that the scientificity of futures studies is really the issue. Indeed, futures studies is just a 
pretension to look at the future, we never look at the future, because the future doesn’t exist. We are 
just trying to look differently at the present. That’s why I am so optimistic about the next generation. 
Because the way the next generation is looking at the world, will be closer to the way futurists look  at 
the world than any generation did before. So, I think the main problem is basically a problem of 
rationality. Do you know Pierre Teilhard de Chardin? 
KT_ No. 
FGB_ If you have time to googlelize him, you will understand. It is difficult to spell, let me  write it 
down… 
FGB_ He was a Jesuit, a paleontologist. His works were forbidden by the Holy See, as too 
challenging and a threat for the Catholic dogma. I think he was one of the greatest thinkers of the 
twentieth century. And the interesting thing was that he was inventor, perhaps you know him this way, 
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he was the inventor of the concept of noosphere. He understood that human being is undergoing a 
continuous process of transformation. Not only adaptation according to Darwin, but kind of growing 
more linked to each other through the noosphere and more aware of the world and then more aware of 
ourself, and doing so, progressing to become more intelligent. And he said the final intelligence, the final 
form of intelligence, and you have to remember he’s a Jesuit, is love. Not as sexual, but the capability to 
think in such a way then you can accept the way of the other, the way of thinking of the other. And what 
you can see with the next generation nowadays is that, because of their continuous networking with 
videogames, internet and virtual worlds, like Second Life and so on, they are able to accept each other. 
They are lowering, decreasing their level of non-tolerance even if they are still violent, globally they are 
more tolerant than the former generation, more open to difference of color, sex, and gender. So, in the 
logic of the two scenarios I sketched just a moment ago, our way of thinking the future (or our inability 
to think it in the proper way), will either survive with the next generation or even  progress. Here we 
make a difference between the visionaries, we call them guru, and the futurists. Futurists are supposed 
to work for everybody, whatever the ideology, they are neutral. They are just scientists working on some 
futures-oriented topic. While visionaries are oriented toward advocacy. They’ve foreseen the future, 
and they want to promote the future that they’ve foreseen, like Kurzweil with Singularity. I think we are 
at a turning point right now and it is not only about foresight, I don’t believe that. But I believe in 
something much more profound, the Great Transition. Sorry if I escaped your question.  
KT_ No, I don’t think you have escaped it, but I will try to go back again and revisit a similar 
question because we ended up in the present and that change may or may not happen, as you hope or 
predict, or so. But when you look at the past, as you were saying – I always compare it to the futurists 
alchemist’s stone: always trying to form a field in academia and universities, but not quite achieving 
that. There are programs under different departments, economics, political science, sociology, etc. but it 
never emerged. So, again I’m going to cautiously ask is it, and I am not necessarily wanting to have you 
put a judgment on it, would you see it as a success or failure, when you look at the development of the 
field and the impact it has had. 
FGB_ You will never get such a clear answer from me. If I am a futurist it is because I cannot 
think in white or black. In terms of heavily promoting futures studies, like other emerging disciplines did 
it, we failed. It is obvious I think, it’s not a judgment just a statement. Now, the real question for me is 
that, is this field just a fashion or a fashionable way for some personalities to promote themselves, when 
you look at the big shots in this field you can ask yourself. or, is this field, has this field been, useful 
during the last fifty years? That is your point, isn’t it? 
KT_ Yes, that’s the essence. 
FGB_ I can only speak for France, because that’s the only p lace where I can witness the results 
with my own eyes. When we look at the futures studies made by the Commissariat Général au Plan, the 
famous planning committee agency created in 1947 to reconstruct France and develop planning, I can 
say today that our housing policy based on its works has been a failure. But it also defined our energy 
independence, with a nuclear policy. And whatever your view pro or con-nuclear, it worked. I mean we 
are as independent as we possibly can from energy. And they wrote also some studies that seem stupid 
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today and by chance they got no influence on our policies. Some others were very clever and were 
unheard. Again, I would say that it is not yes or no, but our policy-makers always tried to take into 
consideration the future when they built their policy. That the choices were good or not, I think it has 
nothing to do with futures studies by itself. As long as futures studies raise the systemic awareness of 
our rulers, it is a success. I am absolutely convinced of that. And this conviction comes from the 
comparison I have done while working in other countries.  Futures studies pushed us to be cautious 
regarding future consequences of our act. Perhaps this explains why French public policy makers have 
been less revolutionary than some other ones. What I mean, for example in the field of territorial 
foresight, Italy succeeded in making a new constitution, where the devolution is really clear, and we 
have not been able to do so in France, it has been impossible because we have such a centralized state. 
But,  in the reality our local authorities are far more advanced in terms of devolution than Italians are. 
And this is the direct consequence of the fact that territorial foresight influences a lot  the local 
politicians. 
KT_ Centralized as in..? 
FGB_ Centralized government. Since the monarchy we are very centralized. All the powers are in 
Paris, in Italy it is no such thing. Perhaps they were able to do better in this way because they were not 
centralized and not because they were not prevented from doing so by futures studies. My position is 
just that, wherever you go now in the world, when I am asked by people who invite me to go, they 
always say we have the best administration in the world. Of course I am critical regarding my country , 
but I think that mainly we’ve been successful in that because Gaston Berger succeeded to convince all 
the civil servants of the high level that they have to build their policy for the future, and not just right 
now. In this field yes. In the field of business I am unable to say something. 
KT_ So, in France specifically public policy making was largely influenced by him specifically, or 
by Bertrand de Jouvenel as well later?  
FGB_ Not so much, mainly Gaston Berger. 
KT_ Could you summarize his influence briefly? 
FGB_ Briefly is difficult, because I wrote my PhD on Gaston Berger.  
KT_ Unfortunately, it is not in a language I can read. 
FGB_ Okay, I think the difference between Gaston Berger (GB) and Bertrand de Jouvenel (BdJ) is 
clear enough. BdJ was a scholar. GB first was a mixed; his father was a mixed from Senegal, and his 
mother was French.  
So, he was mixed. He began his adult life by being sent in the war, the first one, and he stayed 
there for five or six years. More than usual because he went to the Dardanelles and Crimea. When he 
came back, of course he missed school until that time, so he had no baccalaureate, and he had to work 
to sustain his mother. So he is not part of the French aristocracy. He worked at this plant making oil. 
Then he became the boss of it, and then at the same time he went back to school. He succeeded with 
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the baccalaureate, and up to the PhD. And then he began to teach. And simultaneously he was running 
the plant and teaching. At the end of his professional life,  he became the director of higher education in 
the French Ministry of Education. He created a very innovative school of engineering school in Lyon 
(INSA), not in Paris, in Lyons. So all his life he demonstrated that he was not in the mold, but a step 
aside. And despite of that, he was  so brilliant to be accepted by a conservative system. And till today, 
you have two categories of futurists. One category is the stars: they are famous, have no time to 
welcome you, mean to seem very aristocratic, and they speak for speaking mostly. The others are those 
who work on the field, who say “wet your shirt” by sweating and working, this is the heritage of GB. His 
great strength was to combine philosophy and action, the power of advanced thought and the 
experience of the real life. Because he really ruled a private firm, and created and managed schools.  
KT_ One thing you mentioned about him was his anti-determinism. And earlier, when you were 
running down the early history of futures studies as a field, you said strongly deterministic with respect 
to ’45, with the military’s influence in starting the field. In the global context, or the context of the field, 
is there a time when you see that determinism change, or that trend be broken? Not the French case.  
FGB_ Yes, yes, yes, I think definitely the French are not deterministic. I think it’s the heritage of 
Pascal, Descartes and so on that we are not deterministic. And we are so arrogant sometime that we 
believe we can change the world. It is part of the deal. Now, the determinism in America has changed, 
ultimately in the late years, because of 9/11 it was such a blow. Because, do you know the doctrine of 
Monroe? Suppose that you have a kind of sanctuary in your own realm, and your sanctuary was 
attacked. But did this change their determinism? I would say yes, because territorial foresight is now 
slowly spreading in America.  
KT_ So within the last ten years, or even less. 
FGB_ Yes, even less. The last ten years suddenly territorial foresight has bloomed in America. 
And America was late in this field, it really began after South America, after Africa, after Australia. So 
they were late. And suddenly they began in Boston, in Oregon, Seattle. If you look at territorial foresight, 
it is intended to change the city where you are. It is designed to get new development. So I think yes, 
still we have some conservatives, as everywhere in America which are deterministic, but mostly people 
aligning with futurist community are changing that determinism. I think determinism is decreasing.  
KT_ How about the methodology of futurists? 
FGB_ Oops. 
KT_ For example, I was reading through one of the early Delphi studies conducted in 1963. BdJ 
was a part of that, and I can see a strong sense of determinism in those projections and fascinations of 
when things will happen. At the same time, I also see disclaimers, not necessarily specifically in that 
document or that project but especially in the criticisms of the futures studies movement that surrounds 
the futures studies movement later in the 70s against the quantification of values, this mathematization. 
Also this idea that technology will go in the same, or a certain direction. But instead more of a humbling 
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of different futures, and a moving away from this weight given to the methodology used, or math used. 
Would you agree with that? 
FGB_ Yes, clear.  
KT_ And would you agree that this happened in the 1970s? 
FGB_ After that. I would say that until the mid 1990s methodology was the main emphasis of 
futures studies. Much probably the fall of the wall was the reason why methodology was less important 
suddenly. Because futurists understood, or became aware, that even with all their methodologies, they 
have not been able to anticipate, to predict evolutions such as the Fall. Which means that if you can’t 
predict it, first determinism is not so strong obviously, two, your methodologies are not good enough to 
detect it, to sense it. I think it was really the point. Also because, at the same time as the Fall – I think 
the fall is the peak of the iceberg, the thing you can see – but under it, there was the silent revolution of 
the governance . If you remember the word of “governance,” “corporate governance” was used for the 
first time by the Stock Exchange Institution in ’88. Governance applied to territories was applied f or the 
first time in ’92. The word of territory itself appeared for the first time in France to define collective 
place in 1991. We made a major exercise in territorial foresight in ’87 producing 700 pages, in none of 
them the word “territory” is used as a concept. I remember, in 2002, I used the word territorial in 
Ireland, in Dublin, and they did not know what it meant. Now, territorial foresight  is well known,  even 
as a field.  I remember that in 2001, I made a communication in Brasov about territorial  foresight, and all 
the Americans who were there, even  British like Richard Slaughter, had very little interest in territorial 
foresight. Only one Australian futurist, Mary Finley, said territorial foresight is the future of futures 
studies, she was the only one. What I am saying is that at that very moment of the 90s, many things 
changed. I used to say to my students that the twenty first century began in ’89, and I believe it. After 
that, the notion of territory, together with participation, participatory process but also ’concertation’, a 
word that has still no translation in English, became really important. Simultaneously, the notion of 
insight –that was tacitly prohibited from the French futures studies because it was not ‘serious” enough- 
to become more acceptable. Nowadays you cannot read a paper in futures studies without insight. If 
you accept insights, you accept that methodology is not the aim. Because insight is not a methodology 
and you cannot get it from methodology. I think that all this moment of history brought out new ideas, 
new ways of thinking the world. Not only the world as a geopolitical system, but as a new paradigm.  
FGB_ The first time I began to create a new methodology for my own purpose was in 94. And it 
was really not because I wanted to do so, but just because I had the deep feeling that the toolbox 
existing then, among which the Delphi method, would not help me to do my job. Just coming back to 
Delphi, because it is interesting, not being pro or con, but just saying why Delphi became so inefficient. 
It is directly linked to the fact that, still in the same period, perhaps you remember the mad cow disease 
(Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease) that swept across Europe. It created a real  shock in the public opinion who 
suddenly thought that  experts were unable either to know the reality or to say the truth. Because we 
had so many experts saying opposite things, about what this illness was, how it could be or not 
transmitted to people, etc. It lasted several years, experts saying the opposite of each other, just after 
that. In Germany you were not concerned, I think only in France and maybe in UK, that contamination 
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was possible. So we had several movements or events at that time discrediting a lot the experts. And it 
was very obvious in France, I don’t know about the other countries, but the feeling I got at least from 
Italy, where I was working at the time was exactly the same. People saying “you experts, you don’t know 
anything about the world.” I think we make experts sacred persons during the 50s and 60s because so 
many people were not educated and others so highly educated. Today, if you look at the developing 
countries you can observe the same thing, if you arrive as an expert, you are supposed to know 
everything while the other people are considered as ignorant. But now, as people are educated 
everywhere, or think they are, the value of the expert is really decreasing. One of the reasons, maybe 
the main one, is that experts have not been able during the 1990s to make their own knowledge 
progress at the same pace that the society was progressing. And so their knowledge was continuously  
KT_ lagging 
FGB_ Yes. Behind the revolutions. The reason why I told you that, is just to explain that, 
according to me, the Delphi method was a really good method in the 50s and 60s, when it was possible 
to believe in the knowledge of experts. Today, first you have so many people introducing themselves as 
experts, so many ‘friends’ chosen as experts only to advocate something, that it means nothing to be an  
expert.  Moreover you have so much information and disinformation and misinformation available on 
internet, that at the end you are not able to say anymore who says the truth or where it is. I am aware 
that the culture of determinism gives full support to Delphi. But if I think that this method is obsolete, 
this is not because French culture is far less deterministic, but because the credibility of expertise has 
radically changed since the 60s.  
KT_ You started to talk about methodologies you developed in 1994. Can you tell me a little 
more about that? 
FGB_ Well in 94 I left Futuribles (a French futures-oriented organization) where I worked to start 
my own business as proGective, my consulting firm. At that time my toolbox was only the toolbox I 
learnt from Michel Godet (CNAM) such as the scenario-building, etc. When I went into the field, to meet 
the needs of my clients, it has proven inadequate. It was too heavy, demanding too much time, 
therefore money. Local authorities did not have as much money to spend for a foresight as firms. And 
even less time to wait for the results, due to the political agenda. It was also very complicated to bring 
together one hundred people to fill collectively a structural matrix for example; you had to break it in 
several micro-matrix, thus losing something in the process. So I had to think of other ways to take into 
account the opinion of the stakeholders. My futuring work combines both sociology and political 
sciences as well. In territorial foresight you have to take into account what people think, from the 
inhabitants to the elected officials. Of course you cannot take all the inhabitants of a city to talk to them, 
so you have to find another way. My first methodology, called Audit of Concerned Local Players/ 
stakeholders (ALC), was about that: 1) finding a recurrent way to identify the stakeholders that must be 
invited to participate to a territorial foresight process in order to obtain the maximum of influence and 
action and decision-making at the end of the process;  and 2) find a method to collect their opinion 
about the future of the territory in a way adapted to their own constraints (in terms in workload, 
available time, etc.). Thus, the first step was  to create categories such as people who have an influence 
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by authority because they a job giving them authority (Prefect, president of a local authority, as a 
governor, etc.). People having influence because they speak to public opinion like journalists, media, 
communication people and so on. People who have influence because they employ a lot of people or 
invest a lot in the territory. And so on. So I created categories that I then aggregate in larger groups. We 
call these ‘sectors’ – people from different sectors - … 
KT_ geographic? 
FGB_ No, no. Sectors in which the activity is based on business where you sell and buy goods. 
Sectors in which you have no such merchandization (non-profit):  schools, churches, associations, sports, 
culture, these kind of. The idea was to cover all the important parts of the population.  
FGB_ The second step was to create a pyramid representing the  kind of interaction we would 
have with these people. The top of the pyramid is formed by thirty actors playing specific roles on this 
territory. With these actors you must have a direct interaction. So I embedded in this method a way to 
process this interaction. We called these 30 the main local actors/stakeholders.  the second layer of the 
pyramid is formed by 300 important actors, and the third by the population. With the population we use 
polls system. With the three hundred actors we built kind of questionnaire related to strengths and 
weaknesses and future-related questions. Then you sent them these questions, and they have to answer 
them. Usually such a questionnaire can be filled in  one hour. The first 100 stakeholders are your real 
target:  if they do not respond immediately, you will call them back to push them to answer. The other 
200 will not be called back, you consider that if they don’t answer they are not fulfilling their role, so you  
count them as ‘not answered.’ And finally the top thirty most influential. You send them the 
questionnaire too. If they do not have time to fill it, you call them to fill it together either by phone or in 
their office. In any way you have to get the 30’s answer.  Then we analyze the results with SPSS 
(statistical software). We draw assumptions from the results;  not unlike the Delphi as assumptions. 
Then we form 3 workshops of ten of them. And we use an Abaque de Régnier to make them vote.  
[Fabienne gets up to get a board, like a small magnetic white board with columns] 
FGB_ Okay, this is an abaque. You use two abaques. So okay, you are person A, the second is B, 
and so on. You give to each of them colors. So let’s say one of the assumptions is “an increasi ng number 
of shops are closing down in this street.” The question to the participants is : do you agree  or not? You 
pick up a different color according to your position from I strongly disagree to I strongly agree.  
KT_ Okay so you have five colors with white being neutral. 
FGB_ Yes. The point is that you should not speak. To take care of what we call “leadership bias.” 
So I give you this, when everyone answers, and I take these… In the end I will place them in order to 
show what is the main color. When one or two disagree, then you ask them why – you are not looking 
for the consensus, you are looking for dissensus. That’s the part of the abaque.  
KT_ What does Régnier translate to? 
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FGB_ This is a name of a guy who invented it, his name is Régnier. And an abaque is an abacus, 
the Greek matrix. It is difficult to explain if you don’t show it.  
KT_ I’m glad I saw this. There are a lot of the same key tenets with something like the Delphi 
method. For example questioning the dissenter, or trying to eliminate the emphasis of a more vocal 
leader.  
FGB_ If they exist *in Delphi+ I did not know them. That’s why I needed to create my 
methodology. During two or three years I experimented the usual  futures methods provided in France. 
And I noted everything that did not work with what I was doing. Then I created various methods to fill 
the gap, such as one which is used widely in France: informational … 
[trying to translate a French term socle] Let’s imagine you are Roman, and you’re use something 
like this in your house, what is the name of this block… 
FGB_ So, informational pedestal (base) means this is the building block for information process, 
because when you lead a group, the first thing you can see is that some people know things that others 
have never heard of. So you can’t begin a dialog about it. So my first thing was to create what we need 
to know when we discuss about the future of a territory. We need to know about the demographics, we 
need to know about the main tendencies in economics, politics, science and technology. But also, the 
kind of people involved, so I introduced a sociological approach. For example in France it was often 
taboo to talk about immigrants, just to say ‘look you think you have so many immigrants in your town, 
but no in fact you are far low under the average’. For example, in one of the city I was working on, 
people said they knew the reason why the town was decreasing. I say ‘Okay if you know the reason why 
are you asking me?’. ‘We want to tell you and you can see if we are right or not’ . Okay, so what is the 
reason? It is because there are too many aging people in our town. We’re one of the oldest cities in 
France’.  So I did go to interview people and bring out their perceptions like “we have the oldest people 
in France.” Then I listed these perceptions, checked with the statistics, brought these people together 
and asked if they agreed on my list.  They confirmed it. Then I said ‘you say this city has the highest part 
of the aging population in France. The statistics say that, indeed, you have the lowest part of person 
over sixty in all the France. You say the city has no young? Look, this is the number of your young. And 
look at the town just nearby, where this is worse. So my point here is to explain that most problems in 
France don’t come from the territory itself, they come from the way we’re thinking the territory. Most 
of the wrong decisions are made because they are based  on our perceptions, and not on facts. This is 
the main  direction in which I worked during the 90s. 
KT_ And, the information pedestal was a way of bringing everything out into the open? 
FGB_ Yes. Nowadays,   if you would interview other colleagues, they would confirm that all of 
them are doing the same way. The basic elements of demography, economics, etc. help to  provide 
participants to a future workshop  with the same level of knowledge.  
KT_ Are there any articles published about these methods? 
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FGB_ In French yes.  
KT_ We’re resuming the interview. I sort of interrupted you because of this technical thing. If 
there is a thought you would like to finish, I’ll let you finish that train of thought.  
FGB_ No thanks. 
KT_ Otherwise, I would like to shift the conversation specifically to the World Futures Studies 
Federation (WFSF). I have a sense of the motivations that inspired it from the articles in Futures, the 
ones we talked about earlier. But if you placed the federation among other societies, or national 
institutions, organizations, how would you describe the motivations that started it.  
FGB_ It depends on whether you’d like me to tell the truth, or just make up a beautiful image.  
KT_ The truth for sure.  
FGB_ At the very beginning, the first one to be created was the World Futures Society (WFS) in 
68. 
KT_ ’66. It’s your job, but it’s sort of my job too. They started publishing the Futurist before, and 
were established in ’66. *back and forth on when…+ 
FGB_ The first time you would’ve heard of the federation was in ’68 in a conference in Oslo 
where there were mainly European futurists, such  Johann Galtung, Bertrand de Jouvenel (Gaston 
Berger died in ’60), Eleonora Barbieri Masini,  Aurelio Peccei (Club de Rome) and several others. In this 
conference they stated that the WFS was too American and too forecasting-oriented. So they wanted a 
society that would be able to express and have a vision for the future.  Where there would be no 
colonization of the future. They thought WFS was the expression of the colonization of the future. They 
also wanted philosophical debates, reflecting thus the European intellectual tradition, different from the 
US one, more oriented toward pragmatism.   Also you have to keep in mind that it was ’68 in Oslo, 
Norway near Russia: a period of Cold War. So they wanted a place of neutral dialog between Eastern 
and Western scholars to promote peace. I am particularly sensitive to this question that Eleonora Masini 
made me understand when I was her student., The European Union was built first for making peace, the 
economic development was only an output of this goal to  restoring peace in Europe.  The Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute in Sweden was established in this period (’66).So you had at that 
time several currents promoting peace. And it was in 1968, you know the world situation then.  
FGB_ So, these futurists decided to create the WFSF as a place to welcome all the futurists from 
all the countries seeking peace. I wouldn’t say  it was a Christian coloration, but at least it was very 
humanistic. And I don’t think neither that it was very socialist, to put it that way. Rather a ki nd of mid 
centrism at that time. Welcoming people from the left and the right, but not the extremes like anti -
Nazist or anti-communist. But this has never been said or written, just extrapolation of what I suspect. 
So it was a place to think seriously about the future, refusing to colonize it. The federation registered in 
‘74 in Paris as an international association.  
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[ran out of storage space, had to delete a couple of old files] 
KT_ I’d like to talk about a few other organizations and publications to get  a more general sense 
of a movement, how global it was. Because globalization was definitely a theme within the federation, 
but also the field itself. Earlier you talked about Futures, the journal. Where would you place it in this 
history. As a publication that started in ’68. 
FGB_ The Futurist of the WFS? 
KT_ No, Futures, from the Institute of the Future. Where the articles about the history of the 
federation appeared.  
FGB_ I thought it was an Elsevier publication.  
KT_ Yes, it is an Elsevier publication, but the origin was, if you look at the first editorial board, 
the co-founder of IFTF Olaf Helmer was one of those, Herman Kahn was one of them.  
FGB_ Futures was that old? 
KT_ Sure ’68 ’69 was the first volume. 
FGB_ But in England? 
KT_ Yes it was published in England, but IFTF 
FGB_ was American. 
KT_ Yes, I am not done with my research on IFTF. But as far as the publication goes, they had 5 
editors who were U.S., many of whom were born internationally who then moved to the U.S., and 
maybe up to 9 from non-U.S. countries, U.K., Germany, Switzerland. Well there was sort of one, well, I 
don’t want to give you too much of my perception of it, because I want to have another opinion to 
supplement or correct if that makes any sense. 
FGB_ Futures is the only refereed journal. It is a big success, but at the same time it is part of the 
failure, because we have only one refereed journal. Then you have, according to me the most 
interesting after Futures; is the Journal of Futures Studies (JFS) in Tamkang (Taiwan). And most of my 
students when they want to publish I send them first to JFS. And if they’re good in JFS then to Futures. 
Then you have Social Change and Technological Forecasting, to be frank I’ve always considered it to be 
on the fringe of futures studies, as they are more oriented technology forecasting than foresight. 
KT_ That’s not refereed either? 
FGB_ No, I don’t think so, they have a committee but I am not sure that the review is listed on 
the official academic list of the peer-reviewed journals. Perhaps I am wrong, you have to check it. Then 
you have Future Research Quarterly, from the WFS, a kind of academic publication, whose title now is 
the World Future Review. 
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KT_ I don’t concern myself with the recent years as you can imagine.  
FGB_ So [Futures] is the only one counting in the field. 
KT_ Okay, the way I saw it as well, was that they were the flagship publication in the late ‘60s 
and early ‘70s during the futures studies movement as some people called it in the U.S. … News to you?  
FGB_ futures studies movement? 
KT_ These are not my words. I’m just using 
FGB_ Who for example? 
KT_ People who published in Futures, or other publications, when they were discussing what 
this was, I mean what the field of futures studies was, they referred to it as the futures studies 
movement. It is debatable if it was or not, and that’s not my point. But my point is the emergence of the 
field, or the question I was trying to get at was, “how influential was a journal like this with the 
emergence of the field?” 
FGB_ I have no idea. I mean about the beginnings. JFS is late, beginning of 2000 or so. 
KT_ FRQ is late 1980s I think. The Futurist was ‘67, 
FGB_ The Futurist was not a journal, I mean it’s a magazine. 
KT_ Right, you’re absolutely right. And the Bulletin [WFSF] 
FGB_ The same thing, it’s not a journal. That’s why I do not put them here. The difference must 
be made between a peer-reviewed journal – and I think  Futures is the only one properly refereed as a 
scientific review- and an academic/scholar journal, such as JFS -when you send your paper to JFS, it 
needs to have a scientific quality and meet the academic criteria- and magazines, newsletters, bulletins, 
such as The Futurist or the Futures Bulletin of the federation, that do not intend to meet any scientific 
requirements. 
KT_ That gives you a sense of the society from a historical perspective, but as far as scholarly 
journals go it is a different matter. 
FGB_ What do you want to know about it. 
KT_  No, I think I’ve 
FGB_ I think the audience is absolutely poor, to say to have no other words for that. 
KT_ To have no other words for what? 
FGB_ To say worse than poor. They’re just circulating within the community itself. It’s self-
promotion. It’s not enlarging the audience of futures studies. 
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KT_ Okay. You sound like that is not a good thing. From my perspective, that is not a good or 
bad thing. Because there is an audience. 
FGB_ No, I was just answering your question about what was their influence. I was saying if they 
had an influence, it would’ve been within the community. But it did not have an influence to giving roots 
to the field to emerge. I think it is an aftershock. 
KT_ Yeah, that makes perfect sense. 
KT_ Let me return to one major question that I am dealing with. I fully understand what you’re 
talking about here, as far as what futurists in these years wanted futures studies to be versus what it 
became. But I am also trying to understand what it became. Okay, I know that sounded a little 
confusing, so let me rephrase or get to the point. So, instead of starting a fie ld of futures studies in 
academia, or making it as popular or enlarging the audience, as desired, a lot of their influence was 
underground in governments or in companies, their methodologies, their motivations, philosophies had 
impacts in that way. That’s what I’m trying to measure.  
FGB_ ‘Grey influence’ we call it.  
KT_ So how would you describe the grey influence of 
FGB_ Have you read Machiavelli?  
KT_ Yes. 
FGB_ That’s it. It’s the exact same rules. The prince is the prince, and he’s the one making the 
decisions, but near him you have always advisers. It’s just speculation but, I think that if you’re someone 
clever, you can’t ignore the future. So if you do not call yourself a futurist but you’re clever, one day or 
another, you will advise someone making a decision and you will talk to this person about the future. 
That way, I mean the way we spread it as you said, has been amplified by people who are not futurists, 
like Peter Drucker. He was an amazing promoter of futures thinking.  
KT_ Machiavelli makes me think of earlier threads that lead up to the field. And as the main one 
you suggested the U.S. Army. 
FGB_ Still influencing until now. It is a continuous thread. 
KT_ If you look back to the early Cold War period and ask yourself, why the WFSF emerged in  
the late 60s, why did WFS emerge in the late 60s. Do you see other threads? 
[storage ended again…] 
FGB_ Do you know Robert Jungk? 
KT_ Sure, the Austrian? 
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FGB_ Yes, but he lived in Germany. He left a library, the Robert Jungk Library. It is his main gift. 
This library  
KT_ is located? 
FGB_ good question because it was about to be sold. I think it has been bought by, I don’t know, 
but I think they kept some, and sold the other. I don’t know where it is located now, probably Germany, 
not Austria, because he never lived in Austria, was just born there, as far as I know but you can easily 
find it on google. He wrote a lot about the origin of futures studies in Eastern European countries. I think 
it would be really interesting in your study to understand how prognosis, and… 
KT_ Zukunftvorschung? 
FGB_ No, he didn’t really talk about zukunftvorschung. The one by Ossip Flechtheim, he was also 
German: futurology. And he wrote books. As well as Jungk I guess. So in their documents you could find 
reference to the origin of prognosis. I remember that Masini quoted books in German about the way 
futures studies survived during the Soviet period. It would be interesting to read them. From what I 
know, in Moscow, they kept prognosis within the Academy of Science, for planning In the prospects of 
war.  
KT_ I know they had a thriving futures field of their own during similar times, especially to 
support their five year plans, for their economic plans. When you say plan for war, what do you mean?  
FGB_ The reason why the Russian government decided to plan was mainly because they wanted 
in case of war to be ready, and never again be caught in the same situation than during the Second 
World War, such as their lack of oil or the supply of material resources during a very tough winter.  So as 
far as I know, one of their reasons for planning was reconstruction, like in France, but another was to be 
ready in case of attack to react and be successful. So, war was not away from their reasons for planning. 
Also at that time, they had to plan against internal rebellions like in Prague, Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and so on. So, call it civil war if you want, but there was something about that. And I recall, but I may be 
wrong, that in Poland prognosis was forbidden, specifically forbidden.  
KT_ I am interested in shades of leniency. It wasn’t the same across all the Soviet satellites. 
FGB_ Clear. I’m speaking mainly of Moscow. 
KT_ One large question is, can you identify similarities, throughout Soviet satellites, even 
Moscow, and other efforts at defining this emerging field of futurism? 
FGB_ I really don’t know how to connect the main approach of the 70s in futures studies, which 
was the famous global models, with the situation of the Cold War. Was Jay Forrester also paid by the 
DOD? At that time IIASA was created in Austria. Was this connected with the Cold War? The Bariloche 
model was clearly intended to support a model of economic development; it was about the non -
alignment process. Latin America wanted to count in the non-alignment world. For IIASA and Forester, I 
don’t know if there is a relation with the Cold War or not.  
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KT_ One answer that I’ve formulated in my work-in-progress dissertation is there is the rhetoric 
from the top down: Soviet thinkers write “futures studies of the west is not scientific, because it’s not 
communistic,” And as much as that is an oversimplification from the outside looking into the Soviet 
Union, there is also oversimplifications. And when I look at some of the projects that futurists worked 
on, I find some similarities. Perhaps not so much in the motivations for the end result, but in what they 
work on, their methodologies that they use etc. but also that they are looking at the future at about the 
same time. That’s one thing that I think breaks that East/West Cold  War division. 
FGB_ Yes, yes, I totally agree. In my view I was not speaking here of the futurists themselves, but 
I was talking about the funding. Even if the futurists themselves were oriented toward peace, they were 
paid by funds coming from army or military industrial complex. Did you contact Igor? 
KT_ Besthev Lada? I have not. I’ve seen some of his writing, very short snippets. 
FGB_ Because a direct link with him would be very useful. He should know a lot about this and 
he still lives in Moscow I think. 
KT_ While we’re on the topic. You’re the third person I’ve had an oral interview with about this. 
So, perhaps I could ask you who some of the significant persons in futures studies that are alive that 
would be willing and able to talk about this – the other two being Erzsébet Novaky, and Olaf Helmer. 
FGB_ Helmer, he is still alive? 
KT_ He is. He turned ninety nine last month. I met with him the day before his ninety-ninth 
birthday. 
FGB_ how is he? 
KT_ Well enough. He has a little bit of a hearing problem 
FGB_ And in mind? 
KT_ he is there, oh yeah. Enjoying retirement. 
FGB_ Igor, I think you have to send him an e-mail. Linda Groff might help you to contact him, 
she is still quite well connected to Russian futurists. 
KT_ Two other names that appear as obvious are Jim Dator and Eleonora Masini. 
FGB_ Sure, no way to escape them! 
KT_ I’m glad they also speak good English. I hope that’s the case with Igor Besthev Lada as well.  
FGB_ Johann Galtung, definitely, because he was very involved in everything, peace studies and 
on the establishment of the Federation. If I were you, I would write what we call here a synopsis, saying 
here is the topic, and here is what exactly interests me. Because  such people are so full of memories 
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that you have to keep them focused and be very specific on what you’re looking for, and send it with 
your introduction.  
KT_ Good idea. So, Johan Galtung. 
FGB_ Just a quick e-mail to Linda Groff, at UCLA. She also used to travel a lot in Russia. She 
would be a good person to network. 
FGB_ Ted Gordon. Ted is in America so it would be easier. He was part of this period as well. He 
is the co-founder of the Millennium Project so, it would be an interesting point of view.  
KT_ How about on WFS? 
FGB_ Joe Coates. 
KT_ I e-mailed them to see if they have archives. Ed Cornish replied to say they don’t have 
organized archives, which is not too surprising. 
FGB_ There is also, Hazel Henderson. She is very famous, she is a long-standing member of WFS, 
and she was member of WFSF as well. She is also a member of the MP (Millennium Project). I think it’s a 
good mix to have men and women. They say different things. 
KT_ Definitely. If you think of another important personality you think of, we can communicate 
that later.  But this is a good list for me to look into, and maybe there are interviews conducted already 
for some of them, that might give me insights. Regardless since my focus is so specifically the history of 
futures studies, I’d like to ask if they can spare some time for me.  
FGB_ There are several persons their name will be given to you, and the reason why I don’t 
advise you to see them is not because they are not good, but they are young people. And when you are 
that young, you reconstruct by yourself the time you have not lived 
KT_ I see. Sure, of course.  
FGB_ I think you have to make a distinction with people that were witnessing this time. 
KT_ Sure, primary source, secondary source. Okay final question, before I ask my other final 
question. We’ve gone over a list of people, can you think of key case -studies, projects, methods that 
were started that influenced the field of futures studies. Not to answer it for you but, for example the 
“Limits to Growth” report of the Club of Rome, was very popular and influential. But were there other 
methods at any point in this chronology, or projects, models, 
FGB_ Jay Forrester and the world models. Delphi you mentioned. Have you heard of the graph 
theory? It was a method derived from operation research and used to sketch the way you allocate 
resources according to hypotheses of the future; it looks like the knowledge or skill trees. Then you 
follow it like a scenario, but you follow the logical path. Theory of graph was introduced in 1963 in our 
department of defense when it established a unit of futures studies.  
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FGB_ Then you have scenario-building. But I think it is late, well after that. Scenario-building 
emerged in France in the mid-80s. I don’t know in America. 
KT_ In the early Cold War period.  
FGB_ With real methodology? 
KT_ Yeah, that’s one of the early RAND efforts. And Herman Kahn championed that with the 
Hudson Institute. I am not sure exactly when scenario-building 
FGB_ Ted Gordon will answer you. I am sure he knows about that. He is Mr. Methodology.  
KT_ As far as more mathematical methodologies are concerned, statistical forecasting, moving 
averages and other things, did they have an influence on the field? 
FGB_ In France definitely. We had three generations of futurists in France, and Masini says it is 
the same in other parts of the world. The first generation was the thinkers of the future. People with 
huge humanistic goals. The second generation was methodologists thinking of the future in terms of 
mathematics, and probabilities. The third generation was sort of a comeback of the first generation with 
a strong emphasis on desired future, and normative approach, how to build the desired future. 
Pragmatic futurists.  
KT_ And you see the three generations as very distinct? 
FGB_ Oh yes, in France I can categorize that way every colleague. Give me a name and I  can tell 
you which generation it is. It is obvious. And most of my colleagues in the federation as well.  
KT_ That’s interesting, because when I think about it, methodologists may not have the same 
aspirations or motivation 
FGB_ Clear, sure. 
KT_ But it doesn’t necessarily mean placing methodology above what it should be.  
FGB_ It is not about placing methodology somewhere, it is about looking at the world. Looking 
at the future. I do not look at the future in the same way, when I look at it from a philosophical point of 
view which is rather systemic, and when I look at it in a, I’d say probabilistic way which is rather micro-
oriented. For example, if you think the future in terms of philosophy, you are rather oriented towards 
big picture and world view.  
KT_ Very good. On that note, that concludes my questions. But, lastly I’d like to offer a chance to 
share something or say anything else, if I didn’t ask you the question, or if you think there is something 
else. 
FGB_ And the counterpart, I hope you will send me your dissertation. 
KT_ It won’t be in the near future. Not this year.  
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*…off-topic talk about differences in PhDs, assistantships/funding between the U.S. and France]  
KT_ Thank you very much for your time and answering my questions.  
FGB_ You are very welcome. And if you need me to review it, well my spoken English is very bad, 
but my writing is better. 
KT_ Oh no, it is very good. I will transcribe this, and then I might contact you with follow up 
questions. Once again thank you very much. 
[End of Interview] 
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